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The Founding generation understood “executive power” to mean something both
simple and specific: the power to execute law. This authority was constitutionally
indispensable, but it extended only to the implementation of pre-existing legal norms
and directives that had been created pursuant to some prior exercise of legislative
authority. It wasn’t just that the use of executive power was subject to legislative
influence in a crude political sense; rather, the power was conceptually an empty
vessel until there were laws or instructions that needed executing.
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INTRODUCTION
Article II of the Constitution vests “the executive power” in a President
of the United States.1 The text of the provision is plain-spoken, even
underwhelming at first glance. And yet what it meant to the founders is “one
of the most important questions of any kind, on any subject, under the Federal
Constitution . . . .”2 This Article aims to resolve the historical debate. For the
founders, “the executive power” meant the power to execute the law. Nothing
more. And nothing less.
For the uninitiated, this conclusion may seem obvious on its face. And yet
the meaning of the Executive Power Clause is not just immensely important;
it is also “one of the most contested questions in constitutional law.”3 Broadly
speaking, there are three interpretations.4 First, the cross-reference thesis.
On this view, the clause has no standalone content; it simply refers to the
more specific powers listed later in Article II, from the power to appoint
officers to the power to receive ambassadors. Second, the law execution thesis.
On this view, the clause grants the power to execute the laws and is otherwise
an empty vessel until it has legislative instructions to carry out. Third, the
royal residuum thesis. This last view reads the Executive Power Clause as
granting all the powers typically possessed by an eighteenth-century
“executive”—with the British Crown as the presumptive referent—except as
specifically reallocated or prohibited elsewhere in the document.
U.S. CONST. art. II., § 1.
Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV.
375, 383 (2008).
3 Michael McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King 144 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
4 For a full description of these positions and their consequences, see infra Part I.
1
2
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It’s hard to overstate the consequences of this dispute. The least aggressive
version of the royal residuum reads the Executive Power Clause as a
defeasible power authorizing the president to take any action he deems
necessary in the realm of national security or foreign affairs, so long as neither
the Constitution nor any specific statute forbids it.5 The most aggressive
version reads it as indefeasible: that is to say, if it’s the sort of thing the
eighteenth-century British Crown could presumptively have done, then
nothing short of the Constitution itself can stop our American President from
it too.6 This has consequences of the highest order for real-world disputes
ranging from the seizure of steel mills7 to the torture of suspected terrorists.8
On the defeasible version, the President might be able to engage in dragnet
surveillance to gather intelligence on organizations associated with al-Qaeda,
so long as statutes that authorize wiretapping only in more limited forms
don’t expressly prohibit its use in war.9 On the indefeasible version, the
President might be able to bomb Syria for gassing its own civilians so long as
he doesn’t purport to formally declare “war.”10
You don’t have to be an originalist on questions like these to understand
that it’s immensely important to get the historical meaning right. For one thing,
even those who think constitutional meaning evolves—clap your hands if you
believe in precedent!—understand that original meaning is often one of the
things worth having in view. For another, a great many constitutional

5 See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1172-73 & n.10, 1184-85 (2019).
6 Id.
7 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“The Solicitor General seeks the power of seizure in [the Article II Executive Power Clause].
Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I quote the interpretation which his brief puts upon it: ‘In our view, this
clause constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable.’”).
8 Cf. Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum to William J. Haynes II, Department of Defense
General Counsel, Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United
States 18-195 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Torture Memorandum] (“[A]ny power traditionally
understood as pertaining to the executive—which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense
of the nation—unless expressly assigned to Congress, is vested in the President. Article II, Section
1 makes this clear by stating that the ‘executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.’”).
9 Cf. JOINT INSPECTORS GEN., Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program 11 (July
10, 2009) (quoting an unreleased Office of Legal Counsel memo’s assertion that the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act “cannot restrict the President’s ability to engage in warrantless searches
that protect the national security”).
10 Cf. April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities 42 Op. O.L.C. ___, at
*3-4 (May 31, 2018) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]he President, as Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive, has the constitutional authority to deploy the military to protect American persons
and interests without seeking prior authorization from Congress. . . . [This authority] arises from
Article II of the Constitution, which makes the President the ‘Commander in Chief . . . ,’ and vests
in him the Executive Power.”).
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interpreters are indeed committed originalists,11 ready to give sufficiently wellestablished original meaning not just significant but conclusive interpretive
weight. And so what follows is valuable not only as history but as a source of
guidance for some of the most important questions in a modern democracy.
This Article shows that the founders understood the opening sentence of
Article II to vest exactly what it said: the power to execute the law. This
essential element of governance comprised two core components: the
authority to enforce private compliance with the law’s negative prohibitions,
and the authority to carry out projects assigned by law’s affirmative
authorizations.12 Many founders thought the executive power also either
functionally implied or logically entailed the authority to appoint
“assistances” for its implementation.13 The Executive Power Clause thus
represented an incredibly potent delegation to an incredibly important
official. Indeed, the power it vested may have been the Constitution’s single
most controversial innovation—and not for lack of competition.14
The signal characteristic of executive power, however, was that it was
substantively an empty vessel. The only thing the clause authorized the
President to do was to carry out legal instructions created pursuant to some
other authority. This fundamentally derivative characteristic meant that
executive power was incapable of serving as even a defeasible source of
independent substantive authority, let alone one that would be immune to
legislative revision.15 While the founders disagreed vehemently about a great
many questions relating to the separation of powers generally and the
President specifically, this issue prompted no debate at all. The executive
power meant the power to execute. Period.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the current state of
the scholarship. Part II explores the founders’ competing visions of the
11 This includes at least four and probably five current Supreme Court Justices. For the Supreme
Court Justices, see Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 242, 262 (2017)
(statement of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 465 (2006) (Statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito); Confirmation Hearing on Nomination of John G.
Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
182 (2005) (Statement of Judge John G. Roberts); Cass R. Sunstein & Eric A. Posner, Institutional FlipFlops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 502 (2016) (describing Justice Clarence Thomas as a self-proclaimed
originalist); see also Alex Swoyer, Brett Kavanaugh best described as ‘originalist,’ say legal scholars, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018) https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/sep/3/brettkavanaugh-best-described-as-originalist-say-/ [https://perma.cc/UA9N-STLE] (noting disagreement
about how best to read Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence).
12 See infra Sections III.A and III.B.
13 See infra Section III.C.
14 See infra at 38-41.
15 See infra Section III.D.
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presidency and the gradual emergence of a negotiated compromise between
the imperatives of vigor and safety. Part III focuses on the Executive Power
Clause as the central piece of that compromise, and shows that it vested the
empty-vessel power to execute law. Part IV shows that the founders
repeatedly rejected the concept of a royal residuum. The Conclusion sketches
some implications of this research.
I. THREE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER CLAUSE
There are at least three ways to understand Article II’s reference to the
executive power.16 The first is what I will call the “Cross-Reference” theory,
which understands “the executive power” as a content-free referent to the rest
of Article II. This thin reading of the Executive Power Clause has been
embraced by Supreme Court justices,17 national legislators,18 and a number of
academics.19 On this view, the term is a convenient lexical handle for a grab
bag of powers. The full contents are set out in the remainder of Article II.
And nothing else goes in the bag. While this approach reads the Executive
Power Clause as substantively prefatory, it does leave the clause with one
significant job: clarifying that the listed powers belong to the President and
no one else.
The second understanding, which I will call the “Law Execution” theory,
gives the opening clause its own independent substantive content. On this

16 This Part’s summary of scholarly positions both condenses and extends material from
Mortenson, supra note 5.).
17 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I cannot accept the view that this
clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the
presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated.”); id. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(noting a similar view as Justice Jackson). Justice Burger’s majority opinion in INS v. Chadha
gestures at this view as well. 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“When the Executive acts, he presumptively
acts in an executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II.”).
18 See, e.g., DANIEL WEBSTER, Speech on the Appointing and Removing Power (Feb. 16, 1835), in
4 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 179, 187 (18th ed. 1881) (“By the executive power conferred
on the President, the Constitution means no more than that portion which it itself creates, and
which it qualifies, limits, and circumscribes.”).
19 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting
Clause”: Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 35 (2009)
(“[T]he the first sentence [of Article II] was merely a designation clause rather than a conferral of
power.”); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 309 (2009)
(“[T]he Vesting Clause is not a residual source of plenary powers in the presidency.”); see also
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, 177 (5th rev. ed. 1984)
(denying that Article II’s grant of executive power is a viable source of unenumerated foreign affairs
power); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42-44
(1990) (same); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994) (“[T]he framers intended the Vesting Clause to vest constitutionally
little more than the enumerated executive powers.”).
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view—which has found support among Presidents,20 Supreme Court
justices,21 and scholars22—”the executive power” is exactly what it sounds like:
the power to execute the law. The executive power, thus, authorizes the
President to bring that law—which before execution exists only on paper—
into effect in the real world. Sometimes this might mean coercing obedience
from private parties, like ticketing jaywalkers. Other times it might mean
implementing an affirmative project of the legislature, like picking up the
garbage. Either way, the executive power authorizes the President to connect
legal imperative to physical reality: “Interpreting a law enacted by Congress
to implement the legislative mandate,” the Supreme Court tells us, “is the
very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”23 And no other provision of the
Constitution gives it to the President as an affirmative enforcement authority
rather than as the compliance obligation imposed by the Take Care clause.24
The third understanding is what I will call the “Royal Residuum” theory.
Advocates of this theory claim that “[b]ecause supreme executives in [many]
countries had a similar basket of powers, it became common to speak of an

20 Cf. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 140 (1916)
(denying that there is an “undefined residuum” of executive power and arguing that a President can
only act “within the field of action plainly marked for him”).
21 E.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The
Founders . . . . sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws
by placing in the [President] . . . the ultimate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the
Constitution divides among many.”).
22 See, e.g., Matthew Steilen, How to Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study of Early
American Usage, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 557, 618-20 (2018) (arguing that the Constitution’s drafters
considered, but ultimately rejected, vesting the executive with the prerogatives of the British
monarch); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 309, 344 (2006) (“Whatever the proper scope of the president’s implied Article II authority,
it remains in its essence a power to execute, not create, the law.”); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The
President and the Law 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 334 (1952) (“[The Founding Fathers] had very precise,
eighteenth-century notions about the definition of executive power: it was a power to carry into
execution the national laws—that and nothing more.”). For some legal historians who appear
possibly to embrace this view, see, for example, WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 5 (1965) M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 32 (1998) (describing the seventeenth century view of “executive power” as “the machinery
by which the law was put into effect”); FRANCIS WORMUTH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 61 (1949) (describing the notion that the executive merely enforces law). Cf.
Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 545, 551-52 (2004) (arguing that the historical sources “most relevant to the Founding” contain
little support for claims of unenumerated executive power).
23 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
24 For a terrific account of the historical meaning of the Take Care Clause, which imposed a
compliance obligation that was distinct from the authorization conveyed by the Executive Power
Clause, see Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2019) (“The history we present . . . supports readings of
Article II that tend to subordinate presidential power to congressional direction.”).
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‘executive power’ that encompassed an array of powers commonly wielded by
monarchs.”25 Here’s a typical modern description of what went in the basket:
Traditionally, the “executive power” was understood at the time of the
framing as including the power of war and peace, and all external relations of
the nation . . . . [T]he President was left with whatever remained of the
traditional “executive power” in matters of war, peace, and foreign affairs,
diminished to a significant extent, but not completely, by the re-allocation of
some very important, traditionally executive, powers to Congress.26

For judges who subscribe to these claims, the doctrinal implications are
straightforward: “the ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by Article II
includes the residual foreign affairs powers of the Federal Government not
otherwise allocated by the Constitution.”27
The Royal Residuum thesis has been remarkably successful. Besides
express support from Supreme Court justices,28 national legislators,29 leading
executive branch officials,30 and at least one president,31 it is easily the
dominant historical account among modern commentators.32 The
25 SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 31 (2015).
26 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 237-38 (2002);
see also JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 19 (2005) (citing “political theory” and “AngloAmerican constitutional history” to assert that “the executive power was understood at the time of the
Constitution’s framing to include the war, treaty, and other general foreign affairs powers”).
27 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2099 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
28 See id.; Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 708 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the
proposition that “[t]he broad executive power granted by Article II . . . cannot . . . be invoked to
avert disaster”).
29 E.g., 148 CONG. REC. S2640 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[T]he
President’s powers include inherent executive authorities that are unenumerated in the
Constitution. Thus, any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature—
particularly in foreign affairs—should be resolved in favor of the executive branch.”).
30 E.g., Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 73 (2007) (statement of Bradford Berenson, former Assoc. Counsel to the
President) (“The Vesting Clause provides the President a vast reserve of implied authority to do
whatever may be necessary in executing the laws and governing the nation.”).
31 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 389 (1913) (“My belief was that it was not
only [the President’s] right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.”).
32 The canonical modern summation is Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 253-54 (2001). For other typical examples, see,
for example, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW 21 (2002) (“Unless the Vesting Clause is meaningless it incorporates the
unallocated parts of Royal Prerogative.”); ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 55 (1991) (describing
foreign affairs authorities vested elsewhere in the Constitution as “exceptions to the large grant of
executive power to the president”); Charles J. Cooper, What the Constitution Means by Executive
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consequences of that success are stark, at least for originalists willing to stick
with the full logical consequences. If the Executive Power Clause really is a
royal residuum, then the President is endowed with those aspects of kingly
authority that have not been reallocated to other actors. The Executive Power
Clause was front and center, for example, in the now-retracted memo advising
President George W. Bush’s Defense Department that it could torture
suspected terrorists without legal consequences for committing war crimes.33
So too with the Office of Legal Counsel’s later advice that, because of the
president’s “‘unique responsibility,’ as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive, for ‘foreign and military affairs,’ as well as national security,”
President Barack Obama had constitutional authority to initiate the use of
force against Libya without congressional approval.34 And Justice Thomas
argued that the Executive Power Clause, standing alone, justified presidential
defiance of a statute that required the U.S. to issue a passport listing “Israel”
as the place of birth for a young boy born in Jerusalem.35
Particularly among constitutional originalists, the residuum thesis is
dominant. At most, criticism of the historical claim waves a caution flag of
uncertainty, contingency, and historical contestation. As Aziz Huq’s generally
sympathetic account explains, even the strongest critics of the royal residuum
“decline to draw a strong conclusion from the Constitution’s text,
preratification practice, or Founding-era interpretative conventions about the
precise contours of each branch’s authority.”36 It is here that this Article picks
up the challenge.
Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 177 (1988) (“[T]he founding generation understood executive
power as conferring a broad authority that extended beyond the mere execution of the laws.”); Gary
Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Michael D.
Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 141
(2006) (stating that the Vesting Clause “grants, in eighteenth-century terms, the power to execute
the law plus foreign affairs powers”); Eugene Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Monarch?, 83 AM.
J. INT’L L. 740, 742 (1989) (“No one has ever improved on Hamilton’s definition of executive power.
All governmental power that is neither legislative nor judicial, he said, is executive.”); John C. Yoo,
Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2002) (“Article
II’s Vesting Clause establishes a rule of construction that any unenumerated executive power, such
as that over treaty interpretation, must be given to the President.”); McConnell, supra note 3, at 198
(“[T]he executive power comprises all unassigned national power that is neither legislative nor
judicial in nature. In effect, this encompasses the “strict” executive power plus the prerogatives
powers as truncated by the constitutional text.”) .
33 See Torture Memorandum, supra note 8, at 18-19.
34 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6 (2011).
35 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2101 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
36 Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1530-31 (2018)
(reviewing JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017)). For examples of such basically equivocal historical criticism of
residuum theory, see, e.g., Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 22, at 552 (noting that the residuum theory
“fails to take account of complexity within eighteenth-century political theory, the experience of
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What follows will not only refute the residuum thesis as a claim about
original understanding, but also offer an affirmative replacement theory that
is both historically and theoretically coherent. In earlier work, I laid the
intellectual foundation for this claim by showing that the Law Execution
understanding of “executive power” pervaded the eighteenth century
bookshelf. The earlier article showed that, for late-eighteenth-century
English speakers, “the ‘executive power’ was nothing more than ‘a power of
putting [the] laws in execution.’”37 That conclusion, however, only teed up
the real question. The most important task still remains: to show that this
dictionary definition was in fact reflected in both the drafting and ratification
of the Constitution itself.
It is therefore the project of this Article to show that the ordinary Law
Execution understanding of executive power pervaded the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution itself. The sources relied on are varied, but at
bottom the claim is grounded on an exhaustive review of every instance of the
word root “exec-” in three major collections spanning millions of words: the 29volume Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution,38 the 34volume Journals of the Continental Congress,39 and the 26-volume Letters of

state constitutionalism before 1787, and the Founders’ self-conscious rejection of the British model
of government”); Reinstein, supra note 19, at 309 (“The powers delegated to the President in Article
II do not suggest a residue of unspecified powers that can be characterized as ‘executive’ in nature.”).
For some typical responses from residuum advocates, see, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 32, at
42 (“At the risk of engaging a 144-page discussion in a few sentences: it does not suffice to say, as
Professors Bradley and Flaherty convincingly say, that ‘executive Power’ was a messy, contested
concept in the late eighteenth century.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs
and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1661 (2005) (“[W]hile Bradley and
Flaherty devote much energy to the Constitution’s creation . . . . [o]n the most important points
they either concede our view, make only conclusory statements, or say nothing.”).
37 Mortenson, supra note 5 at 1169, 1173 (reporting on a review of more than a thousand works
of political, theological, and legal theory, as well as some forty dictionaries).
38 The Documentary History is a collection of “records of town meetings, legislative
proceedings, convention journals and debates, and forms of ratification; personal papers, such as
letters, memoirs, and diaries; diplomatic correspondence; and printed primary sources, such as
newspaper articles, broadsides, and pamphlets.” For the Documentary History, I have personally
read each document flagged by the “exec-” search, taking care in each instance to read the entire
flagged document and any others potentially helpful for understanding its context.
39 The Journals of the Continental Congress are a collection of “the records of the daily
proceedings of the Congress as kept by the office of its secretary” as supplemented by materials
from other sources. Journals of the Continental Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html [https://perma.cc/9YPV-CUK5]. The initial
review of documents flagged by an “exec-” search in this collection was done by a team of Michigan
law students. We worked in an intensively collaborative process, with careful up-front training and
weekly discussions about potentially useful documents as they emerged. I then read all documents
that the research assistants flagged as potentially useful, taking care in each instance to read the
entire flagged document and any others potentially helpful for understanding its context.
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Delegates to the Continental Congress.40 That work was supplemented by a
similar search through numerous state databases.41 From there, the leads
followed have been varied, inductive, and less categorizable, but those three
collections form the core of evidence on which this Article establishes its claim.
On the strength of that research, this Article concludes that founders did
“ha[ve] in mind, and intend[] the Constitution to reflect, a conception of what
is ‘naturally’ or ‘essentially’ within executive power.”42 That meaning, however,
was unambiguously limited to Law Execution.
II. MAPPING THE ARTICLE II SETTLEMENT
A. America in Crisis
To properly frame the question of how the founders arrived at the
Executive Power Clause, we must start with a wide-angle lens. What
prompted the Constitutional Convention? Why did a sense of crisis emerge
so quickly after the revolutionary triumph of 1781? Why did the founders so
radically transform the national system of government? The following

40 The Letters are a collection of “documents written by delegates that bear directly upon their
work during their years of actual service in the First and Second Continental Congresses,” including
“letters from delegates . . . diaries, public papers, essays, and other documents”). Letters of
Delegates to Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwdg.html
[https://perma.cc/6RNX-9CR9]. As with the Journals, the initial review of documents flagged by
an “exec-” search in this collection was done by a team of Michigan law students. We worked in an
intensively collaborative process, with careful up-front training and weekly discussions about
potentially useful documents as they emerged. I then read all documents that the research assistants
flagged as potentially useful, taking care in each instance to read the entire flagged document and
any others potentially helpful for understanding its context.
41 This leg of the research is ongoing. Collections reviewed to date include the following:
Maryland Province/State, Journals of the Council/State, LLMC Digital at llmc.com (reviewing
materials from 1777 to 1790); New Jersey Constitutional Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com; New
Jersey Laws, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1704-1800); New York
Constitutional Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1754-1788); New York
Legislative Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1776-1800); New York
Executive Materials, LLMC Digital, at llmc.com (reviewing materials from 1776-1778); Early State
Records (Virginia), LLMC Digita, at llmc.com; THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE
CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790. THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FORMED THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER TO WILLIAM
PENN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, AND A VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION OF 1776 AND THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS (1825); THE POPULAR SOURCES OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780
(1966); THE JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION OF
GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1832); THE ACTS AND RESOLVES,
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1867).
42 Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 22, at 551-52 (disagreeing with this proposition).
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account barely qualifies as even a sketch of the consensus historiography.43
But it’s worth letting the founders’ own words speak to the urgency they felt
about their governments’ inability to execute the law. Grasping the intensity
of that concern is essential to understanding why the executive power was so
central to the settlement that resulted.
1. The Critical Period
The 1780s were a time of experimentation and failure, hope and
disappointment, uncertainty and—increasingly as the decade wound on—
anger. By the time politicians began exploring serious constitutional reform,
Americans shared a broad sense of crisis. Any number of alarm bells were
ringing. The states were descending into a destructive economic competition
that European powers were only too happy to exploit.44 Both national and
state budgets were in a parlous state.45 One American wrote of state finances
in 1787 that “their Ars will be through their breeches before they can buy new
ones,”46 and only George Washington’s maudlin-like-a-fox intervention may
have stopped an infantry revolt after Virginia and Rhode Island vetoed
national taxes that would have covered the soldiers’ unpaid wages.47 The
states’ inability to coordinate left them militarily vulnerable to “little

43 For more detail on any particular point see the scholarship referenced in the footnotes. For
an excellent survey of the traditional historiography of the era’s politics, see Martin Flaherty’s The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725, 1758-79 (1996).
44 For a highly readable overview of the foreign affairs dimensions of Critical Period politics,
see NORMAN A. GRAEBNER, RICHARD DEAN BURNS, & JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: FROM CONFEDERATION TO CONSTITUTION, 17761787 (2011); see also, JACK RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 243-274 (1979) (focusing on
connection between domestic factions and international relations); Patrick O’Brien, Inseperable
Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688-1815, in 2 OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 53 (1998) (focusing on commercial relationships and
competition); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932,
952-1014 (2010) (focusing on international power politics).
45 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 44 at 275-329.
46 Archibald Stuart, Letter to John Breckinridge, Richmond (Oct. 21, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 89, 89 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
1988) [hereinafter DHRC].
47 See THOMAS FLEMING, THE PERILS OF PEACE: AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL
AFTER YORKTOWN 271 (2007) (“‘Gentlemen,’ [Washington] said, ‘You will permit me to put on
my spectacles, for I have not only grown grey but almost blind in the service of my country.”); see
also id. at 253 (describing the Rhode Island and Virginia decisions). Washington did more than just
pull their heart strings; he also wrote a circular to the government of all thirteen states putting his
immense political capital behind major reform of the system. George Washington, To the Executives
of the States, PROVIDENCE U.S. CHRON., Mar. 15, 1783, reprinted in 13 DHRC supra note 46, at 60
(1981).
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insurgents”48 like the “ignoble contemptible Shays,”49 to “depredations of the
savages”50 as white settlers pressed ever harder on the frontier, and to slave
rebellions, the great terror of the south.51
All of this gave rise to a mood of intense crisis. Regardless of whether the
Philadelphia drafting convention exceeded its remit by producing an entirely
new governing document,52 many Americans understood that profound
change was afoot. As one Pennsylvanian argued in June 1787:
The present Confederation may be compared to a hut or tent, accommodated
to the emergencies of war—but it is now time to erect a castle of durable
materials, with a tight roof and substantial bolts and bars to secure our
persons and property from violence, and external injuries of all kinds.53

Americans were happy to hold forth on any number of failures by their
governments. But a common theme was clear: the ardent expectations for
republicanism had come a cropper. In Gordon Wood’s classic account,
[t]he belief that the 1780’s, the years after the peace with Britain, had become
the really critical period of the entire Revolution was prevalent everywhere
during the decade . . . .

48 Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, Letter V (Nov. 8, 1787), in 19 DHRC, supra note
46, at 203, 239 (2003); see also id. (describing these “insurgents” as “men in debt, who want no law”).
49 David Daggett, Oration Delivered in New Haven (July 4, 1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 160, 162 (1981).
50 Extract of a Letter from Augusta, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, Oct. 15, 1787, reprinted in
3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 223, 223 (1978); see also id. (warning it would require “martial law” to repel).
For more on diplomacy, trade, and conflict with Native American tribes, see, e.g., KATHLEEN DUVAL,
THE NATIVE GROUND: INDIANS AND COLONISTS IN THE HEART OF THE CONTINENT (2007);
PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA
(2008). For a work exploring the cultural salience of this fear, see NICOLE EUSTACE, PASSION IS THE
GALE: EMOTION, POWER, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2012).
51 See, e.g., HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS (1993); DAVID
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2009)
(arguing that the fear of slave rebellions directly influenced the Constitution’s militia and suspension
clauses). The comments of Convention delegates, at least as recorded by Madison and other
notetakers, were often indirect on this point. But see, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 371 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Oliver
Ellsworth) (pointing out, perhaps archly, that “the danger of insurrections . . . will become a motive
to kind treatment of the slaves”).
52 For two of the best narrative accounts of drafting and ratification in all their contextual
complexity, see CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966) (discussing the
drafting convention), and PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION 1787–1788 (2011) (discussing the ratification debates). For a one-volume analysis
synthesizing some key ideological and legal themes of debate, see JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997).
53 PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 147, 148 (1981).
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The move for a stronger national government thus became something more
than a response to the obvious weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation.
It became as well an answer to the problems of the state governments . . . . ,
[which James Madison called] “so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the
most stedfast friends of Republicanism . . . .”54

For many, the signal failure of their governments was the inability to cope
with the willful persistence of factions in domestic politics. There had always
been reason to doubt, of course, whether political disagreement could really
be resolved by pat reference to the general will.55 But in the late 1780s such
skepticism was typically presented as a new insight “discovered”56 during
America’s experimentations in governance after the revolution. As James
Madison put it at the Convention, “what we once thought the Calumny of
the Enemies of Republican Govts. is undoubtedly true—There is diversity of
Interest in every Country the Rich & poor, the D[ebto]r. & Cr[editor]. the
followers of different Demagogues, the diversity of religious Sects . . . .”57
In truth, few of these social divisions were new. But many revolutionaries
appear to have pinned sincere hopes on political salvation through the selfrestraint of a virtuous republic. Here too, however, hard experience dashed
54 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, 393, 467
(1998); see also Sidney, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 6, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 88 (1981) (“[T]he melancholy experience we have had of the folly, instability, and tyranny of single
legislatures” should lead Americans “to banish those dangerous experiments in government out of our
country”). In a letter published in a Maryland newspaper, another citizen made a similar argument,

[T]o attempt to form a virtuous republic on the unqualified principles of
representation is as vain as to expect a carriage to run with wheels only on one side.—
Wheels will be added on the other, and the machine once set in motion down hill will
never stop until it carries us to the bottom . . . .”
A Farmer, VII (Part 1), BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at
473, 476 (2015).
55 See generally DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989)
(discussing New Model Army debates at Putney in 1647). I tend to agree with Merrill Jensen that
“the leaders of the Revolution . . . took party politics for granted . . . gloried in partisan warfare,
and . . . used methods as invariably deplored but as invariably used by practitioners of the art of
politics in every age.” MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1774–1781, xxv (1940).
56 Americanus, I, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 2, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 171, 173 (2003) (“It has also been discovered, that faction cannot be expelled even from a
Representative body, while possessed singly of the whole of the Legislative power.”).
57 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 108 (James Madison). The scholarship on these various
axes of American identity and interest is extensive, to say the least. For socio-economic dimensions, see,
e.g., JAMES HENRETTA, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1700–1815: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS (1973); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 143-66 (1985); GARY NASH, THE URBAN
CRUCIBLE: THE NORTHERN SEAPORTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986).
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dreams of a New World birthing New Citizens. Americans, it turned out,
were no more intrinsically virtuous than anyone else:
It is idle to expect more virtue in an American than in an individual of any
other nation. . . . Human nature is the same in all parts of the world, bad is
the best . . . . We see in America the same vices, as abroad, and we are not
backward in the practice of both wit and ingenuity in cultivating them.58

This cheery assessment was shared by Federalists59 and Anti-federalists60
alike, and the implication was clear. There was no reason to expect that
American virtue would ever live up to the dearest hopes of revolutionary
theorists. “[I]t must be evident to all by this time that our Utopian Ideas were
to[o] fine spun for Execution . . . .”61
2. The Execution Problem
That brings us to the whole reason for adopting the Executive Power
Clause in the first place: the systemic failure of execution throughout much
of American governance, and above all else at the national level. “Our Laws
are generally good,” wrote one merchant; “[i]t is the administration that gives
us pause.”62 The Governor of Maryland was more blunt: “the demands of
58 John De Witt, IV, A M . H ERALD , Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at
265, 266 (1997).
59 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (Oct. 24 & Nov. 1, 1787), in 8
DHRC, supra note 46, at 97, 104 (“Experience . . . . shews” that “prudent regard” for the “general
and permanent good of the whole . . . . has little effect on individuals, and perhaps still less on a
collection of individuals; and least of all on a majority with the public authority in their hands.”).
NEWPORT HERALD, July 3, 1788, reprinted in 25 DHRC, supra note 46, at 339, 343 (2012) (“The
scene now before us is truly dark” because of “the want of public virtue” and “the neglect or abuse
of public and private advantages” arising from “the dishonesty and villainy of some individuals, but
principally [from] that blindness and infatuation which governs at large”).
60 See, e.g., Cato, V, N.Y. J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 276, 278 (2003)
(“[Y]ou do not believe that an American can be a tyrant? If this be the case you rest on a weak basis,
Americans are like other men in similar situations . . . .”); A Federal Republican, A Review of the
Constitution, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 255, 264-65
(1983) (quoting Montesquieu’s observation that “ministers of restless dispositions have [often] imagined
that the wants of the state were those of their own little and ignoble souls” and noting “[t]hat this may
happen here, we have a right, and indeed ought to suppose”).
61 John Pintard wrote,

Were we all as upright as Yourself & a very few others Mankind might be ruled by
opinion, but as that can never be the case in an extensive dominion the Laws ought to
be sufficient & the executive powerful enough to restrain the turbulent & support the
peaceable members of Society . . . .
Letter from John Pintard to Elisha Boudinot (Sept. 22, 1787), in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 47,
47-48 (2003)
62 Letter from Logan & Story to Stephen Collins (Nov. 2, 1787), in 8 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 141, 141 (1988).
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government are uncomplied with, . . . and your executive reduced to the most
humiliating condition, and exposed to the most mortifying animadversions
and censures.”63 Political and legal theorists, of course, had been grappling
with this execution problem for centuries. But many Revolutionary-era
governments managed to distinguish themselves as award-winningly bad at
executing the laws they so loved to enact.
Hamilton’s version of the point may have been tendentious: “It is said a
republican government does not admit a vigorous execution. It is therefore
bad; for the goodness of a government consists in a vigorous execution.”64 But
even the arch-republican Richard Price knew there were problems, alerting
his beloved Americans in a published letter from London that
[a]t present the power of Congress in Europe is an object of derision rather
than respect, at the same time the tumults in New-England, the weakness of
Congress, the difficulties and sufferings of many of the states, and the
knavery of the Rhode-Island Legislature, form subjects of triumph in this
country. The conclusion is that you are falling to pieces, and will soon repent
of your independence.65

George Washington agreed with Price that the national government was
literally a joke, calling congressional requisitions “little better than a jest and
a bye word throughout the Land.”66 And one Federalist pamphleteer waxed
metaphorical in making the same point:
I scarcely need tell you that Congress is but a name, that her resolutions are
cyphers. She is fallen into contempt. Our union is slender: exists rather in
idea than in reality—in the shadow than in the substance. Her present state
is the grief of the friends of the union, the source of the fears of strangers
and the subject of the ridicule of enemies . . . . Without a government which
can employ and improve the power of the whole to national purposes we are

63 Letter from Governor William Paca and Council to Maryland Assembly (May 6, 1783), in
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND (1783).
64 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 304, 310 (Alexander Hamilton).
65 Richard Price, On the American Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, May 16, 1787,
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 100, 101 (1981). Price kept pushing the point over the course
of the year. See, e.g., Richard Price to William Bingham, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 20, 1787,
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 133, 134 (1981) (reprinted by at least 24 different newspapers)
(“[T]he Federal Government, in particular, is unsettled, and, I suppose, will continue so, ‘till
insignificance and discredit amongst foreign powers, and internal distresses of wars oblige them to
give it due strength and energy.”).
66 Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786), in THE CORRESPONDENCE
AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 208-09 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1971) (1891) (“If you tell the
Legislatures they have violated the treaty of peace and invaded the prerogatives of the confederacy
they will laugh in your face.”).
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an headless trunk: a monster in creation. Thirteen bodies without one soul to
inspire, pervade and move the complicate, unwieldy and nameless machine.67

Many blamed these problems on the dissipation of the Spirit of ‘76, which
was now sooner seen as an idiosyncrasy of war than as a sign of special
American virtue.68
Practically speaking, the Confederation’s fatal flaw—and this is by now as
standard an observation in the scholarship as it was during the Founding69—
was that the national government relied heavily on the states to execute its
measures. Instead of a reliably complete government staffed by committed
national officials, the Continental Congress was “a diplomatic corps”70

67 Numa, Political and Moral Entertainment VII, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 1789, reprinted
in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 7, 8-9 (1997); see also, e.g., Editor’s Note, 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at
159 (“Robert R. Livingston told the New York Society of the Cincinnati that ‘I sicken at the sight’
of the federal government. Congress, he continued, was ‘a nerveless council, united by imaginary
ties, brooding over ideal decrees, which caprice, or fancy, is at pleasure to annul, or execute . . . .”).
68 “During the war,” one Federalist wrote, “the fear of a powerful enemy answered all the purposes
of the most energetic government. But as soon as that fear was removed, . . . . its powers . . . became a
dead letter, for the fear of common danger was gone.” A Native of Virginia, Observations upon the
Proposed Plan of Federal Government, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 2, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note
46, at 655, 656 (1990); see also id. (“As soon as peace took place, confusion in every department of
Congress, ruin of public and private credit, decay of trade, and loss of importance abroad, were the
immediate consequences of the radical defects in the Confederation.). For others making this point,
see, e.g., Speech of Simeon Baldwin (July 4, 1788), in 18 DHRC supra note 46 at 235 (1995) (“[T]he
glory of the United-States—where is it? It expired with that patriot warmth which once united our
councils, opened our purses, and strengthened our arms without the force of law.”); Statement of
Alexander Hamilton, New York Ratification Debates (June 20, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1704,
1730 (2008) (“[D]uring the War that Governt. only gave advice and the Patriotism of the People made
them Execute the measures And even then where there was less Danger the Citizens were more
Inactive—”); Publicola, Address to the Freemen of North Carolina, ST. GAZETTE OF N.C., Mar. 27, 1788,
reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 493, 495 (1986) (“Our zeal during the war supplied the want of
good government . . . .”); An Old Soldier, CONN. GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 256, 257 (1984) (“[D]uring the late war . . . the recommendations of Congress, like a decree
from above, were implicitly obeyed. . . . But peace . . . has made us fat, and we have waxed wanton.”) .
69 See, e.g., JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1-3, 153-211 (1986); ALISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 126-135 (2010). For a representative example of the standard execution strategy, see
16 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 144-45 (Feb. 9, 1780) (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS] (resolving
to appoint a committee to ask the Pennsylvania executive branch to convene its legislature to “carry[]
into execution the above resolves” seeking the procurement of 50,000 barrels of flour or wheat).
70 James Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution (c. May 25, 1788) (not generally
circulated), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 844, 850 (1990).
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plagued by chronic absenteeism.71 And the states were often disinclined to
carry out its instructions.72 As John Jay wrote on the eve of the Convention:
[The existing Congress] may resolve, but cannot execute either with dispatch
or with secrecy—In short, they may consult, and deliberate, and recommend,
and make requisitions, and they who please may regard them. From this new
and wonderful system of Government, it has come to pass, that almost every
national object of every kind, is at this day unprovided for.73

In response, Congress became almost a parody of itself, creating first a
committee to explore solutions to the “public embarrassments”74 of their
execution problem;75 then a committee to explore the implementation of the
71 See, e.g., Motion of Charles Pinckney (Aug. 16, 1785), in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 629-30 (“[I]t has not been in [Congress’s] power to keep nine States upon
the floor—a number without which any important resolution cannot be passed . . . . [T]his arises from
some of the States not sending any, and others having but two members attending . . . .”); 21 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 1113-16 (Nov. 14, 1781) (“Ordered, That the
President write to the executives of the states, requesting the attendance of delegates from such states
as are not represented, and urging the necessity of sending forward and keeping up a representation in
Congress for conducting the affairs of the United States”).
72 For a sampling on this point, see, e.g., A Native of Virginia, supra note 68, reprinted in 9
DHRC, supra note 46, at 656, 656 (“Congress might advise, or recommend measures; might approve
the conduct of some States, and condemn that of others; might preach up public faith, honour, and
justice: But was this sufficient to preserve a union of thirteen States, or support a national
government? It had no authority . . . .”); BALT. MD. GAZETTE, May 22, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 112, 112 (1981) (reprinted by 18 other newspapers) (“In short, [the Confederation
Congress] may DECLARE every thing, but can DO nothing. If any thing can be added to this
description of the impotence of our federal Government, it must be a total want of authority over
its own members.”).
73 A Citizen of New-York (John Jay), An Address to the People of the State of New York (Apr.
15, 1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 922, 930; see also, e.g., Americanus, I, VA. INDEP. CHRON.,
Dec. 5, 1787, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 200, 201 (1988) (“It was found, that a want of
energy prevailed in our national Assembly, and that jealousies pervaded our local legislatures; that
the pressing requisitions of Congress were treated with haughty contempt . . . .”); Statement of
Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 28, 1783), in 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra
note 69, at 872 (urging that the general revenue “be collected by officers under the appointment of
Congress,” who would “deriv[e] their emoluments from & consequently [be] interested in
supporting the power of Congress”).
74 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 525 (June 17, 1780)
(“Resolved, That the United States, from New Hampshire to South Carolina, inclusive, . . . be requested,
at this critical conjuncture, to inform Congress . . . what measures they have taken in consequence of the
several resolutions . . . .”). Such simultaneously peevish and plaintive requests for updates from the states
on their execution of national law were a common occurrence. Cf. 10 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 261 (Mar. 16, 1778) (“Resolved, That the governors and presidents of the
said states be earnestly requested to transmit to Congress, as soon as possible, attested copies of the acts
passed by their respective legislatures, in pursuance of recommendations of Congress . . . .”).
75 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 236 (Mar. 6, 1781)
(appointing James M. Varnum, James Madison, and James Duane “to prepare a plan to invest the
United States in Congress assembled with full and explicit powers for effectually carrying into
execution in the several states all acts or resolutions passed agreeably to the Articles of
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solutions identified by the first committee;76 and then still more committees to
take over the implementation and execution of specific national portfolios.77
What apparatus there was often fell prey to infighting—as with the furious
complaints from the national Treasurer of Loans about the “very reprehensible
[and] extremely disgusting” behavior of the Board of Treasury, including its
refusal to conduct business “between the hours of nine and twelve in the
forenoon” and its insistence on transacting even “the most trivial affairs in
writing only.”78 By the end they were grasping at straws. At least one delegate
thought the path to respect might run through the garment district, urging his
colleagues to adopt a resolution requiring that “the President of Congress shall
in future while in the Chair be seated in his robes . . . .”79
In truth, writes Gordon Wood, “by the middle eighties Congress had
virtually collapsed.”80 And so the sense of urgency around getting the laws
executed pervaded the Philadelphia discussions, both in- and out-of-doors.
“Let us be under one vigorous government, established on liberal principles,”
exhorted one Philadelphia newspaper, “possessed of coercion and energy
sufficient to pervade and invigorate the whole—we will then rise immediately

Confederation”). Varnum’s appointment at least may have signaled the mood of the committee; he
had written to a friend the month before that “in the United States[, the] Manners are generally
corrupt, & the Laws but feebly executed.” Letter of James M. Varnum to Horatio Gates (Feb. 15,
1781), in 16 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, 716 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1986)
[hereinafter LETTERS OF DELEGATES]. For the Committee’s report, see 21 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 893-96 (Aug. 22, 1781) (listing several dozen
recommendations reforming the national government).
76 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 896 (Aug. 22, 1781)
(“Resolved, That a Comee [sic] be appointed to prepare a representation to the several States of the
necessity of these supplemental powers and of pursuing in the modification thereof, one uniform plan.”).
77 For a more detailed discussion of the Continental Congress’s experimentations with
governance, see Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 44 (2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3512154
[https://perma.cc/ABC4-ZQQZ]
(internal citations omitted) (“By the time of the [constitutional] convention, congressional delegates
were executing the body’s legislation variously ‘by themselves,’ through ‘committees’ both ad hoc
and formalized, through individual agents, and through the creation and supervision of
institutionalized ‘boards’ of governance.”).
78 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 779-80 (Aug. 25, 1780);
see also id. (emphasizing that “even . . . officers in the department” had been subjected to this
rigamarole, and bemoaning Treasury’s “unintelligible and impracticable” orders). It does not appear
that Treasury exercised its right of reply.
79 Motion of Charles Pinckney (Aug. 19, 1785), in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 69 at 649. And yes, the delegates promptly appointed a committee to explore
the question. Id. at 649 n.2.
80 WOOD, supra note 54, at 464; see also RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 192-215, 275-296, 333-352
(detailing Congress’s ineffectiveness and the failure of various efforts to reform national
administration under the Articles).

1288

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1269

into the highest consideration . . . .”81 Inside the convention hall, Governor
Edmund Randolph opened the proceedings with a speech that focused almost
completely on the Confederation’s execution problem.82 This singlemindedness turned out to be basically common ground, with the delegates
generally agreeing that “[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive
sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”83
Even comparatively anti-consolidationist members of the Convention
acknowledged the political reality that “[t]he Language of the people has been
that Congs. ought to have the power of collecting an impost and of coercing
the States when it may be necessary.”84
This theme carried over full force into the ratification debates, where the
Confederation’s inability to take meaningful practical action was the butt of
relentless criticism. The basic challenge was simple— “What is advice,
recommendation, or requisition? It is not Government”85—and Federalists
from Connecticut,86 Maryland,87 Massachusetts,88 New York,89 North
81 Virginia Gentleman, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, (June 26, 1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 145, 146-47 (1981) (citing “contempt [Americans] have so universally incurred on
account of the weakness of government”).
82 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 18-20 (Edmund Randolph).
83 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 9 (James Madison). Roger Sherman offered a typical
republican concession of the point at the Convention: “The complaints at present are not that the views
of Congs. are unwise or unfaithful, but that that their powers are insufficient for the execution of their
views.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 341 (Roger Sherman). See also, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 43 (Gouverneur Morris) (“The federal gov. has no such compelling
capacities . . . .”); see also 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 284-85 (Alexander Hamilton)
(similar); 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 70 (James Wilson) (similar) .
84 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 491-92 (Gunning Bedford); see also id. at 491 (“We
must like Solon make such a Governt. as the people will approve.”).
85 Letter of Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger (1788), in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at
563, 563; see also id. at 564 (“What security is it possible to have under such a Government? A
Government without energy, without power.”).
86 E.g., Oliver Walcott, Sr., Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), in 15 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 312, 315 (1984) (“It is generally agreed, that the present confederation is inadequate
to the exigencies of our national affairs.”).
87 E.g., Aristides, Remarks on the Proposed Plan, Annapolis (Jan. 31, 1788), in 11 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 229, 247 (2015) (“At this moment, congress is little more than a name, without power to
effect a single thing . . . .”).
88 E.g., Statement of James Bowdoin, Massachusetts Ratification Debates (Jan. 23, 1788), in 6
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1313, 1317-18 (2000) (noting that because the national government lacked
“any power of coercion . . . . the requisitions of Congress, have in most of the States, been little
regarded”); Remarker, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 734,
737 (1998) (“We have long seen the futility of a nominal power in Congress, unsupported by
reality . . . . Bare recommendations have been too long slighted and the delinquency of some States
hath engendered evils in them all.”).
89 E.g., Statement of Robert R. Livingston, New York Ratification Debates (June 19, 1788), in
22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1681, 1686 (2008) (“[W]ith the addition of a few powers, those [the
national government] possessed were competent to the purposes of the Union. But . . . the defect
of the system rested in the impossibility of carrying into effect the rights invested in them by the
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Carolina,90 Pennsylvania,91 South Carolina,92 and Virginia93 competed to
make the point most forcefully. As one bit of doggerel put it:
Nor can you boast this present hour,
The shadow of the form of power;
For what’s your congress or its end?
A power to advise and recommend;
To call for troops, adjust your quotas,
And yet no soul is bound to notice;
To pawn your faith to the utmost limit,
But cannot bind you to redeem it . . . .
Can utter oracles of dread
Like Friar Bacon’s brazen head;
But should a faction e’er dispute ‘em
Has ne’er an arm to execute ‘em.94

States.”); id. at 1693 (“[M]any powers were given, yet they were withheld, by withholding the means
of executing them.”); see also Letter of John Brown Cutting to William Short (c. Jan. 9, 1788), in 14
DHRC, supra note 46, at 492, 493-97 (1983)(“[T]he confederation of 1781”—“a Code thus feebly
formed thus carelessly executed”—“was from the first formation of it unsustainable . . . and in short
built upon the unstable breath of State Legislatures who might and did puff its contexture and edicts
into empty air at pleasure.”).
90 E.g., 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 21-22 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (William Davie) [hereinafter
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“Another radical vice in the old system . . . was, that it legislated on states,
instead of individuals; and that its powers could not be executed but by fire or by the sword . . . .”).
91 E.g., An American, PA. GAZETTE, May 21, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 833,
836 (1990) (“[W]e have not constitutional powers to execute our own desires, even within our own
jurisdiction <dominions>.”).
92 E.g., A Back Wood’s Man, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, May 8, 1788, reprinted in
27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 277, 278 (2016) (“[T]he inefficacy of our laws, which though they
answered the purpose pretty well, during our late troubles, are notwithstanding in their present
state, inadequate to the execution of domestic or foreign regulations . . . .”).
93 E.g., Nov. Anglus, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Dec. 12, 1787, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 235, 235 (“A want of energy in the laws of some States, and a want of their execution in
others . . . .”). For a satisfyingly sarcastic version of the point, see Statement of Edmund Randolph,
Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 970, at 986 (1990) (“We humbly
supplicate, that it may please you to comply with your federal duties! We implore, we beg your obedience! Is
not this, Sir, a fair representation of the powers of Congress? . . . Their authority to recommend is
a mere mockery of Government.”).
94 A Federalist, CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, May 16, 1788, reprinted in 27 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 284, 284 (2016). The verse is from John Trumbull’s “M’Fingal.” See JOHN TRUMBULL,
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A central theme for many Federalist authors was thus precisely how well
the laws would be executed under the draft Constitution. However much
some modern thinkers may minimize the “errand boy” nature of Law
Execution,95 the founders never made that mistake:
[H]ow humiliating is our present situation . . . . [H]ow necessary for the union
is a coercive principle. No man pretends the contrary. We all see and feel this
necessity. The only question is, shall it be a coercion of Law, or a coercion of
arms . . . . [W]e must establish a national government, to be enforced by the
equal decisions of Law, and the peaceable arm of the magistrate.96

M’FINGAL: A MODERN EPIC POEM IN FOUR CANTOS (1782). It doesn’t get any better. Thanks to
Jo Ann Davis for explaining that the “brazen head” allusion is to a failed enchantment in Robert
Greene’s Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay (1630).
95 HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN
EXECUTIVE POWER 2-3 (1989) (“[I]f any real president confined himself to this definition, he would
be contemptuously called an ‘errand boy,’ considered nothing in himself, a mere agent whose duty
is to command actions according to the law”); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 708 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) (“Under this messenger-boy concept” of the Presidency, “the President must confine
himself to sending a message to Congress recommending action”).
96 Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 15 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 273, 279 (1984) (reprinted in 15 other newspapers).
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Time and again, it was the lead point raised or first issue discussed: at the
Philadelphia drafting convention;97 at the Pennsylvania98 and Connecticut99
ratifying conventions; in public propaganda;100 and in private correspondence.101
Certainly the Federalist Papers rarely lost an opportunity to laud the
constitutional fix for the Articles’ “great and radical error”102 of leaving its
government “destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce

97 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 19 (Edmund Randolph) (“[T]he prospect of
anarchy from the laxity of government every where.”).
98 James Wilson opened the Pennsylvania Convention with a speech hammering on the point.
And then his final stemwinder—which stretched over two sessions and according to Yeates’s notes
lasted more than two and a half hours—focused almost entirely on the new government’s capacity
to execute its law and other legislative projects. On his opening speech, see James Wilson, Opening
Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 333,
335 (1976) (“He forcibly contrasted the imbecility of our present Confederation with the energy
which must result from the proffered Constitution.”); cf. Alexander J. Dallas, Version of Wilson’s
Speech (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 340, 348 (“In short, sir, the tedious tale disgusts
me . . . .”). For a pithy summary of Wilson’s endless closing pitch, see James Wilson, Speech in the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 550, 570 (1976) (“It
is of great consequence to us and our posterity whether we shall continue under a Confederation
without efficient powers to carry its purposes into execution, despised abroad and without credit at
home; or whether we shall adopt a system of Union; with energetic powers, which can effectually
carry into execution such measures as may be calculated and devised for the common safety.”). For
a perhaps unreliably florid recapitulation of the latter, compare James Wilson, Speech to the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Morning Session) (Dec. 11, 1787), reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 550, 557-58 (1976)(“[A]fter making a law, they cannot take a single step towards carrying
it into execution.”), with James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
(Afternoon Session) (Dec. 11, 1787), reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 571, 580-81
(1976)(“Congress may recommend, they can do more, they may require, but they must not proceed
one step further.”).
99 Oliver Ellsworth opened the ratifying convention with a speech focusing entirely on the need
for a more energetic system. “The present is merely advisory. It has no coercive power . . . . [H]ave we
not seen and felt the necessity of such a coercive power? . . . The Constitution before us is a complete
system of legislative, judicial, and executive power. It was designed to supply the defects of the former
system . . . .” Ellsworth, supra note 96, at 245-48 (reprinted in 20 other newspapers); see also id. at 246
(surveying the “coercive power” of various European executives to “execute decrees” and “set their
unwieldy machine of government in motion”). William Samuel Johnson came next, and doubled down:
“Our commerce is annihilated; our national honour, once in so high esteem, is no more . . . . The
gentleman’s arguments have demonstrated that a principle of coercion is absolutely necessary.” William
Samuel Johnson, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note
46, at 243, 248 (reprinted in sixteen other newspapers).
100 James McHenry, Speech to Maryland House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 14
DHRC, supra note 46, at 279, 279-80 (1983) (“[T]he Journals of Congress are nothing more than a
History of expedients, without any regular or fixed system, and without power to give them efficacy
or carry them into Execution . . . [T]here is no power, no force to carry their Laws into execution,
or to punish the Offenders who oppose them.”).
101 See, e.g., Letter from the Reverend James Madison to James Madison (c. Oct. 1, 1789),
reprinted in 8 DHRC supra note 46, at 31, 31 (1988) (noting as first concern the need for “ready
Compliance amongst ye Bulk of ye People of America, with federal Measures”).
102 T HE F EDERALIST N O . 38 (James Madison), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at
353, 355 (1984).
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the execution of its own laws.”103 (To be honest, Publius was a little obsessed
with the need for enforcement authority.104 As the generally sympathetic
Charles Johnson wrote to James Iredell, “I am surprised that he should have
thought it necessary to take so much pains to establish, what appears at the
first glance, at least to me, an incontrovertible truth . . . .”105) Nor was the
Madison-Hamilton-Jay troika unusual in this respect. Many Federalist
propagandists defended the draft constitution first and foremost as a solution
for the Confederation’s “very certain” lack of “vigor enough to carry [its]
actually delegated power into execution . . . .”106 The very existence of “union
can never be supported,” said another Federalist, “without definite and
effectual laws which are co-extensive with their occasions, and which are
supported by authorities and laws which can give them execution with
energy . . . .”107 What the constitution principally offered was thus “an
energetic government capable of putting in execution prohibitory laws
uniformly throughout the states.”108 And on and on and on.109
103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at
414, 414 (1983).
104 For just a few of the longer passages, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST NO. 16
(Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 339, 341 (1983) (“It must carry its
agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must
itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 95, 97
(1984) (“[T]here is good ground [under the draft Constitution] to calculate upon a regular and
peaceable execution of the laws of the Union . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), reprinted
in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 555, 557 (1981) (“[U]nder the national Government, treaties and
articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed
in the same manner . . . .”). Even Publius’s discussion of the legislative powers of the draft federal
government emphasized the point. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), reprinted in 15
DHRC, supra note 46, at 476, 480 (1984) (“[T]he new Constitution . . . does not enlarge [the
Confederation’s] powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them.”).
105 Letter from Charles Johnson to James Iredell (Jan. 14, 1788), in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at
363, 363 (1984) (“[T]hat the States, united under one efficient government, properly balanced, will
be much more powerful . . . than the States disunited into distinct, independent governments, or
separate confederacies.”).
106 A Freeman, I, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 453, 456 (1984).
107 A Citizen of Philadelphia, Remarks on the Address of Sixteen Members (Oct. 18, 1787),
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 297, 304 (1981); see also id. (“[T]he superlative authority and
energetic force vested in congress and our federal executive powers . . . . extensive as they are, are
not greater than is necessary for our benefit . . . .”).
108 Letter from New York (Oct. 24 & 31 1787), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 380, 381 (1978);
see also id. at 387 (Oct 31, 1787) (observing that the Philadelphia convention resulted from “the
opinion of a majority of the citizens of America that a national government, of energy and efficiency,
ought to be established over the United States for the better security and promotion of the interests
of the individual, as well as the confederated states”).
109 For but a small further sampling, see, e.g., Common Sense, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1788,
reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 693, 694 (1998) (“Men of penetration have grown weary of
such a weak and inefficient system, and wish to lay it aside; and have substituted in its room, a
government that shall be as efficacious throughout the union as this state government is throughout
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What about the loose and diverse group of skeptics and outright
opponents known to history as the Antifederalists? Certainly some contested
the premise. Agrippa huffed that “our government . . . is respected from
principles of affection, and obeyed with alacrity,”110 and Patrick Henry puffed
that “the people of Virginia” have “manifested the most cordial acquiescence
in the execution of the laws.”111 But the urgency of such denials just betrayed
the power of the argument.112 Indeed, for the most part Antifederalists agreed

the Massachusetts.”); Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 10
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1623, 1623, 1626 (1993) (“Union is only to be preserved by a Fœdral Energetic
Government, and . . . the Articles of Confederation Possess not an Atom of such a Government
. . . . a strong & firm Govt. of wholsome laws, well executed, to protect the honest Peaceable Citizen
From Oppression, Licentiousness, Rapine & violence, appear to me indispensibly necessy.”); A Freeholder,
VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 719, 727 (1990) (“[T]his
constitution . . . . gives an energy and dignity to the supreme legislative and executive powers, of
which energy and dignity the present Congress have not even the shadow . . . .”); One of the People,
PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 186, 188 (1976) (noting that
while “no one state can carry into effect their impost laws,” the new government “will have energy
and power to regulate your trade and commerce, to enforce the execution of your imposts, duties
and customs”).
110 Agrippa, XII, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1787, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 720,
721 (1998). Agrippa was notably insistent on the point. See also Agrippa, II, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov.
27, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 322, 323 (1997) (“[T]he sheriffs, have in no case been
interrupted in the execution of their office . . . . [T]he law has been punctually executed”); Agrippa,
I, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 303, 304 (1997) (“It is now
conceded on all sides that the laws relating to civil causes were never better executed than at
present.”); cf. NAKED GUN (Paramount Pictures 1988) (“Nothing to see here. Please disperse.”).
111 Statement of Patrick Henry, Va. Ratification Debates (June 5, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note
46, at 943, 954 (1990); see also id. (“What could be more awful than their unanimous acquiescence
under general distresses? Is there any revolution in Virginia? Whither is the spirit of America gone?
Whither is the genius of America fled?”). The Virginia delegates chased their tails on this question
for some time. See Virginia Ratification Debates (June 7, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1006,
1016-46 (1990) (recounting a multi-session back-and-forth among James Madison, Edmund
Randolph, and Patrick Henry).
112 See also, e.g., A Plebeian: An Address to the People of the State of New York (1788), in 20
DHRC, supra note 46, at 942 (2004) (“[A]ll the powers of rhetoric . . . are employed to paint the
condition of this country, in the most hideous and frightful colours . . . . [But the] laws are as well
executed as they ever were, in this or any other country.”); Benjamin Gale, Speech at a Town
Meeting (Nov. 12, 1787), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 420, 422 (1978) (“All these combining have
raised a mighty outcry of the weakness of the federal government . . . . But, gentlemen, have not we
the same power we ever have had . . . . If any opposition is made to government, has not our sheriffs
power to call to their assistance the militia to support him in the execution of his office, and is it not
so in every state in the Union.”); Statement of John Lansing, New York Ratification Debates (June
28, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1976, 1999 (2008) (“Sir, have the states ever shewn a
disposition not to comply with the requisitions? We shall find that, in almost every instance, they
have, so far forth as the passing the law of compliance, been carried into execution.”).
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with the diagnosis, both privately113 and publicly.114 Brutus was typical in
“acknowledg[ing] . . . that the powers of Congress, under the present
confederation, amount to little more than that of recommending,”115 and
Centinel called it “universally allowed” that “extraordinary difficulties [have]
hitherto impeded the execution of the confederation . . . .”116
Rather than denying the problem, Antifederalists typically responded by
warning that the draft Constitution went too far in fixing it. The new
government’s dramatically improved enforcement power, they urged, would
overshoot the mark and result in tyranny.117 “The publick mind, I fear,”
worried Cornelius, “is at this critical juncture, prepared to do the same that
almost every people, who have enjoyed an excessive degree of liberty have
done before;—to plunge headlong into the dreadful abyss of Despotick
113 See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to John Adams (Sept. 3, 1787), in 8 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 9, 9 (1988) (“The present federal system, however well calculated it might have been for its designed
ends if the States had done their duty, under the almost total neglect of that duty, has been found quite
inefficient and ineffectual—The government must be both Legislative and Executive, with the former
power paramount to the State Legislatures in certain respects essential to federal purposes.”).
114 See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to their Constituents, PA. PACKET, Dec. 18, 1787 [hereinafter Dissent of the Minority],
reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 617, 618-19 (1976) (“[T]he annual requisitions were set at
naught by some of the states, while others complied with them by legislative acts, but were tardy in
their payments . . . . The Congress could make treaties of commerce, but could not enforce the
observance of them”); Statement of William Grayson, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 11, 1788),
in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1142, 1169 (1990) (“I admit that coercion is necessary in every
Government in some degree, that it is manifestly wanting in our present Government, and that the
want of it has ruined many nations.”); Statement of Samuel Jones, New York Ratification Debates
(June 25, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1877, 1904 (2008) (“[A] fact universally known, that
the present confederation had not proved adequate to the purposes of good government.”); Town of
Preston Instructions to State Convention Delegates (Nov. 12, 1787), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at
438, 439 (1978) (calling for a series of amendments while expressing “our ardent wish that an efficient
government may be established over these states” with “sufficient provision made for carrying into
execution all the powers vested in government”). The “Federal Farmer” was notably preoccupied
with this issue in his first three letters. See, e.g., Federal Farmer, supra note 48, at 18-19 (“[T]he
interest I have in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the laws, will convince you,
that, if I am under any biass at it, it is in favor of any general system which shall promise those
advantages.” (footnote omitted)).
115 Brutus, IX, N.Y. J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 393, 397 (1984).
116 Centinel, IV, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 30, 1787, reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note
46, at 317, 318-19 (1983); see also id. (conceding that “the present confederation is inadequate to the
objects of the union,” while cautioning that these difficulties were “temporary” and should not be
attributed to irreparable “defects in the [Confederation] system itself ”).
117 See, e.g., A Countryman, AM. HERALD, Jan. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 757 (1998) (“Are we to give up every thing dear to us, because it is demanded by a set of men,
who, while they make the demand, exhibit a spirit of despotism—equalled only by that of the Batons
of the Germanic Empire . . . over their vassals[?]”); The Impartial Examiner, I, VA. INDEP.
CHRON., Mar. 5, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 459, 463 (1988) (“[C]an any one think
that there is no medium between want of power, and the possession of it in an unlimited degree?
Between the imbecility of mere recommendatory propositions, and the sweeping jurisdiction of
exercising every branch of government over the United States to the greatest extent?”).
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Government.”118 Dire warnings abounded about execution running amok,
from “swarms” of enforcement agents119 to the “military execution”120 of the
national laws.121 Cato’s litany of predictions was typical, including in its
special concern for taxation:
118 Cornelius, HAMPSHIRE CHRON., Dec. 11, 18, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at
410, 416 (1997); see also id. (suggesting that the “great embarrassments under which we have
laboured” could be remedied by narrower amendments facilitating tax collection and the regulation
of commerce). At the Virginia ratifying convention, one Antifederalist had some fun on this score:
“We are now told . . . that every calamity is to attend us . . . unless we adopt this
Constitution. . . . [T]he Carolinians from the South, mounted on alligators, I presume, are to come
and destroy our corn fields and eat up our little children!” Statement of William Grayson, Virginia
Ratification Debates (June 11, 1788), reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1142, 1167 (1990).
119 See Statement of Melancton Smith, New York Ratification Debates (June 27, 1788), in 22
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1921, 1924 (2008) (“Will it not give occasion for an innumerable swarm of
officers, to infest our country and consume our substance?”); John De Witt, V, AM. HERALD, Dec.
3, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 351, 356 (1997) (“[T]hat swarm of revenue, excise,
impost and stamp officers, Continental assessors and collectors, that your new Constitution will
introduce among you . . . . will, of themselves, be a STANDING ARMY to you . . . . without the
blessed assistance of any military corps.”); Dissent of the Minority, supra note 114, at 639 (“[J]udges,
collectors, tax gatherers, excisemen, and the whole host of revenue officers will swarm over the land,
devouring the hard earnings of the industrious, like the locusts of old . . . .”); The Republican
Federalist, VII, MASS. CENTINEL, Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 869, 870
(1998) (“[T]he executive and judicial departments of the union, will necessarily produce through the
Continent, swarms of officers . . . .”). John DeWitt was so distraught about this point that he wrote
two straight essays on it. See also John De Witt, supra note 58, at 269 (“A new set of Continental
pensioned Assessors will be introduced into your towns, whose interest will be distinct from yours.—
They will be joined by another set of Continental Collectors, still less principled and less adequate
than the former.”).
120 See A Federal Farmer, Letter II to the Republican (Oct. 9, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note
46 at 25, 29 (“the general government, far removed from the people, and none of its members elected
oftener than once in two years, will be forgot or neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded,
unless a multitude of officers and military force be . . . employed to enforce the execution of the
laws. . . .”); Twenty-seven Subscribers, N.Y.J., Jan. 1, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at
558, 558 (2004) (“do not be so irresolute as to be frightened out of your duty by any pert adventurer,
whose principles may be despotic, from habit in the wars and whose ideas of government cannot be
satisfied with less than military execution . . . .”).
121 The Virginia ratifying convention saw especially long colloquies on the subject. See Virginia
Ratification Debates (June 14, 1788), reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1258, 1269-97 (1993)
(recounting a debate involving Clay, Madison, Mason, Henry, Nicholas, Randolph, and Lee); see
also Virginia Ratification Debate (June 16, 1788), reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1299, 12991304, 1325 (1993) (describing a debate between Henry, Madison, and Pendleton). See also, e.g., John
De Witt, V, AM. HERALD, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 351, 353, 356 (1997)
(warning that federal military power was an “infernal engine of oppression to execute their civil
laws” and asking “[w]here is the standing army in the world” that has not “finally, tak[en] a chief
part in executing its laws”); Philadelphiensis, IV, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Dec. 12, 1787, reprinted in
14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 418, 420 (1983) (“[T]o carry the arbitrary decrees of the federal judges
into execution, and to protect the tax gatherers in collecting the revenue, will be ample employment
for the military . . . .”); Interrogator, To Publius or the Pseudo-Federalist Post-1 (Dec. 1787)
(unpublished manuscript), reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 342, 343 (2003) (“And does not
the [Calling Forth?] Clause . . . involve a State of War and military Execution to the Persons who
are the objects of it?” (emphasis omitted)).
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[T]he necessity to enforce the execution of revenue laws (a fruitful source of
oppression) on the extremes and in the other districts of the government, will
incidentally, and necessarily require a permanent force, to be kept on foot—
will not political security, and even the opinion of it, be extinguished? can
mildness and moderation exist in a government, where the primary incident
in its exercise must be force?122

Given longstanding Country anxieties about a standing army, these
reactions made some sense, at least for the most paranoid.123 The key factor
for our purpose is that both supporters and opponents understood the sales
pitch for ratification to focus on a radically improved execution of national
projects and prohibitions.
B. The Presidency’s Role in the Constitutional Solution
That brings us to the President. Expanded legislative power was, of
course, an essential element of the proposed constitutional solution, and there
was angst aplenty about the federal courts’ ability to enforce legal rights and
obligations. But when it came to the execution problem, the Article II
presidency was central. Certainly James Madison thought so. In a letter
summarizing the proceedings for Thomas Jefferson, Madison listed executive
power first among “the great objects which presented themselves” to the
Convention.124 The reason for this primacy was simple: The whole point of
122 Cato, III, N.Y.J., Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 125, 128 (2003); see
also Brutus, IV, N.Y.J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 313, 317 (2003) (“If then
this government should not derive support from the good will of the people, it must be executed by
force, or not executed at all . . . . The convention seemed aware of this, and have therefore provided
for calling out the militia to execute the laws of the union.”). Brutus’s first number was in much the
same vein. See Brutus, I, N.Y.J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 103, 113 (2003)
(“[T]he government will be nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it otherwise,
but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet . . . .”).
123 See, e.g., Luther Martin Addresses the House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 11
DHRC, supra note 46, at 87, 93 (2015) (“Should the power of these Judiciaries be incompetent to
carry this extensive plan into execution, other, and more certain Engines of power are supplied by
the standing Army unlimited as to number or its duration, in addition to this Government has the
entire Command of the Militia . . . .”); Dissent of the Minority, supra note 114, at 617 (noting that
“as standing armies in the time of piece are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up”). Cf.
A Baptist, N.Y.J., Nov. 30, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 331, 336-37, (2003)
(suggesting that the new Congress would “call [the militia] out to execute the laws of the union,” thereby
“grievously oppressing the people, and greatly endangering public liberty”).
124 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 59, at 98; see also id. (“1. to
unite a proper energy in the Executive and a proper stability in the Legislative departments, with
the essential characters of Republican Government.”); id. (“Hence was embraced the alternative of
a Government which instead of operating, on the States, should operate without their intervention
on the individuals composing them . . . .”). One of the most strangely persistent misunderstandings
of Madison is the idea that he was uninterested in the executive branch or resistant to strong
centralized authority. Clinton Rossiter had it right back in 1964: “I am far more impressed by the
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the presidency was to cure the national government’s inability to bring its
laws, policies, and projects into anything like effective execution.125
Many Federalists traced the Confederation’s execution problem to an
overreaction by their fellow citizens in the wake of independence. “[T]he
immediate crush of arbitrary [British] power,” they lamented, had prompted
Americans to “lean too much . . . to the extreme, of weakening than of
strengthening the Executive power in our own government.”126 In the throes
of the Critical Period, however, even the staunchest republicans began to
concede the need for some kind of office to “preside over our civil concerns,
and see that our laws are duly executed,”127 and even the smallest states
eventually signed onto New Jersey’s call for a new “federal Executive” vested
with authority “to enforce and compel” and “carry[] into execution” “all Acts
of the U. States in Congs. made.”128 The resulting presidency thus served as
the Convention’s answer to the following choice: “We must either . . .
renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient
vigor to pervade every part of it.”129 As one North Carolina Federalist said of
the President:
If he takes care to see the laws faithfully executed, it will be more than is done
in any government on the continent; for I will venture to say that our
government, and those of the other states, are, with respect to the execution
of the laws, in many respects mere ciphers.130

Unfortunately, creating an executive magistrate wasn’t just one of the
most pressing questions. It was also one of the hardest. James Madison later
explained to the Virginia convention that—while debates about “the
organization of the General Government” were certainly “in all [their] parts,

large area of agreement between Hamilton and Madison than by the differences in emphasis that
have been read into rather than [written] in their papers.” CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER
HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 58 (1964).
125 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 52 (Gouverneur Morris) (“It is necessary to
take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of
which must depend the efficacy & utility of the Union among the present and future States.”).
126 Marcus, III, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Mar. 5, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note
46, at 322, 326 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
127 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 85 (Benjamin Franklin).
128 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 245 (New Jersey Amendments); see also id.
(requesting an executive who could “enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an
Observance of such Treaties”). OK, not Rhode Island. But they weren’t even there.
129 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 52 (Gouverneur Morris); see id. (“It is necessary
to take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of
which must depend the efficacy & utility of the Union among the present and future States.”).
130 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 136 (Archibald Maclaine).
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very difficult”—there was “a peculiar difficulty in that of the Executive.”131 At
times, the difficulty seemed almost paralyzing. The Convention’s discussion
of the subject began with a motion “that the Executive consist of a single
person.” Then:
A considerable pause ensuing, and the Chairman asking if he should put the
question, Docr. Franklin observed that it was a point of great importance and
wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the
question was put.
Mr. Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other
subjects.132

Whence this weird silence among delegates who—John Rutledge’s
reference to “other subjects” notwithstanding—had so far showed no
detectable reticence on any other topic? Surely it was due in part to the
identity of their presiding officer, “whose election [as President] will
doubtless be unanimous, unless he declines the trust . . . .”133 But that can’t
be the whole story: indeed, the topic of presidential power prompted an
identically awkward “silence” when introduced at the North Carolina
ratification debates, where General Washington was nowhere to be found.134
The founders’ persistent “embarrass[ment]”135 on the topic had a
thoroughly substantive reason. Indeed, structuring the chief magistracy
might have been the hardest design problem in governance.136 As Virginia
131 Statement of James Madison, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 10
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1412, 1412 (1993) (emphasis added); see also id. (“Every thing incident to it,
must have participated of that difficulty.”). Madison made the same point privately. See Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 59, at 98 (“The first of these objects as it respects
the Executive, was peculiarly embarrassing.”); see also 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 118
(George Mason) (“In every Stage of the Question relative to the Executive, the difficulty of the
subject and the diversity of the opinions concerning it have appeared.”).
132 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 65.
133 A Citizen of New-York, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 27, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 54, 54 (2003); see also id. (listing other politicians “equal to the office of President”
should Washington decline). Cf. A Letter from Philadelphia, FAIRFIELD GAZETTE, July 25, 1787,
reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 172, 172-73 (1981) (suggesting that there was a plot to install
a monarch, and speculating that “Gen. Washington, though unexceptionable in every respect of his
virtues, would probably decline the crown were it offered him . . . .”).
134 On the relevant day, the secretary’s notes observe that “Article 2d, section 1st” was read for
comment. The next recorded comment comes from an irritated Federalist challenging the opponents
of the Constitution to object. See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 102 (William Davie) (“Is
it not highly improper to pass over in silence any part of this Constitution which has been loudly
objected to?”). Silences continued throughout the North Carolina convention’s discussion of Article
II. See, e.g., id. at 107 (James Iredell) (“The rest of the 1st section read without any observations”);
id. (“Mr. Chairman, I was in hopes that some other gentleman would have spoken to this clause.”).
135 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 59, at 98.
136 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1207-19.
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Governor Edmund Randolph said to the Virginia ratifying convention,
“[e]very Gentleman who has . . . considered of the most eligible mode of
Republican Government, agrees that the greatest difficulty arises from the
Executive, as to the time of his election, mode of his election, quantum of
power, &c.”137 Echoing the handwringing of parliamentarians a century
earlier and an ocean away, Gouverneur Morris explained why:
It is <the> most difficult of all rightly to balance the Executive. Make him
too weak: The Legislature will usurp his powers. Make him too strong. He
will usurp on the Legislature.138

This dynamic forced the Framers to “act[] a very strange part” in
structuring the presidency: “We first form a strong man to protect us, and at
the same time wish to tie his hands behind him.”139 The Antifederalist
Melancton Smith borrowed the English treatise Bracton’s bridle metaphor to
make the point: “Power is a Head strong Horse—requires a Curb and will
even then sometimes [break free.140] Will the Rider then Hamstring To
Contrive a Govt. to check it from operating?”141
These were hard questions, to put it mildly. And so the Convention
bogged down in what Madison called “tedious and reiterated discussions.”142
(Smash cut to generations of scholars nodding vigorously.) A series of
137 Statement of Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 17, 1788), reprinted in
10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1338, 1366 (1993). See generally Mortenson, supra note 5.
138 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 105 (Gouverneur Morris). Cf. Reply to George
Mason’s Objections to the Constitution, N.J. J., Dec. 19 & Dec. 26, 1787, reprinted in 3 DHRC, supra note
46, at 154, 159 (1978) (“May not every person you appoint, probably, also become venal, wicked, and
oppressive? I answer . . . . If we must have no government till we can get one that cannot be abused,
there is an end of the business at once.”). See also generally HENRY PARKER, OBSERVATIONS UPON
SOME OF HIS MAJESTIES LATE ANSWERS AND EXPRESSES (1642).
139 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 317 (Gouverneur Morris).
140 Melancton Smith, New York Ratification Debates (June 25, 1788), reprinted in 22 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 1877, 1901 (2008). McKesson did not get down the end of this thought. It seems
safe to assume the reference was to the “Curb” sometimes failing.
141 See id. (“With respect to the Powers of Govt. they must [be] adequate to the objects or it
becomes useless—There must be checks or the Govt. will [be] dangerous—”). James Wilson, a
Federalist, made a version of this same point when he noted, “Bad Governts. are of two sorts. 1. that
which does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro’ weakness; and that which
destroys thro’ oppression.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 483 (James Wilson). Something
like a sensible middle did drive the discussions: Federalists like Wilson and Morris generally
acknowledged that fixing the execution problem risked making the government too strong;
Antifederalists and skeptics like Smith and Randolph generally acknowledged that every
government required some force and authority and capacity to execute. The calibration was the hard
part—and the contested one.
142 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 59, at 98 (“On the question
whether it should consist of a single person, or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on the mode of
appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and
reiterated discussions took place.”).
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interconnected issues was hotly debated, including the number of people at
the head of the executive branch, the process of selecting them, the provisions
for removing them, the length of their terms, their eligibility for re-election,
and the provision for an executive veto.143 However mechanical each question
may seem individually, the disagreement they provoked was entirely in line
with Morris’s sketch of the basic problem: how to promote presidential
independence and vigor (and how much) while restraining presidential abuse
(and how strictly)?
The vehemence of these debates over presidential independence,
however, shouldn’t obscure a broad band of warm agreement on at least two
equally central questions of presidential design. First, everyone knew that
vehement antiroyalism was a singularly potent force in American politics.
The King’s protection had of course for a time been invoked during the
colonists’ various confrontations with Parliament,144 and there appear even to
have been some pockets of genuinely revanchist sentiment.145 But what we
now think of as Whig history was easily the dominant rhetorical trope, with
all sides of the mainstream debate celebrating “that patriotic spirit which
prompted the illustrious English barons to extort Magna Charta from their
tyrannical king, John.”146 This bedrock fact of political life sharply constrained
the founders’ options in designing an American executive.
Both the Framers and the Federalists thus had to account at every stage
for “that jealousy of executive power which has shown itself so strongly in all
the American governments.”147 We might discount the Antifederalist

143 For present purposes, tracking the chronological evolution of the Philadelphia proposals
isn’t terribly useful. For discussions of how the Presidency evolved over the course of the drafting
process, see CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 182-256 (1966); M.J.C. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 168-173 (1967). See also RAKOVE, supra
note 52, at 244-87 (canvassing Founding-era debates about presidential power); Bradley & Flaherty,
supra note 22, at 593-95 (describing Convention debates about presidential power).
144 See generally JACK P. GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2011); ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCY AND THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING (2014); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1995).
145 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to John Jay, supra note 66, at 208-09 (“I am told
that even respectable characters speak of a monarchical form of government without horror.”).
146 Tar & Feathers, 2, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 2, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 152, 153 (1976). For particularly detailed contemporaneous surveys of the relevant English
constitutional history, see, for example, THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted
in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 65, 65-69 (1984); A Farmer, I, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1788,
reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 306 (2015).
147 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 115, 120 (William Davie). James Monroe made the
same point from across the aisle. See Monroe, supra note 70, at 863 (“Against the encroachments of
the Executive the fears and apprehensions of the whole continent would be awake, with a watchful
jealousy they would observe its movements.”).
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tendency to bang on about the draft constitution’s betrayal of liberty148—
always a surefire way to irritate the Federalists, who saw in such warnings “the
same design that nurses tell children many strange stories about raw-head and
bloody-bones.”149 But even proponents of a vigorous executive like James
Iredell admitted that “in every [American] country . . . there is a strong
prejudice against the executive authority.”150
To be sure, that didn’t necessarily translate into categorical opposition to
any non-hereditary magistracy. While James Wilson conceded that “the
manners of the United States . . . are [against] a King and are purely
republican,”151 for example, he also reminded the Philadelphia delegates not
to get carried away: “[a]ll know that a single magistrate is not a King.”152 But
the resistance was to more than just a title. From Randolph observing that
“the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of
Monarchy”153 to Hamilton conceding “the aversion of the people to
148 Cornelius, supra note 118, at 415 (“[T]he dignified station in which that officer is
placed . . . cannot be considered as far below that of an European Monarch . . . . with the most
dreadful consequences.”); Philadelphiensis, IX, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 16
DHRC, supra note 46, at 57, 58 (1986) (“Who can deny but the president general will be a king to
all intents and purposes . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
149 Letter from New York, supra note 108, at 383; see also id. at 382-83 (“What snake in the grass is
there here? . . . Such a whim could never have entered the noddle of any man of sense, unless it were
for the purpose of frightening those who have been taught to start at the sound of ‘king.’”). Hamilton
was a little over the top in his fury, accusing Antifederalists of inventing a President with a “diadem
sparkling on his brow” and “murdering janizaries” and the “unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio” at
his command. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 369, 370 (1986); see also id. at 371 (“[C]alculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, [the
antifederalists] have endeavoured to [mischaracterize] the intended President of the United States; not
merely as the embryo but as the full grown progeny of that detested parent.”). For further similar
commentary, see also, for example, Aristides, supra note 87, at 229; Americanus, supra note 73, at 200;
A Freeholder, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 719 (1990);
Publicola, supra note 68, at 493.
150 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 113 (James Iredell); see also, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 86, 87 (John Dickenson) (noting that he considered “limited Monarchy . . .
as one of the best Governments in the world,” but conceding that “limited monarchy was out of the
question. The spirit of the times—the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment”); Charles Pinckney,
Opening Speech in the South Carolina Ratification Debates (May 14, 1788), reprinted in 27 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 324, 333 (2016) (“The citizens of the United States would reprobate, with indignation,
the idea of a monarchy.”). Alexander Hamilton’s “despair that a Republican Govt. Could be established”
in the United States didn’t prevent his “sensib[ility] at the same time that it would be unwise to propose
one of any other form.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 288 (Alexander Hamilton); see also
id. at 288-89 (emphasizing his “private” admiration of the “British Govt”).
151 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 71 (James Wilson).
152 Id. at 96; see also id. (“[Wilson] observed that [Randolph’s] objections [to a one-person
presidency] were levelled not so much agst. the measure itself, as agst. its unpopularity.”).
153 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 88 (Edmund Randolph) (emphasis added)
(unsuccessfully urging an executive by committee); see also id. at 72 (“I Situation of this Country
peculiar—II—Taught the people an aversion to Monarchy III All their constitutions opposed to it—
IV—Fixed character of the people opposed to it . . . .”). For others in this vein, see, e.g., 1
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monarchy . . . . that detested parent,”154 this descriptive point was understood
across the ideological spectrum.
That brings us to a second point of broad agreement: at least in part
because of the power of such antimonarchical politics, everyone understood
that any politically viable proposal would have to subject the executive branch
to the law of the land. As Blackstone’s enormously influential treatise taught,
“one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty” in Britain was “the limitation
of the king’s prerogative by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is
impossible he should ever exceed them . . . .”155 Americans liked to imagine
that this principle was embedded deep in English history, as in the sketch
offered here by “A Farmer”:
Henry Bracton a cotemporary [sic] lawyer and judge, who has left us a
compleat and able treatise on the laws of England, is thus clear and express—
Omnes quidem sub rege, ipse autem sub lege, all are subject to the King, but the
King is subject to the law—It will hardly then be imagined, that the supreme
law and constitution were the grants and concessions of a Prince, who was
thus in theory and practice, subject himself to ordinary acts of legislation.156

While this point had been forcefully contested by the Stuarts and their
intellectual minions, the long aftermath of the Glorious Revolution
conclusively resolved the debate in favor of Parliament.157 So as a political
matter, Federalists simply had to reiterate that the Constitution they were

FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 432 (Elbridge Gerry) (“[T]he American people have the
greatest aversion to monarchy, and the nearer our government approaches to it, the less Chance have
we for their approbation.”); id. at 101-02 (George Mason) (“He hoped that nothing like a monarchy
would ever be attempted in this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through
the late Revolution.”); BALT. MD. GAZETTE, July 3, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at
89, 89 (1988) (criticizing John Adams for supporting “monarchy, or what is the same, ‘a first
Magistrate possessed exclusively of the Executive power.’”).
154 THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at
370, 370 (1986).
155 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230. A recent and excellent Note sheds
important light on the substantial influence that legal writers other than Blackstone exerted on legal
education. But its title is best read as an overstatement of the author’s thesis, which is impressively
demonstrated. See Martin Jordan Minot, Note, The Irrelevance of Blackstone: Rethinking the EighteenthCentury Importance of the Commentaries, 104 VA. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2018) (arguing that Coke, Hale,
and Rolle may have been more significant than Blackstone in the instruction of eighteenth-century
law students).
156 A Farmer, supra note 146, at 311 (footnote omitted) (criticizing the draft constitution’s failure
to include a bill of rights).
157 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1210-15, 1223.
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selling would put “every department and officer of the federal
government . . . subject to the regulation and controul of the laws . . . .”158
But wasn’t subjecting the chief magistrate to “ordinary acts of legislation”
incompatible with Federalists’ avowed and enthusiastic embrace of
presidential vigor and independence? They didn’t think so. Just as the
founders understood the difference between conceptual powers and political
entities, they also understood the difference between the statutory framework
and the various branches of government which created and interpreted it.
The separation of powers was implicated when you forced the President to
obey Congress, not when you forced him to obey the laws. The former was a
political entity that existed and acted at a specific point in time. The latter
was an abstract framework of rules that had been successfully enacted through
a complex process that included presidential approval as a necessary step.
Alexander Hamilton could not have been clearer on the point:
It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on
the legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the
fundamental principles of good government; and whatever may be the forms
of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands.159

Pause for a moment, if you don’t mind, and read that quote again. As the era’s
most vocal advocate for a strong executive magistracy saw it, the
considerations bearing on the President’s political independence from Congress
had nothing to do with the considerations bearing on what substantive
authorities he should possess.160 The two questions were wholly separate:
[H]owever inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded complaisance
in the executive to the inclinations of the people, we can with no propriety
contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the Legislature. The latter
may sometimes stand in opposition to the former; and at other times the

158 A Citizen of New Haven, Observations on the New Federal Constitution, CONN. COURANT,
Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 280, 283 (1984); see also id. (“[T]herefore the
people will have all possible security against oppression.”).
159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at
411, 413 (1986); see also id. (emphasizing the “tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every
other” (emphasis added)). This was no aside. The excerpt above is perhaps the most important two
sentences in perhaps Publius’s most important defense of presidential independence. FEDERALIST
NO. 71 was the first in a pair of essays defending two core elements of the Convention’s package deal
on presidential independence: the duration of the office and the president’s eligibility for re-election.
It was thus a key task to explain why these bulwarks of independence were not at odds with the
universally accepted principle that the chief magistrate should be subject to law.
160 Prudence might have counseled more care about assuming a sharply binary distinction; it’s
not hard to imagine how the form of law could be used to effectuate direct control by a political
entity. But I have seen no evidence in the Founding debates that this proposition would have been
adjusted in response to more careful thought about the ambiguity of that line.
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people may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is certainly desirable
that the executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with
vigor and decision.161

It would be a perfectly natural response here to respond with limit-testing
hypotheticals. But don’t let that reaction obscure the political centrality of
Hamilton’s distinction. Even as they forcefully defended the wisdom of an
independent and vigorous executive magistrate, Federalists not only didn’t,
but couldn’t, question Bractonian piety. The president was subject to the laws.
There was no question, however, of the President being weak. To the
contrary: Federalists leaned hard into their pitch of an Article II president
who would be independent in the exercise of his constitutional and statutory
authorities.162 The Philadelphia deliberations had certainly created a series of
safeguards to precisely that end. By combining selection by the Electoral
College with an extended duration in office, the Constitution reduced the
likelihood that the President would be a catspaw for legislative factions. By
giving him the first move in the appointments process and a presumptively
decisive veto power, the Constitution gave the President tools to defend that
independence once in office. By permitting impeachment, the Constitution
created a limited route for real-time supervision; by requiring a supermajority
for conviction, the Constitution reduced the likelihood that impeachment
would become a tool of ordinary politics.
For the Federalists, this hydraulic calibration was a triumphant solution
to the age-old dilemma of executive authority. And so throughout ratification
they trumpeted the Constitution’s success in giving the President both “that
degree of vigour which will enable the president to execute the laws with
energy and dispatch,” and also “that firm or independent situation which can

THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 159, at 413 (Alexander Hamilton).
This point has been made at least since Charles Thach’s seminal CREATION OF THE
PRESIDENCY. See CHARLES THACH, CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1923). The latest entry in this literature is Eric Nelson’s ROYALIST
REVOLUTION, which urges the non-parliamentary nature of the government scheme that emerged.
See ERIC NELSON, ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICA FOUNDING (2014).
Recall that in the Westminster system, literally anything Parliament enacted was law, including
fundamental changes to the constitution. Nelson’s immensely learned book rightly argues that some
of the king’s prerogatives were reintroduced by the American constitution. And certainly the
revolutionaries’ deployment of the “evil counsellors” trope—so familiar to political debate in any
monarchical system—conveyed a perhaps-sometimes-even-sincere regard for the British monarchy.
E.g. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 391 (Nov. 29, 1775) (“The
manner in which the last dutiful petition to his Majesty was received . . . are considered by Congress
as further proofs of those malignant councils, that surround the sovereign . . . .”). But Nelson’s
imprecision about legal terminology—and in particular about the constitutional significance of
prerogative as a well-defined suite of authorities—leads him to misread evidence of support for
executive independence as an embrace of royalism in a politically or legally significant sense.
161
162
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alone secure the safety of the people, or the just administration of the laws.”163
Did this raise its own risks to liberty? You betcha. This was no milquetoast
president, and everyone knew it. In the ever-so-delicate words of one French
emissary’s report home, it would “perhaps be interesting to examine, if . . . it
is prudent . . . to elect an Officer as powerful as the President of the united
States will be?”164 As Federalists enjoyed reminding their opponents, though,
“[i]t is a well established principle in rhetorick, that it is not fair to argue
against a thing, from the abuse of it.”165
As the founding era has receded further into memory, the more difficult
problem for historians has been to identify the substantive scope of presidential
power. At least where the constitutional authorities of the office are concerned,
the enumeration principle simplifies that question quite a bit. If “[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few
and defined,”166 then it’s hard to get around the fact that Article II doesn’t
include many grants of presidential authority. And that brings us back to the
Executive Power Clause. Does that mousehole hide an elephant?167 Did
someone slip “the unallocated parts of Royal Prerogative”168 into the first
sentence of Article II? Or does the clause convey only the functional authority
to execute law? On either reading, the Executive Power Clause was the raison
d’être of Article II. Let’s try to figure out which one is right.
III. “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” MEANT THE POWER TO EXECUTE
THE LAWS
Americans on all sides of the debates constantly invoked a standard lesson
of eighteenth-century political theory: it’s not enough for government to
163 Charles Pinckney, Opening Convention Speech of the South Carolina Ratification Debates
(May 14, 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 324, 329, 333 (2016). For a pair of more canonical
examples, see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 56 (James Madison) (“If it be a fundamental
principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately exercised;
it is equally so that they be independently exercised . . . . It is essential then . . . [to] give [the President]
a free agency with regard to the Legislature.”); JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA xii-xiii (1787) (“[T]he people’s rights and
liberties, and the democratical mixture in a constitution, can never be preserved without a strong
executive, or, in other words, without separating the executive power from the legislative.”).
164 Letter from Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Montmorin (Oct. 20, 1787), in 13 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 422, 425 (1981) (editors’ translation).
165 A Native of Virginia, supra note 68, at 664; see also id. (“Would you say there should be no
Physicians because there are unskilful administers of medicine: No Lawyers because some are
dishonest: No Courts because Judges are sometimes ignorant; nor government because power may
be abused? In short, it is impossible to guard entirely against the abuse of power.”).
166 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 104, at 479 (James Madison).
167 Cf. Statement of Sir Edward Coke, 4 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1628) col. 357 (“This is magnum in
parvo . . . . It is a matter of great weight, and to speak plainly, it will overthrow all our Petition.”).
168 TRIMBLE, supra note 32.
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make rules; it must also have the power to enforce them. As this Part will
show, the name for that simple but crucial authority was “the executive
power.” Many thought possession of the authority implied at least a
presumptive power to make appointments. And everyone agreed that the
executive power was an empty vessel with a simple executory function: to
implement the law as generated by relevant sources of legislative authority.
A. The Power to Execute the Laws Was Essential to a Complete Government
1. Law Is Meaningless Without Execution
The founders understood the Confederation’s ineffectiveness as just the
latest example of a recurring difficulty in governance design. For Edmund
Randolph, the point was practical: “No government can be stable, which
hangs on human inclination alone, unbiassed by the fear of coercion.”169 For
Publius, it was intrinsic to law as such: “It is essential to the idea of a law, that
it be attended with a sanction; or, in Other words, a penalty or punishment
for disobedience.”170 Either way, the implications were straightforward:
“positive regulations ought to be carried into execution” and “negative
restrictions ought not to [be] disregarded or violated.”171
This was no abstract piety. To the contrary, the execution problem was
a matter of deep and abiding concern. “It is an established truth that no
nation can exist without a coercive power, a power to enforce the execution
169 Edmund Randolph, Letter of his Excellency Edmund Randolph on the Federal Constitution
(Oct. 10, 1787), in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 117, 124 (1984); id. (deriding the Confederation’s
“wretched impotency . . . . sentenced to witness in unavailing anguish”); see also, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 90, at 182 (statement of Archibald Maclaine) (“[T]he powers given by this
Constitution must be executed. What, shall we ratify a government and then say it shall not operate?
This would be the same as not to ratify.”); id. at 139 (statement of Richard Spaight) (“When any
government is established, it ought to have power to enforce its laws, or else it might as well have no
power. What but that is the use of a judiciary? . . . . [N]o government can exist without a judiciary to
enforce its laws, by distinguishing the disobedient from the rest of the people, and imposing sanctions
for securing the execution of the laws.”); id. at 153 (statement of Samuel Spencer) (“I am ready to
acknowledge that the Congress ought to have the power of executing its laws.”).
170 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at
324, 328 (1984); see also id. (“Government implies the power of making laws.”).
171 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 156 (William Davie). Note that in the literature on
which this discussion drew, the founders distinguished between two theoretically distinct powers of
execution. First, the enforcement of negative prohibitions like a ban on piracy. See, e.g. Marcus, IV,
NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Mar. 12, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 379, 381 (1986)
(“[I]f they could not enforce such acts by the enacting of penalties, those powers would be altogether
useless, since a legislative regulation without some sanction would be an absurd thing indeed.”). Second,
the implementation of affirmative projects like the construction of postal roads. Letter from the
Reverend James Madison to James Madison, supra note 101, at 31 (“[A] Govt. so wisely conceived in it’s
general Plan . . . must possess Vigour & Energy sufft. to execute the Measures adopted under it.”). See
generally Julian Davis Mortenson, A Theory of Republican Prerogative, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 52-54 (2014).

2020]

Executive Power Clause

1307

of its political regulations.”172 Without the power to enforce, the power to
legislate was “nonsensical”;173 “idle and nugatory”;174 “useless”;175
“ridiculous”;176 an “inconceivable absurdity”;177 a “political farce” or
“solecism”;178 “strange indeed;”179 even “a felo de se.”180 Some founders went
so far as to argue that “[l]aws of any kind which fail of execution, are worse
than none, because they weaken the government, expose it to contempt,
destroy the confidence of all men . . . .”181
As throughout the literature on which the founders relied, this point was
often made through extended metaphors involving bodies or machines.

172 Samuel Huntington, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), reprinted in 15
DHRC, supra note 46, at 312, 313 (1984).
173 Letter from Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger, supra note 85, at 567; see also id. at
564, 567 (“Can there be such a thing as Government without Power? What is advice, recommendation,
or requisition? It is not Government . . . . When Laws are made they are nonsensical unless they can
be carried into execution; therefore it is necessary somebody shou’d have a Power of determining when
they are broken, and to decree ye forfieture in consequence of such breach.”).
174 Cato, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at
438, 440 (Dec. 19 1787); see also id. at 439-40 (“If a union is necessary, a government is also necessary
for that union; for to make general laws without having power of executing them, would be idle and
nugatory . . . . [T]he powers necessary to be given to a confederated government, for the purposes
of executing the general laws of the union . . . .”).
175 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 144, 145 (statement of James Iredell); see also id. at
145-46 (“[L]aws are useless unless they are executed. At present, Congress have powers which they
cannot execute. After making laws which affect the dearest interest of the people, in the
constitutional mode, they have no way of enforcing them.”).
176 A Jerseyman, To the Citizens of New Jersey, TRENTON MERCURY, Nov. 6, 1787, reprinted in
3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 146, 149 (1978); see also id. (“It will be readily agreed that it would be
highly ridiculous to send representatives . . . to make laws for us, if we did not give power to some
person or persons to see them duly executed. The wisdom and prudence is to be shown in the
framing laws; the complete execution of them ought to follow of course.” (emphasis omitted)).
177 Letter from New York, supra note 108, at 389 (discussing Calling Forth clause); see also id.
(“[I]f Congress is invested with power to make laws, the power of executing laws in the most ample
and effectual manner ought to be lodged there also. Without this, there would have been an
inconceivable absurdity in the Constitution.”).
178 Edmund Randolph, Speech in the Virginia Ratification Debates (June 4, 1788), in 9 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 915, 934 (1978); see also id. (arguing that the Confederation was “a system, that provided
no means of enforcing the powers which were nominally given it. Was it not a political farce, to pretend
to vest powers, without accompanying them with the means of putting them in execution?”).
179 Charles Carroll, Draft Speech for Maryland Convention (Jan.–Mar. 1788), in 12 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 832, 839 (2015); see also id. (“To have given to Congress an authority & power to
make laws, & withheld the means of enforcing them would have been a proceeding strange indeed
in men so well acquainted with the defects of the existing system . . . . and leave us nothing but the
shadow, the mockery of an unreal government . . . .”).
180 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 158 (statement of William Davie).
181 A Citizen of Philadelphia, supra note 107, at 304 (emphasis partly omitted); see also id. (“[I]n
fine, our union can never be supported without definite and effectual laws which are co-extensive
with their occasions, and which are supported by authorities and laws which can give them execution
with energy . . . .”).
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Enforcement authority provided the “ligaments of Government,”182 the
“limbs, or parts” of the institutions they served,183 and “[t]he nerves of the
whole body politic.”184 Government is therefore “a nerveless mass, a dead
carcase, without the executive power.”185 Its “powers . . . are mere sound”;186
its “machine[ry]” can “no more move, than a ship without wind, or a clock
without weights.”187 “[E]mpower[ing] one body of men to enact statutes; and
another to forbid their being carried into execution,” Republicus wrote,
“resembles a man putting forth his right hand to do some important business
and then stretching forth his left hand to prevent it . . . .”188
Their obsessive worry manifested in almost ritualistic reference to “good
laws faithfully executed.”189 Indeed, that phrase became literal ritual when it
182 Statement of Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 12, 1788), reprinted in
10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1184, 1193 (1993) (citing Montesquieu, Locke, Sidney, and Harrington
on the balance between excessive severity and excessive lenience in execution).
183 Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, Letter XV (May 2,
1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1043 (2004) (“[E]xecutive officers [such] as clerks, sheriffs,
&c . . . . are all properly limbs, or parts, of the judicial courts . . . .”).
184 Speech of Simeon Baldwin, supra note 68, at 237; see also id. (“The nerves of the whole body
politic should concenter in the supreme executive; and the great council of the nation, under due
restrictions, ought to command the purse and the sword; or in vain will they weild the sceptre of
government. To what purpose should a legislative enact laws if nobody is obliged to obey them?”).
185 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 58 (William Davie); see id. (“Let your
representatives be the most vicious demons that ever existed; let them plot against the liberties of
America; let them conspire against its happiness,—all their machinations will not avail if not put in
execution. By whom are their laws and projects to be executed? By the President.”). Compare THE
FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 102, at 358 (James Madison) (declaring that government is “a lifeless
mass” without “the means of carrying [its powers] into practice”), with id. (“[T]he Confederation is
chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in the fœderal government to be
absolutely necessary, and at the time rendering them absolutely nugatory . . . .”).
186 Statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratification Debates (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 571, 581 (1976); see also id. (“Can we perform a single national act?”).
187 Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), in 15 DHRC, supra
note 46 at 243, 246 (1984); see id. (“Mr. President, have we not seen and felt the necessity of such a
coercive power?”); cf. Speech of William Pierce (July 4, 1788), in 18 DHRC, supra note 46, at 249, 253
(1995) (“[T]he old Constitution . . . being placed, as it were, out of the perpendicular, it is like the
hanging tower of Pisa; it is kept up and supported only by props, that must one day or other fall.”).
188 Republicus, KY. GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 375, 380 (1988);
see id. (criticizing bicameral structure of legislative process rather than the executive power per se).
189 PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, June 5, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 126, 126
(1981). American antecedents stretched back at least to the Rhode Island Compact of 1636. R.I.
COMPACT (1636), in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3207-08 (1909) (“It is in the
Powre of the Body of Freemen orderly assembled, or the major part of them, to make or constitute
Just Lawes, by which they will be regulated, and to depute from among themselves such Ministers
as shall see them faithfully executed between Man and Man.”); see also, e.g., Statement of Edmund
Randolph, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 970,
987-88 (1990) (“No extent on earth seems to me too great, provided the laws be wisely made and
executed.”); id. (“[L]aws . . . made with integrity, and executed with wisdom . . . .”); Statement of
Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note
46, at 1412, 1427 (1993) (“To give execution to proper laws, in a proper manner, is the[] peculiar
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came time to toast ratification. Whether accompanied by muskets or cannon,
by folded hands or a raised tumbler, the formulation was strikingly consistent:
“wise Federal Laws, and may they be well executed” in Maryland190 and
Pennsylvania;191 “[w]isdom to frame laws and spirit to execute them” in South
Carolina;192 and “grace, wisdom and understanding to make and execute such
laws . . . to secure . . . the blessings of liberty” in Virginia.193 Meaningful
execution was the central promise of ratification, and they knew it.
2. Executing Laws Was the Defining Function of the Article II President
Once you know the job that needs doing, the next step is to give it to
someone.194 “Suppose that the three powers, were to be vested in three
persons by compact among themselves,” Gouverneur Morris mused, such that
“one was to have the power of making—another of executing, and a third of
judging, the laws.”195 His analogy wasn’t subtle. The defining role of the
legislature was promulgating law. The defining role of the judiciary was
adjudicating law. And the defining role of the President was executing law.
In this framework, it was the Article II presidency that made the new
government “complete.” To be sure, a number of other provisions also spoke
province” of the judiciary); Letter from William Vassall to John Lowell (Feb. 26, 1788), reprinted in
7 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1709, 1709 (2001) (“[W]ithout an Efficient Government no State or
Society of Men will be just or happy. By an Efficient government . . . that will make wise &
Equitable Laws, And as Horace expresses it, Justos et tenaces propositi Vires be Armed with full
compulsive power to Execute said Laws . . . .”).
190 BALT. MD. J., July 11, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 751, 751 (2015); see also
MD. J., July 1, 1788, reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1718, 1719 (1993) (toast to “Wise Federal
Laws, and well executed”).
191 Extract of a letter from Head of Elk, PA. MERCURY, July 15, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 752, 752 (2015).
192 CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, May 7, 1788, reprinted in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 276, 276 (2016).
193 E.g., The New Litany, V A. H ERALD, Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 399, 400 (1988).
194 Separation of powers theory advised at least two design principles for any distribution of
the powers of government. First, the various entities needed to be meaningfully independent. E.g.
Statement of Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 5, 1788), reprinted in 9 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 943, 947 (1990) (“Would any Gentleman in this Committee agree,” one Federalist
asked in Virginia, “to vest these three powers in one body, Congress? No.—Hence the necessity of
a new organization and distribution of those powers.”). Second, each individual entity needed to be
structured so that it could most effectively implement its defining power. E.g. Speech of Simeon
Baldwin, supra note 68, at 236 (“It is necessary in a good government, that the legislature should be
so formed as not to enact laws without due deliberation—that the judicial be competent to the
administration of justice, and that the executive have energy to carry their decisions into execution.”).
195 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 78-79 (Gouverneur Morris) (responding to
criticism of including the judiciary in proposed council of revision). Cato’s use of Vesting Clause
terms was similarly unmistakable. Cato, supra note 60, at 277 (without certainty in “political
compacts . . . you might as well deposit the important powers of legislation and execution in one or
a few and permit them to govern according to their disposition and will”).
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to the execution problem. But it was fundamentally “the president, . . . so
much concerned in the execution of the laws,”196 who transformed the
Confederation into a more perfect union. This point was common ground
among the competing proposals in Philadelphia: both the New Jersey plan
and its Virginia competitor listed “authority to execute” or “power to carry
into execution” as the chief magistrate’s first substantive authority.197 Indeed,
the first draft of each plan gave these provisions an almost-goes-withoutsaying flavor, listing presidential powers “besides a general authority to
execute the National laws”198 and “besides [a] general authority to execute the
federal acts,”199 respectively.
What emerged from the ensuing negotiations was the President as “the
superior officer, who is to see the laws put in execution”:200
[A] properly constituted and independent executive,—a vindex injuriarum—
an avenger of public wrongs; who with the assistance of a third estate, may
enforce the rigor of equal law on those who are otherwise above the fear of
punishment . . . .201

This was an indispensable charge. As James Iredell put it, the “office of
superintending the execution of the laws of the Union” was “of the utmost
importance. It is of the greatest consequence to the happiness of the people
of America, that the person to whom this great trust is delegated should be
worthy of it.”202
B. The Constitutional Term for this Power to Execute Laws Was “The Executive
Power”
So everyone understood that the defining function of the President was his
power to execute laws. In a limited constitution of enumerated powers, though,
which clause conveyed that specific mandate as an affirmatively authorized
governance authority? Stepping back from decades of highly politicized
controversy, the question is so textually obvious that for newcomers it might
seem rhetorical. Because the answer is staring you in the face:
196 Fabius, IV, PA. MERCURY, Apr. 19, 1788, reprinted in 17 DHRC, supra note 46, at 180, 181
(1995); see also id. (surveying the defining features of each branch).
197 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 21 (Virginia Plan); id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan)
(first listing “authority to execute the federal acts”); cf. id. at 230 (Amended Virginia Plan) (“power
to carry into execution the National Laws”); 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 116 (ReAmended Virginia Plan) (“power to carry into execution the National Laws”).
198 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 21 (Virginia Plan) (emphasis added).
199 Id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan) (emphasis added).
200 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 47 (Archibald Maclaine).
201 A Farmer, II, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 29, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at
325, 330 (2015) (emphasis omitted).
202 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 106 (James Iredell).
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The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.

It really is that simple. The founders variously shorthanded the power therein
granted as the “authority [or responsibility] to execute laws”;203 as “the whole
executive government”;204 or as “the whole [or sole] executive authority.”205 But
most often they just called it “executive power.”206 Sometimes it seemed like the
only thing on which that squabbling generation could agree.
1. The Root and Cognates of the Term
Let’s start with the root of the word. The word “execute” meant to
perform; to complete; to carry out; to implement; to bring into being; or
simply to do.207 When you executed something, you took some intention that
as yet existed only as a plan, and you brought it into reality. Execution thus
meant success in creating something new, often with a flavor of subordination
203 A Countryman, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 115, 115 (2015); see also id. (“Are not the Governors of the different States equally absolute all along?
Each of them have had the command of the fleet, the army and militia, and authority to execute
laws?”); A NATIVE OF BOSTON: THOUGHTS UPON THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1787), reprinted in 7 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1763, 1767 (2001) (advocating a single
magistrate with a veto, the appointment power, and “responsib[ility] in the dernier resort for the
execution” of law (emphasis omitted)).
204 A Countryman, V, NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 1787, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note
46, at 54, 55 (1984) (listing “the whole executive government” as a separate prerogative from the
king’s military, veto, prorogation, and financial powers).
205 Id. (describing “the whole executive authority” as an alternative formulation); The
Impartial Examiner, IV, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 11, 1788, reprinted in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at
1609, 1610 (1993) (contrasting “the sole executive authority” with the separate prerogative of veto)
(emphasis omitted); see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 109 (James Iredell) (“In [Great
Britain], the executive authority is vested in a magistrate who holds it by birthright. He has great
powers and prerogatives . . . .”).
206 See, e.g., Americanus, IV, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 5-6, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 354, 358 (2003) (contrasting the constitution’s placement of “the Executive power
in the hands of a single person” with the King’s suite of “dangerous prerogatives”); The Impartial
Examiner, supra note 205, at 1609 (contrasting “the supreme executive power” as an alternative
formulation); Pierce Butler to Weeden Butler (May 5, 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 268, 269
n.6 (2016) (paralleling Caroliniensis; implications unclear for question of authorship vs. influence);
cf. Marcus, II , NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 242, 244-45 (1986) (describing the Crown “who has the whole Executive authority” and need not
“consult []either house as to any exercise of its Executive power,” in a discussion of “the actual
present practice of Great-Britain”—where, of course, other elements of the royal prerogative were
regularly subject to legislative review and control); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison),
reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 498, 500 (1984) (explaining that the English constitution
mixes powers because the King—who possesses “the whole executive power”—is thus “the executive
magistrate” and yet also possesses “the prerogative of making treaties,” the veto, and the power of
judicial appointments).
207 E.g. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 732 (6th ed. 1785)
(offering a typical range of definitions for “execute”).
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to instructions from somewhere else.208 It was also a pretty ordinary word,
appearing regularly in circumstances where we would likely use a lowerregister formulation today.
The sheer range of objects taken by “execute” in eighteenth-century
discourse is striking. But easily its most common209 grammatical object was
the enforcement, implementation, and carrying out of “law.” If, as Publius
declaimed, “[l]aw is defined to be a rule of action,”210 then enforcing that rule
was obviously its “execution.” (Just to make extra sure, the busybodies of the
Political Club of Danville agreed that it would be best to amend the
Constitution by “strik[ing] out the word ‘execute’” each time it appeared and
replacing it with “enforce obedience to.”211) This formulation was in constant
use, whether the founders were chattering in informal contexts or declaiming
in formal ones. They spoke of “executing” the law of the national government,
the law of the individual states, the law of particular localities, the law of
nations, and the law of political society in the abstract. Their state
constitutions are covered in references to the “execution” of law, and often
more than that—a constant collocation that both reflected and reinforced the
standard tripartite structure for the elements of complete government.212
From here the key point for the Executive Power Clause followed
naturally. As shown in previous work, scores of eighteen-century dictionaries
offer the following uncontradicted definition of the adjective “executive”:
“having the quality of executing or performing.”213

The sheer unanimity is overwhelming. Consider how easy it would be to
specify a metonymic definition of “executive” that could support a substantive
residuum, even if only as a secondary meaning. All it would take is adding
some variation on “relating to an executive,” “relating to the executive branch
208 E.g., Rough Carver, NY DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 4, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 36, 37 (2003) (“[I]f a great villain orders one, or more, smaller ones, to cut our throats,
they are all guilty, as well those who execute, as he who directs”); Letter from Zephaniah Swift to
Paul Fearing (Apr. 10, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 599, 600 (1978) (“Their story was that a
combination was forming in the western part of the state to dismiss Dyer from the Superior Court
and that this depended on me as an instrument to execute the plan.”).
209 At least as reflected in the Documentary History, the Journals of the Continental and
Confederation Congress, and the Correspondence of Delegates to the Continental and
Confederation Congress.
210 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 232,
236 (1986) (criticizing mutability in government policy).
211 The Political Club of Danville, Kentucky, Debates over the Constitution, (Feb. 23–May 17,
1788), in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 408, 413 (1988). We can apparently thank Mr. Innes for the
initial motion, and Mr. McDowell for its second.
212 See infra Section III.B.3. (discussing the concept of a “complete” and “perfect” government).
213 JOHNSON, supra note 207, at 732; see also generally Mortenson, supra note 5 (surveying all
Founding era dictionaries that could be identified and located after a comprehensive search).
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of government,” or “relating to an executive magistrate.” Indeed, precisely
that “relating to” formulation was used regularly—in definitions of other
words.214 But in dictionary definitions of “executive,” it didn’t appear once.
An “executive officer” was thus the one responsible for “execution of the
laws,”215 for “carry[ing] . . . decrees into execution,”216 or simply for
“compulsion.”217 The “executive part” of government was that which is
“requisite for carrying those decrees into execution.”218 “Executive business”
was implemented by “executive officers” who “have it in charge, faithfully
to . . . execute the laws”219 and whose reason for being was simply by
214 For just a few examples of this standard “relating to [noun]” formula, see, e.g. JOHNSON,
supra note 207, at 74, 124, 710 (defining “Abdominal” as “relating to the abdomen,” “Airy” as “Relating
to the air,” and “Epistolary” as “Relating to letters”); NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 666, 176 (1828) (defining “subjective” as “[r]elating to
the subject” and “nominative” as “[p]ertaining to the name which precedes a verb”).
215 NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA 16
(1787); see also id. (“One half the evils in a state arise from a lax execution of the laws; and it is
impossible that an executive officer can act with vigor and impartiality, when his office depends on
the popular voice.”)
216 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 269 (May 7, 1787)
(describing a proposal for the organization of the Illinois territory, resolving “that the said
Commissioner with the advice and Consent of the major part of the said Magistrates of the district
shall appoint executive officers therein respectively to carry their decrees into execution. . . .”); see
also 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 156 (Mar. 14, 1785)
(describing a proposal for the organization of the Kaskaskie territory, resolving “[t]hat the
Commissioner, with the advice and consent of the above magistrates, appoint executive Officers in
the respective districts to carry their decrees into execution.”).
217 Statement of Robert Livingston, Convention Debates (June 26, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 1921, 1941 (2008) (arguing that a proposal for indirect taxation requires “compulsion” in
the case the states refuse, which in turn “supposes that a compleat establishment of executive officers
must be constantly maintained . . . .”).
218 Letter from Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant to Joseph Badger, supra note 85, at 567. Sargeant
expounded on the point at some length.

This shows ye necessity of ye Judicial Power—and an executive with ye necessary
officers are requisite for carrying those decrees into execution—and without all this ye
whole parade of making laws wou’d be idle. That these parts, ye Judicial and executive,
shou’d be appointed by congress is necessary in order that ye proceedings may be
uniform and to prevent one state from conniving at or disregarding ye laws made for
ye benefit of ye whole. If they are to raise money they must have officers to collect it.
Id. 567-68.
219 Federal Farmer, supra note 183, at 1043. Federal Farmer went on to note that
The business of the judicial department is, properly speaking, judicial in part, in part
executive, done by judges and juries, by certain recording and executive officers, as
clerks, sheriffs, &c. they are all properly limbs, or parts, of the judicial courts, and have
it in charge, faithfully to decide upon, and execute the laws, in judicial cases.
Id.; see also RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 200 (quoting Robert Morris urging Congress to “pay good
executive men to do [its] business . . . , because no man living can attend the daily deliberations of
Congress and do executive parts of business at the same time.”).
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definition “to carry into the effect the laws of the nation.”220 And referring to
a government entity as the “Execut[ive] . . . power[]” meant that it was “the
Executor . . . of laws.”221
Enter metonymy. Because when the founders used the noun form of
“executive,” they meant an entity that had the power of execution.222 No one
put it better than Publius: “A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of
the government. A feeble executive is but another phrase for a bad execution:
And a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in
practice a bad government.”223 So the definition of an “executive” in its
nominal form simply meant an “[e]xecutor of the [l]aws,”224 a “person[] for
the execution of the laws,”225 an “[e]xecutor . . . of laws,”226 and an officer with
“authority to enforce your laws.”227 An executive was thus necessarily
“invested with power to enforce the laws of the union and give energy to the

220 A Landholder, V (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 480, 483 (1978); see also
id. (“It is as necessary there should be courts of law and executive officers, to carry into effect the laws
of the nation, as that there be courts and officers to execute the laws made by your state assemblies.”).
221 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 34 (James Madison) (“If it be essential to the
preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to
a maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other . . . . In like
manner a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as well
as the maker of laws . . . .”).
222 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 (“[O]n demand of the executive Authority of the
State . . . .”); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV (1777) (“[U]pon demand of the
Governor or executive power, of the state . . . .”).
223 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at
396, 396 (1986).
224 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 110 (Pierce Butler) (“Mr. Dickinson could not
agree with Gentlemen in blending the national Judicial with the Executive, because the one is the
expounder, and the other the Executor of the Laws.”).
225 Aristides, supra note 87, at 236-37. Alexander Contee Hanson, the person behind the
pseudonym Aristides, begins by discussing the basic units of government: First, the legislative
function: “That the people should either make laws to bind themselves, or elect persons, without
whose consent, no laws shall be made, is essential to their freedom.” Id. at 236 Next, the executive
function: “But universal experience forbids, that they should also immediately choose persons for
the execution of the laws”—people who are then described as “an executive.” Id.; see also id. at 237
(“Against choosing an executive for life the reasons are weighty indeed.”).
226 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 34 (James Madison) (“If it be essential to the
preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other. . . . In like manner a
dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as the maker
of laws . . . .”).
227 John Kean, Comments on the Constitution (c. Apr. 8, 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 248, 248 (2016) (noting that “an energetic executive is as necessary to government & the happiness
of the governed as liberty—for without authority to enforce your laws, liberty degenerates into
savage licentiousness, an extreme as much to be dreaded as tyranny”).
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federal government,”228 and indeed defined by its ability to “execute the laws
without restraint.”229
2. “The Executive Power” Meant “The Power to Execute”
On this background, the meaning of “the executive power” was exactly
what you’d expect. If Publius could ask, “[w]hat is a legislative power but a
power of making laws?”,230 then what indeed was the executive power but the
power of executing them? As previous work has shown, the sources most
prized by modern originalists reflect a literally uncontested understanding of
this point.231 Eighteenth-century dictionaries, legal treatises, political theory
tracts, caselaw, politicians, clergymen, and pamphleteers all agreed that the
phrase “executive power” meant something quite simple: “[t]he power of
putting in execution.”232
Rousseau’s use of a simplistic bodily metaphor was typical:
Every free action has two causes which concur to produce it, one moral—the
will which determines the act; the other physical—the strength which
executes it . . . . The body politic has the same two motive powers—and we
can make the same distinction between will and strength—the former is
legislative power and the latter executive power.233

This understanding held true in dictionary definitions for generic
authority without any specific context.234 It held true in definitions that
specified a legal hook or governance role.235 It held true in definitions that
referenced the entire phrase as a singular term of art.236 And it held true in

228 WEBSTER, supra note 215, at 54 (“The president of the United States is elective, and . . .
[a]s the supreme executive, he is invested with power to enforce the laws of the union and give
energy to the federal government.”).
229 Statement of Alexander Hamilton, New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788), reprinted
in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1921, 1954 (2008) (“What is your state government? Does not your
legislature command what money it pleases? Does not your executive execute the laws without
restraint? These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system,
but only to its separate branches.”).
230 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 216, 220 (1984).
231 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1230-43.
232 A POCKET DICTIONARY; OR, COMPLETE ENGLISH EXPOSITOR (3d ed. 1765).
233 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. III, ch. 1, at 101 (Maurice
Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762).
234 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1265-66 nn.391-417 (listing twenty-seven definitions for the
adjective “executive” in non-governance contexts).
235 Id. at 1267-68 nn.424-34 and accompanying text (listing eleven definitions for the adjective
“executive” in governance contexts).
236 Id. at 1269 nn.435-39 and accompanying text (providing five definitions for the full phrases
“executive power” or “the executive power”).
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the formulations offered by canonical writers like Blackstone,237 De Lolme,238
Filmer,239 Locke,240 Montesquieu,241 and Vattel,242 among many, many
others.243 The evidence for this background understanding is uncontested,
and it is overwhelming.
The founders took this definition entirely for granted. Indeed, it was a
presumption without which half of what they said about the presidency didn’t
make sense. And it was everywhere, with late-eighteenth-century Americans
variously defining the executive power as:
•

“the power of . . . enforcing laws,”244

•

“the power of executing the laws,”245

•

“the power of carrying th[e] laws into execution”246

237 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142 (defining executive power as “the
right . . . of enforcing the laws . . . .”).
238 See JEAN-LOUIS DELOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR AN ACCOUNT OF
THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 81 (1775) (“[T]he administration of Justice.”).
239 See SIR ROBERT FILMER, THE ANARCHY OF A LIMITED OR MIXED MONARCHY 4
(1648) (“[A] power of putting those laws in execution . . . .”).
240 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 90 (1690) (“[S]ee[ing] to the
execution of the laws that are made . . . .”).
241 See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 165 (Thomas Nugent,
trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748) (describing “the execution of [the] general will” as being
determined by “the legislative power”).
242 See M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, 134 (1820) (“[T]he
. . . province to have [the laws] put into execution.”).
243 Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1230-43.
244 Cassius, Letter I to Richard Henry Lee, Esquire, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 2, 1788, reprinted
in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 641, 642-43 (1990) (quoting Blackstone); see also id. (“Are the legislative
and executive powers in that government ‘separate,’ in which the King, who has the whole of the
executive, occupies one entire branch of the legislative?” (emphasis omitted)). Cassius then goes on
to quote “your favorite author, Blackstone”: “‘In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy,
or the right of making and enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man . . . and whenever
these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty.’ From this it appears, that
liberty is only endangered, when the whole of the power of both making and enforcing laws is vested
in one man . . . .” Id. at 643 (footnote omitted).
245 Statement of Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 10, 1788), in 9
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1092, 1097 (1990); see also id. at 1097-98 (“It cannot be objected to the
Federal Executive, that the power is executed by one man. All the enlightened part of mankind agree
that the superior dispatch, secrecy, and energy with which one man can act, renders it more politic
to vest the power of executing the laws in one man, than in any number of men.”).
246 Pennsylvania Council of Censors (Aug. 11, 1784), in PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO
CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, 84 (1825) (“The exercise of power in the greatest
articles of it, those of making laws, and carrying those laws into execution, is, by [our constitution]
assigned to two great branches. The legislative power is vested in the . . . general assembly, and the
executive in a president and council . . . . [,] [t]he legislative [and] executive . . . powers of the people
being thus . . . delegated to different bodies”)
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•

the “peculiar duty to see [legislative] act[s] carried into execution,”247

•

“that of executing the public resolutions,”248

•

“direct[ing] the execution of our laws,”249

•

“The execution of ye. Laws,”250

•

an “efficient power, to carry . . . article[s] into effect,”251 and

•

the “power to use . . . the powers nominally vested” in a government.252

That’s why the Federal Farmer could breeze so quickly by the Executive
Power Clause: “reason, and the experience of enlightened nations, seem justly
to assign the [Article I] business of making laws to numerous assemblies; and
the [Article II] execution of them, principally, to the direction and care of one
man.”253 That’s why a Connecticut ratification delegate could refer so blandly
to the clause as a simple, unobjectionable authority: “the power, which is to

Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. 96, 105 (Gen. Ct. Va. 1771) (defining “the executive power of the laws”).
Brutus, VA. INDEP. CHRON., May 14, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 798,
799-800 (1990); see also id. (“[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers. . . . Miserable indeed would be the case, were the same man or the
same body of men . . . to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the
public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes and differences of individuals.”).
249 BALT. MD. Gazette, Mar. 4, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 363, 364 (2015);
see also id. (denying that the Senate would share “the executive power,” since it cannot “interfere
with or direct the execution of our laws”).
250 Letter from William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 107, 114 (1983); see id. (“That there must be an executive power independent of ye.
Legislative branch, appears to have been generally agreed by ye. fabricators of modern
Constitutions. But I believe it has not till now been supposed essential that this power should be
vested in a single person . . . . Laws requires as much prudence as any other department, & ye.
pardoning or refusing to pardon offences is a very delicate matter.”).
251 William Cushing, Undelivered Speech (c. Feb. 4, 1788), in 6 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1438,
1440 (2000) (along with the judicial power); see id. at 1339-1440 (“[T]he Confederation, in appearance
imparted many, if not most of the great powers, now inserted in the proposed Constitution; . . . but
not one efficient power, to carry a single article into effect . . . . These governmental [sic] powers, in
order to have full & proper effect, must . . . consist of the Executive, the Legislative, & judicial.
Without these govmt cannot be carried an End.”).
252 Statement of James Madison, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 16, 1788), in 10 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 1299, 1304 (1993) (“He asked, if powers were given to the General Government, if
we must not give it executive power to use it? The vice of the old system was, that Congress could
not execute the powers nominally vested in them.”).
253 Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican Letter XIV (May 2,
1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976 (2004) (noting that “[b]y art. 2. sect. 1. the executive power
shall be vested in a president”). He elsewhere explained the “business of the judicial department” is
“properly speaking, judicial in part, in part executive” because courts are charged both “faithfully to
decide upon, and [to] execute the laws, in judicial cases . . . .” Federal Farmer, supra note 183, at 1043.
247
248
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enforce the[] Laws.”254 And that’s why a Georgia Federalist could describe the
requisite authority so simply as “an efficient power to execute . . . laws.”255
This understanding was unmistakable regardless of the precise
terminology used, as when Brutus observed that the governments’ “authority
to execute” amounted to “the means, to attain the ends, to which they are
designed.”256 This resulted, among other things, in the frequent equation of
“executive duties” and “administration,”257 as with the Continental Congress
defining “the executive powers” as “the powers of administration,”258 or with
Centinel observing that among “the great distinctions of power,” “the
executive” element was simply “the ordinary administrative.”259 (The
standard definition of executive power as the implementing authority was
actually one reason the drafters decided to give Congress the power to
“Declare” rather than to “Make” war. One delegate worried that “make war
might be understood to ‘conduct’ it which was an Executive function . . . .”260)
So Publius was just stating a commonplace when explaining that “[t]he
administration of government . . . in its most usual and perhaps in its most

William Samuel Johnson, supra note 99, at 249.
Speech of William Pierce, supra note 7, at 253 (“In all the state governments the three great branches
that maintain each other give each separate part of the Union an efficient power to execute its own laws.
But, in the Federal Constitution, there is nothing but legislative and recommendatory powers, without even the
shadow of authority to support or enforce its decrees.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
256 Brutus, VI, N.Y. J., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 466, 472 (2003)
(“[T]he objects of each [government] ought to be pointed out, and . . . each ought to possess ample
authority to execute the powers committed to them . . . . This being the case, the conclusion follows,
that each should be furnished with the means, to attain the ends, to which they are designed.”).
257 E.g., A Citizen of Philadelphia, The Weaknesses of Brutus Exposed (Nov. 8, 1787), in 14
DHRC, supra note 46, at 63, 68 (1983) (“[T]he execution and administration of [these government
powers] will require the greatest wisdom . . . . The best constitution possible, even a divine one,
badly administered, will make a bad government.” (emphasis omitted)); PHILA. INDEP.
GAZETTEER, June 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 147, 148 (1981) (“[T]he
administration or executive duties of government . . . .”); cf. Theophilus Parsons, Notes of
Massachusetts Ratification Debates (Jan. 15, 1788), in 6 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1206, 1207 (2000)
(noting “executors or administrators” of an estate).
258 Continental Congress, Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774), reprinted in 1
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 104, 110 (“Apply these decisive
maxims [of Montesquieu], sanctified by the authority of a name which all Europe reveres, to your
own state. You have a Governor, it may be urged, vested with the executive powers, or the powers of
administration . . . .”); see also infra text accompanying note 337 for more on this letter.
259 Centinel, II, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at
457, 465 (1981) (emphasis omitted) (“The chief improvement in government, in modern times, has
been the compleat separation of the great distinctions of power; placing the legislative in different
hands from those which hold the executive; and again severing the judicial part from the ordinary
administrative. When the legislative and executive powers (says Montesquieu) are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.” (cleaned up)).
260 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 319 (Rufus King) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254
255
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precise signification” is “limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly
within the province of the executive department.261
3. “The Executive Power” Was the Hallmark of a “Complete” or “Perfect”
Government
That brings us to one of the era’s most important political tropes: the idea
of a “complete” or “perfect” government. This had nothing to do with morality
or beauty. Rather, it built on an almost naive concept of government action as
a simple three-part sequence of “legislative, judicial, and executive power.”262
These “three grand immutable principles in good government”263 were
logically intertwined, each indispensable to a coherent whole. Legislative action
was the formulation of political intent in the form of operational instructions.
Judicial action was the impartial assessment of how legislated instructions
should apply to particular circumstances. Executive action was the active
implementation of legislated instructions in the real world. Drawing on a rich
foundation of political and legal theory,264 the sequence was so familiar that it
verged on trite.265 Soap, scrub, rinse. Powder, ball, cartridge. Legislate,
261 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at
421, 422 (1986); see also id. (noting also that administration “in its largest sense, comprehends all the
operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive or judiciary . . . .”).
262 Cato, II, N.Y.J., Oct. 11, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 79, 80 (2003); cf.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE 26
(1735) (“Of every perfect Law there are two Parts: One, whereby it is directed what is to be done or
omitted: the other, wherein is declared what Punishment he shall incur, who neglects to do what is
commanded, or attempts that which is prohibited.” (emphasis omitted)).
263 A Bostonian, A View of the Federal Government of America, Its Defects, and a Proposed Remedy,
BOS. INDEP. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1786, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 359, 360 (1981); see also
An Address of the Convention, for Framing a New Constitution of Government for the State of
Massachusetts Bay, No. III (1780), in JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A
CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 219 (1832) (“The
Legislative; the Judicial and Executive Powers naturally exist in every Government: And . . . when
the same Man or Body of Men enact, interpret, and execute the Laws, . . . a People are finally borne
down with the force of corruption resulting from the Union of those Powers”).
264 See Mortenson, supra note 5, Parts II–III. For perhaps the quintessential real-world
example when the Framers sat down in Philadelphia, consider the 1783 Massachusetts Constitution:
“The body politic” requires “an equitable mode of making laws . . . an impartial interpretation, and
a faithful execution of them . . . .” MASS. CONST. pmbl., reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at
440, 440. “[T]he people” therefore “vested” these three powers as “authority, whether legislative,
executive, or judicial” in “the several magistrates and officers of government” as “their substitutes
and agents.” MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. V, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 440, 442.
265 An exasperated British reviewer’s snark about John Adams’s work on mixed government can
serve just as well to in describing the Founder’s discussions of the separation of powers: “We are
indeed repeatedly told that no government can exist, but where a balance, consisting of three parts, is
preserved. Upon this point, like Lord Chesterfield with the Graces, Dr. Adams dwells for ever.” John
Adams, A Defence of the Constitution of Government of the United States of America, LONDON MONTHLY
REV., May 1787, at 394, 395. Note of course that, as Martin Flaherty has emphasized, the Founding
debate engaged two quite different concerns: the separation of powers proper and the Aristotelian-
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adjudicate, execute. Once in a great while someone pointed out that the boxes
had fuzzy edges,266 and—true to long tradition267—there were varying views
on the taxonomic relationship between executive power and judicial power.268
But for the most part the tripartite sequence was catechism.269 It’s like what

via-Westminster theory of mixed government. See Flaherty, supra note 43, at 1755-1807. As I have
shown in previous work, the distinction between those two concerns was well established in the
Anglo-American legal and political discourse that undergirded the Founding era. See Mortenson,
supra note 5, at 1210-42. This Article shows that the Founding debates reflected that fully.
266 True to form, Madison offered the clearest thinking about the hard cases: “Even the
boundaries between the Executive, Legislative & Judiciary powers, though in general so strongly
marked in themselves, consist in many instances of mere shades of difference.” Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 59, at 102; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James
Madison), reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 343, 345-48 (1984) (generically discussing linedrawing problems, including in the separation of powers context).
267 For more on the uneven development of distinctions between executive and judicial power,
see Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1238.
268 For examples that focused on a two-step process of moving from the formulation of
intentions to their execution in the real world, see, e.g., Luther Martin, Genuine Information III,
BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 144, 144 (2015) (discussing
a citizen’s “share in the forming of his own government, and in the making and executing its laws”);
Philanthrop, To the People, AM. MERCURY, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 3 DHRC, supra note 46, at 467,
468 (1978) (“Are not the Congress and Senate servants of the people, chosen and instructed by them,
because the whole body of the people cannot assemble at one place to make and execute laws?”);
Reply to George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution, N.J. J., Dec. 19 & 26, 1787, reprinted in 3 DHRC,
supra note 456, at 154, 156 (1978) (“Was it ever said that the people do not make their own laws or
that the government of a republic is not in the people because they make the one, and execute the
other, through persons delegated by them?”); Republicus, KY. GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 1788, reprinted in 8
DHRC, supra note 46, at 446, 449, 451 (1988) (criticizing “president [who] may exercise the
combined authority of legislation, and execution,” and noting that “the people . . . . and only they,
have a right to determine whether they will make laws, or execute them”); A Watchman,
WORCESTER MAG., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 879, 881 (1998) (“[T]he
governments of Connecticut and Rhodeisland . . . have chose their own officers, and made and
executed their own laws . . . .”).
269 For just a few examples, see, e.g., Curtius, II, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted
in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 97, 100 (2003) (“What! resign all the three powers, legislative, judicial
and executive, in the hands of one body of men?”) NEWPORT HERALD, Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 24
DHRC, supra note 46, at 40, 40 (2011) (“It is presumed that those States who have heretofore granted
powers to Congress for regulating trade cannot disapprove of the New Constitution; for the grant to
Congress implied that they were vested with full powers to enact all laws relative thereto, to be adjudged
and executed by officers of their appointment . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). James
Wilson’s post-Ratification lectures were magisterial on the point:
The powers of government are usually, and with propriety, arranged under three great
divisions; the legislative authority, the executive authority, and the judicial
authority . . . . Wise and good laws are indeed essential; but though they are essential,
they are so only as means. If we stop here, all that we have done is nugatory and
abortive. The end is still unattained; and that can be attained only when the laws are
vigorously and steadily executed; and when the administration of justice under them
is unbiassed and enlightened.
JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 394-97 (1791).
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one Virginian said about the relationship between George Mason and Patrick
Henry: “the former plans, & the latter executes.”270
In this context, no government could be “complete”271 or “perfect”272 if it
did not include “the powers of Legislation, Judgment and Execution.”273 If a
government didn’t have the power to implement its intentions, then it was
“incomplete”274 in the sense that it lacked the final link in a sequential chain
of governing.275 Certainly Federalists thought so, with one opening the
Connecticut ratification convention by arguing that “[t]he Constitution
before us is a complete system of legislative, judicial, and executive power,”276
and another telling the Virginia convention:
270 Letter from James Duncanson to James Maury (June 7 & 13, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note
46, at 1582, 1583 (1993); see also id. at 1583-84 (describing the relationship between George Mason
and Patrick Henry in organizing Antifederalists in Virginia).
271 George Clinton, Remarks Against Ratifying the Constitution (July 11, 1788), in 22 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 2142, 2145 (2008) (The proposed system “commences in a complete system of
government—divided into Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches”); 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 51, at 284-86 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The great & essential principles necessary for the
support of Government . . . . [include] Force by which may be understood a coertion of laws or coertion
of arms. Congs. have not the former except in few cases . . . . How then are all these evils to be
avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the general Govermt . . . .”).
272 Brutus alternated between the two formulations. See, e.g., Brutus, supra note 122, at 109
(“[O]ne complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive
powers . . . .”); see also, e.g., A.B., HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1788, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 596, 598 (1998) (“I am ready to concede, that ‘the government proposed . . . has as
absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws,[‘] &c. with respect to every object to
which it extends as any other in the world . . . .” (quoting Brutus while disagreeing with his
conclusions)); POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Oct. 3, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at
71, 73 (2003) (“[I]f the only effective and durable bond of union among states, as well as among
individuals be a coercive government; . . . and if the perfection of that form consists in the accurate
distribution of the legislature, executive and judiciary powers . . . the expediency of adopting the
new constitution comes as strongly enforced as any thing which can be offered to the human mind.”
(emphasis omitted)).
273 John De Witt, II, AM. HERALD, Oct. 29, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 156,
159 (1997) (“[T]he future Congress of the United States shall be armed with the powers of
Legislation, Judgment and Execution . . . .”).
274 Statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratification Debates (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 465, 476 (1976) (“I think it no objection, that it is alleged the government will
possess legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Should it have only legislative authority! . . . .For
what purpose give the power to make laws, unless they are to be executed? . . . Ought the
government then to remain any longer incomplete?”).
275 E.g., An Old Planter, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note
46, at 394, 395 (1988) (“It is clear that wherever we give or delegate a trust to do any one act, we
must lodge authority sufficient to insure the execution of that act. When we choose an assembly to
make laws and regulate the government of this state, what would an assembly avail, if they had not
power to inforce every act necessary for our government?”); Letter from Richard Henry Lee to John
Adams, supra note 113, at 9 (“The present federal system . . . has been found quite ineffecient and
ineffectual—The government must be both Legislative and Executive . . . .”).
276 Ellsworth, supra note 187, at 244-48 (“[T]he proposed Constitution . . . evidently
presupposes two things; one is the necessity of a federal government, the other is the inefficiency of
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Government must then have its complete powers, or be ineffectual:
Legislative to fix rules, impose sanctions, and point out the punishment of
the transgressors of these rules,—an Executive to watch over officers and
bring them to punishment,—a Judiciary to guard the innocent, and fix the
guilty, by a fair trial: Without an Executive, offenders would not be brought
to punishment: Without a Judiciary, any man might be taken up, convicted
and punished, without a trial. Hence the necessity of having these three
branches.277

Antifederalists shared the same vocabulary for the “compleat and
compulsive operation” of government.278 Indeed, it was Brutus who offered
perhaps the most thoroughly worked-out model of governmental
perfection,279 and certainly its most repetitive expression. To “give the general
[government] compleat legislative, executive and judicial powers to every
purpose,”280 he thought, would yield something very frightening: “one
complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive
powers . . . .”281 Brutus framed his first letter around precisely this point,
drawing a sharp distinction between the functional “powers” of government
and the particular subject matter “objects” to which those powers would be
applied.282 “It is true this government is limited to certain objects,” he
conceded.283 But as to those objects, he continued, the federal government
the old articles of confederation . . . . A more energetic system is necessary. The present is merely
advisory. It has no coercive power . . . . The Constitution before us . . . . was designed to supply the
defects of the former system . . . .”).
277 Pendleton, supra note 194, at 947; see also id. (contrasting “complete” government in this
sense with “consolidated” government in the totally centralized sense feared by Antifederalists).
278 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 34-35 (Gouverneur Morris) (urging the
Philadelphia drafting convention to understand their very project as aimed at a new national
government with “a compleat and compulsive operation”) (responding to a question from one of the
Pinckneys whether the Convention was even “authorize[d] [to] discuss[] . . . a System founded on
different principles from the federal Constitution.”).
279 For others, see, e.g., Statement of John Smilie, Pennsylvania Ratification Debates (Dec. 4,
1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 465, 468 (1976) (“[A] complete [government], with legislative,
executive, and judicial powers.”); Statement of John Smilie, Pennsylvania Ratification Debates (Nov.
28, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 382, 408 (1976) (“It contains all the necessary parts of a
complete system of government, the executive, legislative, and judicial establishments . . . .”);
Republicus, supra note 188, at 377 (“[E]qual natural right to legislative and executive power in all
their different branches, which takes in all the powers that can exist in a state . . . .”).
280 Brutus, XII, N.Y. J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 756, 759 (2004).
281 Brutus, supra note 122, at 109-10. Brutus couldn’t get enough of this point. See also, e.g.,
Brutus, supra note 256, at 467 (“What will render this power in Congress effectual and sure in its
operation is, that the government will have complete judicial and executive authority to carry all
their laws into effect . . . .”); Brutus, XI, N.Y. J., Jan 31, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at
512, 512 (1984) (“This [proposed] government is a complete system, not only for making, but for
executing laws.”).
282 Brutus, supra note 122, at 107.
283 Id.
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would be “as much one complete government as that of New-York or
Massachusetts.”284 Indeed,
It . . . has as absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws, to
appoint officers, institute courts, declare offences, and annex penalties, with
respect to every object to which it extends, as any other in the world.285

The framework explained by Brutus was pervasive. The founders
repetitiously distinguished between [1] various subject matter objects of
government action, “whether civil or military,” and [2] the tripartite
mechanical sequence by which government took functional action on those
objects, “whether . . . legislative, executive, or judicial.”286 The conceptual
point was simply common currency; the only thing to debate was its
implications. And so on one side, Samuel Chase objected to the fact that the
“National Government has unlimited power, legislative, executive and
judicial, as to every object to which it extends by the Constitution”;287 the
Federal Farmer explained that “[t]hese powers, legislative, executive, and
judicial, respect internal as well as external objects”;288 and A Farmer fretted
about granting the national government “legislative, executive, and judiciary
powers on every citizen of the empire.”289 And on the other side, the
Federalist “A.B.” agreed that “[t]his government is to possess absolute and
Id.; see also id. (“The [proposed] government then, so far as it extends, is a complete one.”).
Id. Brutus returned to the formulation in his later letters, albeit in a less central role. Brutus,
supra note 280, at 759 (warning against giving “the general [government] compleat legislative,
executive and judicial powers to every purpose,” and then returning repeatedly to warn of the
consequences of allowing that government to “pass[] laws on these subjects, as well as of appointing
magistrates with authority to execute them” in various contexts).
286 BOS. GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 274, 276 (1997) (“[A]
charter of delegation, being a clear and full description of the quantity and degree of power and
authority, with which the society, vests the persons intrusted with the powers of the society, whether
civil or military, legislative, executive or judicial.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
287 Samuel Chase, Objections to the Constitution (Apr. 24-25, 1788), in 12 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 631, 636 (2015). Chase’s next three sentences rehearse the same point in more detail. First: there was
no serious subject matter limitation on the business of the federal government: “The powers of the
National legislature extend to every case of the least consequence . . . .” Id. Second, the national
government had the legislative power to extend to the formulation of binding policies in each such area:
“[I]t may make laws to affect the lives, liberty and property of every citizen in America . . . .” Id. Third,
the national government had the executive power to bring those into being: “[N]or can the Constitution
of any State prevent the Execution of any power given to the National legislature.” Id.
288 Federal Farmer, supra note 48, at 224. Note how the author’s distinction between “internal”
and “external” executive power tracks onto every power of government; it is not a special feature of
“executive” authority. See Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section IV.A. (discussing Rutherforth,
Montesquieu, and Essex Result); see also Federal Farmer, supra note 48, at 24 (“Let the general
government consist of an executive, a judiciary and ballanced legislature, and its powers extend
exclusively to all foreign concerns . . . and to a few internal concerns of the community . . . . In this
case there would be a compleat consolidation, quoad certain objects only.”).
289 A Farmer, VII (Part 6), BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Apr. 25, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 535, 536 (2015).
284
285
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uncoutroulable powers, legislative, executive, and judicial with respect to
every object to which it extends.”290
A casual reader might get the impression that completeness was just
another way or talking about the police power. So let’s be clear: the question
of completeness in government had nothing to do with the substantive scope
of a government’s regulatory portfolio. To measure a government’s perfection
required no knowledge about its power to regulate commerce, make treaties,
establish a religion, or invade Canada. Any unit of government at any level of
regional or administrative hierarchy with any sorts of subject-matter
competences could easily possess all three powers as to those things where its
jurisdiction extended.291 The point of perfection was that “the means of securing
the welfare of the community must be coextensive with the objects to which
the legislature extends its views.”292
That’s why Oliver Ellsworth said of Hartford, “This very spot where we
now are, is a city. It has complete legislative, judicial and executive powers. It
is a complete state in miniature.”293 And that’s why Brutus was careful to
emphasize that even entities with only limited subject-matter competences—
like the proposed federal government—were perfectly capable of being
“complete” in the relevant sense: “This government is to possess absolute and
uncontroulable power, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every
object to which it extends for . . . . The government then, so far as it extends,
is a complete one, and not a confederation.”294
290 A.B., supra note 272, at 596-97 (somewhat misquoting Brutus to dispute the implications
of this description).
291 See also, e.g., Pendleton, supra note 194, at 947 (embracing the Constitution as creating
“complete” government, and sharply distinguishing that from charges of it also creating a
“consolidated” government, defined as “that which should have the sole and exclusive power,
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, without any limitation”). For an example of the kind of criticism
prompting Pendleton’s point, see, for example, Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters
to the Republican, Letter XVII (May 2, 1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1060 (2004) (“To
form a consolidated, or one entire government, . . . all things, persons and property, must be subject
to the laws of one legislature alone; to one executive, and one judiciary.”).
292 Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 569, 570 (1978). The Connecticut convention delegate was writing here to his Federalist
colleague—and future Supreme Court Justice—in Massachusetts. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.
80 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 18 DHRC, supra note 46, at 96, 99 (1995) (implicitly endorsing
the proposition that “every government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions
by its own authority” (emphasis omitted)). Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 103, at 414
(Alexander Hamilton) (focusing on the Confederation’s gap in this respect as the “extraordinary
spectacle of a government, destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the
execution of its own laws”).
293 See Ellsworth, supra note 96, at 278 (“Yet it breeds no confusion, it makes no scism. The
city has not eat up the state, nor the state the city.”); see also id. (“Wherever the army was, in whatever
state, there congress had complete legislative, judicial and executive power.”).
294 Brutus, supra note 122, at 106-07. For other examples of the distinction, see, for example,
PROVIDENCE U.S. CHRON., Aug. 7, 1788, reprinted in 25 DHRC, supra note 46, at 383, 384 (2012).
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Rather than omnicompetent subject-matter authorization,295 then, the
idea of completeness meant the functionally sequential process of (first)
bringing an idea or project into being and (then) implementing it in the real
world. And that functional relationship now brings us to an authority often
viewed as either logically entailed in or functionally necessitated by the
executive power: the right to appoint “assistances” for its implementation.
C. The Executive Power Was Often Viewed as Either Logically Entailing or
Functionally Implying the Appointment of “Assistances”
Modern Supreme Court doctrine holds that “the power to appoint
inferior officers . . . is not in itself an ‘executive’ function in the constitutional
sense.”296 A good number of founders would have disagreed. George Mason
was in good company in considering “the appointment of publick officers”297
closely linked to the executive power—sometimes as a strict conceptual
element of the thing itself, other times more loosely as an indispensable
buttress for its meaningful exercise.
This view of appointments as “executive” drew on a longstanding (though
not uncontested) strand of Anglo-American legal thought. Certainly the
inseparability of execution and appointment was central among Charles I’s
objections to conceding a parliamentary role in appointments:
He conceives, He cannot perform the Oath of protecting His people if He
abandon this power, and assume others into it. He conceives it such a Flowre
of the Crown, as is worth all the rest of the Garland.”298

Charles’s argument may have had special force under English law, which was
often said to prohibit the King from personally executing the law.299 But its

295 Contrast, for example, A Freeman’s argument that ““[S]uch would be the consequence of a
single national constitution, in which all the objects of society and government were so compleatly provided
for, as to place the several states in the union on the footing of counties of the empire.” A Freeman, III, PA.
GAZETTE, Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 49, 49 (1986).
296 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988).
297 George Mason, Objections to the Constitution, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1787, reprinted
in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 287, 289 (1997); see also id. (concluding that this power was
“improper” in the Senate).
298 HENRY PARKER, OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAJESTIES LATE ANSWERS AND
EXPRESSES 38 (1642); see also id. (“He conceives, That if He should passe this, He should retain nothing
but the Ceremonious Ensignes of Royalty, or the meer sight of a Crown and Scepter . . . but as to true,
and reall power, He should remain, but the outside, the picture, the signe of a King.”). There’s some
irony in how much more evocative the parliamentarian’s paraphrase is than the King’s original.
299 EDWARD BAGSHAW, THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN OF ENGLAND AS IT IS ESTABLISHED
BY LAW 105 (1660) (“[H]e neither speaketh, nor acteth, nor judgeth, nor executeth, but by his Writt,
by his Laws, by his Judges, and Ministers, and both these sworne to him to judge a right, and to
execute justice to his People.”); MATTHEW HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 1-7 (“[H]e
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deeper logic was quite generalizable. As Matthew Hale’s pathbreaking treatise
observed, “the weight, multiplicity and variety of the occasions and
emergencies of a kingdom doth necessarily require assistances.”300 Laying
claim to the executive power in any large jurisdiction was thus arguably an
exercise in fiction unless you had the authority to appoint “assistances”—
implementing agents—to act on your behalf.
This view of the relationship between appointments and execution
influenced thinking in the Americas well before the Founding. In a 1771
Virginia dispute about appointments authority, for example, the winning
counsel argued that “wherever an act of Parliament or of Assembly erects a
new office, without prescribing the particular mode of appointing the officer,
it belongs to the King to make the appointment.”301 Counsel’s explanation is
key: the proposed canon of construction followed necessarily from the King’s
executive power. “[P]ossessing the executive power of the laws,” it is the
King’s “peculiar duty to see such act carried into execution, which cannot be
unless an officer is appointed.”302 That in turned implied that “[i]f then our
acts of Assembly, erecting [an office] have not said by whom the nomination
shall be, it will follow that the King, who is to see the law executed, must
nominate persons for that purpose.”303
This commonsense view persisted into the Founding era. Some relied on
formal arguments that King Charles would have found quite congenial,304 while
neither speaks nor doth anything in the public administration of this realm but what he doth by
these or some of these, especially the chancellor.”).
300 HALE, supra note 299, at 105; see also id. at 107 (describing the king’s “legal council” as “the
distributors of the king’s judgment and will according to rule, for he neither speaks nor doth
anything in the public administration of this realm but what he doth by these or some of these,
especially the chancellor”). As Hale later explained, the king’s appointments power was at least at
times compulsory—that is to say, he could conscript private individuals into compulsory state service.
Id. at 269 (“refusing to take” an “office[] that [is] grantable by the king and concern[s] the
administration of justice” was “punishable for a contempt”). Obadiah Hulme made a similar point.
The king, who is in the constant exercise, of the executive power, in the state, always
did the business of the state; and therefore, it immediately falls within his province,
to see any plan, of national utility, put into execution, and to authorize the acting
parties by a writing, vesting them with certain powers, for the accomplishment of the
business which is to be done.
OBADIAH HULME, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 182 (1771).
301 Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. 96, 105 (Gen. Ct. Va. 1771).
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 538 (James Wilson) (“[O]bject[ing] to the
mode of appointing, as blending a branch of the Legislature with the Executive.”); see also 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison) (“[I]f any power
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those
who execute the laws.”); cf. id. at 538-39 (“Good laws are of no effect without a good Executive; and
there can be no good Executive without a responsible appointment of officers to execute.”); 2
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others were agnostic on the formal classification305 and focused instead on
prudential considerations.306 The limited and parasitic nature of the claim was
evident, however, in the fact that this view focused only on the appointment of
executive officers.307 There was much less angst about the Senate’s role in
appointing judges—and much more angst about the President’s.308
The point wasn’t uncontested.309 Indeed, some of the fussier formalists
forcefully rejected the claim that the Senate’s role in appointments gave it
any portion of the executive power. For them, the standard meaning of
executive power decisively rebutted that claim: since the Senate “cannot
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 53 (July 19, 1787) (Gouverneur Morris) (“There must be
certain great officers of State . . . . These he presumes will exercise their functions in subordination
to the Executive . . . . Without these ministers the Executive can do nothing of consequence.”).
305 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 405 (Edmund Randolph) (“[T]he power
of appointments was a formidable one both in the Executive & Legislative hands . . . .”).
306 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 537 (George Mason) (arguing that
legislative bodies were “too unwieldy & expensive for appointing officers”); 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 81 (Edmund Randolph) (noting the “inconveniencies” with vesting
judicial appointments in a multi-member body”).
307 Publius explained a pragmatic aspect to the point. In general, “each department should have
a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have
as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 43, 43 (1986). But “[w]ere
this principle rigorously adhered to, . . . [s]ome difficulties . . . would attend the execution of it.
Some deviations therefore from the principle must be admitted.” Id.
308 George Mason, for example, supported presidential appointment of executive branch
officers, but opposed any presidential role in the appointment of judges. Compare Letter from
George Mason to John Lamb (June 9, 1787), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 818, 822 (“[T]hat the
Power of . . . appointing Judges of the Supreme Courts . . . be vested in the president of the United
States with the Assistance of the [newly formed Executive] Council . . . .”), with 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 83 (George Mason) (“He considered the appointment [of judges] by the
Executive as a dangerous prerogative. It might even give him an influence over the Judiciary
department itself.”). For others expressing similar views, see, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 51, at 120 (James Madison) (“On the other hand, He was not satisfied with referring the
appointment [of judges] to the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch
. . . .”). Next to the Framers’ comparatively desultory discussion of judicial appointments, their tail
chasing about non-judicial appointments was much more charged. Compare, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 232-33 (James Madison) (discussing appointment of judicial officers),
and 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 41-44 (James Madison) (same), and id. at 80-83
(same), with, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 405-07 (discussing appointment of nonjudicial officers), and id. at 522-25 (same), and id. at 537-40 (same), and id. at 627-28 (same).
309 Dissent from the Committee Report, Second Session of the Pennsylvania Council of
Censors (Aug. 11, 1784), in THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF
1776 AND 1790 (1825) 101-102 n.* (Notwithstanding the Pennsylvania Constitution’s vesting of
executive power in a Council, it was “the right of the assembly . . . either by law to appoint . . . or
to empower the executive council to appoint” officials to offices created by statute, because “every
power necessary for good government, not placed somewhere by the constitution, is vested in the
assembly, as the representatives of the people”). But see Committee Report, Second Session of the
Pennsylvania Council of Censors (Aug. 11, 1784), in id. at 101 (“[T]he appointment of officers is an
executive prerogative, and belongs to the council in all cases, if it be not in-express terms vested in
the assembly or in the people.”).
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execute” the laws, it was definitionally impossible for it to be “a part also of
the executive.”310 One Maryland Federalist made the point at some length:
Much learned and hackneyed declamation has been used against the executive
power of the senate, and the making one body of men both an executive and
a legislative. Happily the reasoning does not apply.—The objection would be
valid, if the senate could alone make laws, and alone execute. This they cannot
do, and we may rest assured, that the representatives, having no share in the
execution, will never consent to tyrannical laws, to be executed in a tyrannical
manner by the president and the senate. What are the executive powers of
the senate? None at all. It has nothing at all to do with the execution of the
laws it assents to.311

For his part, Tench Coxe (writing under the pseudonym “An American”)
called it an “evident” error to speak of “the executive powers of the senate.”312
There’s no mistaking the prescriptivist condescension of his explanation:
The Senate as a body & the Senators as individuals can hold or execute no
office whatever. They cannot be Ambassadors Generals, Admirals, Judges.
Secretaries of War. or Finance, nor perform any other National duty, but that
of Senators, nor can they even nominate a person for any post or
employment. In short they can execute no offices themselves, nor can they
declare who shall—Their power is merely to declare who shall not. You will
pardon me, Sir. for applying the term to so elegant a Scholar as you are. but
really to say as you do that the power of declaring who shall not hold an office
is to hold it oneself appears to me an absolute Solecism.313

310 Charles Carroll, Notes on the Constitution (Feb. 1, 1788), in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at
862, 864 (2015); see also, e.g., A Landholder, supra note 220, at 483 (“On examination you will find
this objection [to the Senate] unfounded. The supreme executive is vested in a President of the
United States . . . . In the President, all the executive departments meet, and he will be a channel of
communication between those who make and those who execute the laws.”). Other than the
President’s legislative veto and the Vice-President’s presiding role in the Senate, Landholder
continued, “[i]n no other instance is there even the shadow of blending or influence between the
two departments.” Id. When discussing the judiciary in the very next section, Landholder went on
to discuss the need for “executive officers, to carry into effect the laws of the nation,” so it’s not like
the functional point was lost on him. Id.
311 MD. J., July 25, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 867, 886 (2015). While the
author was contemptuous of the formal claim, he was typical among Federalists in taking the
functional concerns more seriously. See id. (disputing the notion that the Senate’s constitutional
designation as a source of “advice” rendered it a “council to the president,” which was in itself a
“formidable executive power[]”).
312 Letter from An American to Richard Henry Lee, in 15 DHRC, supra note 46, at 173,
175 (1984) (draft).
313 Id. at 175-76. Coxe was typical of Federalists in both dismissing Antifederalists’ formalist
argument and evaluating more seriously their functionalist criticism of the Senate’s mix of authorities.
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This was just vanilla formalism pulled straight from the dictionary. The
Senate had no power to execute the law. Therefore, the Senate did not possess
executive power. Case closed.
These objections aside, most Americans who spoke to the point seemed
to conclude that the right to appoint “assistances” in execution was necessary
on any functional understanding of the power to execute. Certainly this view
was prominent among antifederalists. “Hampden” was typical in singling out
“the most important and most influential portion of the executive power, viz.,
the appointment of all officers.”314 The list of constitutional skeptics who
called appointments “executive”—among them Brutus,315 Centinel,316 the

314 Hampden, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at
663, 667 (1976); see also id. at 664, 667 (criticizing “the highly dangerous combination of the
legislative and executive departments,” and noting that “the President only acts as a nominating
member” for executive appointments). William Findley, who is thought to be the author of
“Hampden,” urged the same point in opposing ratification at the Pennsylvania convention: “Only a
part of the executive power is vested in the President. The most influential part is in the Senate,
and he only acts as primus inter pares of the Senate; only he has the sole right of nomination. The
officers of government are the creatures of the Senate . . . . The great objection is the blending of
executive and legislative power.” Statement of William Findley, Pennsylvania Ratification Debates
(Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 512, 512 (1976); see also id. at 513 (“President in
appointing officers will generally nominate such persons as will be agreeable to the Senate. The
legislative and executive departments are mixed in this Constitution.”).
315 See Brutus, supra note 122, at 313; McHenry, supra note 100, at 85 (“[The President’s] power
when elected is check’d by the Consent of the Senate to the appointment of Officers, and without
endangering Liberty by the junction of the Executive and Legislative in this instance.”); see also, e.g.,
Brutus, XVI, N.Y. J., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 907, 911 (2004) (“It may
possibly also, in some special cases, be adviseable to associate the legislature, or a branch of it, with
the executive, in the exercise of acts of great national importance . . . . But I think it equally evident,
that a branch of the legislature should not be invested with the power of appointing officers.”).
Melancton Smith, often thought the likeliest author of the Brutus letters, seems to have made the
same point at the New York Ratification debates. See Statement of Melancton Smith, New York
Ratification Debates (July 4, 1788), in 22 DHRC, supra note 46, at 2094, 2097 (2008) (“[T]he
legislative & executive should be kept apart . . . it is improper that the Senate . . . should appoint
Officers.”); see also id. (“Objs. to appt of officers by consent senate—executive power to be distinct.”).
316 Centinel, I, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 158,
165 (1976) (“The Senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very considerable share in the
executive; none of the principal appointments to office can be made without its advice and
consent.”); see also, e.g., Centinel, supra note 259, at 464 (“The king of England is . . . in possession
of the whole executive power, including the unrestrained appointment to offices . . . .”).
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Federal Farmer,317 Richard Henry Lee,318 and George Mason319—goes on.320
Many Federalists readily conceded the point as well. Writing as Publius,
Madison conceded that “the appointment to offices, particularly executive
offices, is in its nature an executive function . . . .”321 A number of other
317 Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, Letter XIV (May 2,
1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1036 (2004) (“It has been thought adviseable by the wisest
nations, that the legislature should so far exercise executive and judicial powers as to appoint some
officers . . . .”). The Federal Farmer’s discussion of the separation of powers spans many letters, and
richly rewards close study. Given space limitations, I note here only that the author classifies
appointments as “executive” in nature.
318 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph, PA. PACKET, Dec. 20,
1787, reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 46, at 364, 371 (1983) (“In order to prevent the dangerous
blending of the legislative and executive powers, and to secure responsibility, the privy, and not the
senate shall be joined with the president in the appointment of all officers, civil and military, under
the new constitution . . . .”).
319 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 101 (George Mason) (“Col. Mason observed that
a vote had already passed he found (he was out at the time) for vesting the executive powers in a
single person. Among these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases.”).
320 See, e.g., A Federal Republican, supra note 60, at 272 (proposing “a sovereign executive
council . . . [which would] have the appointment of all officers” since “the senate . . . should have no
executive or other powers whatever in that department”); John De Witt, III, AM. HERALD, Nov. 5,
1787, reprinted in 4 DHRC, supra note 46, at 194, 197 (1997) (“With respect to the Executive, the
Senate excepting in [i.e., taking exception to ] nomination, have a negative upon the President . . . .);
id. (referencing “their share above mentioned in the Executive department”).
Less unequivocal, but hard to explain on any other theory, were more abstractly expressed
Antifederalist claims that the Senate would “execute [the laws] tyrannically”—a concern with
no obvious legal hook besides the Appointments Clause. E.g., Cincinnatus, IV, To James Wilson,
Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 281, 285 (2003) (“[B]y
making [the Senate] participant in the executive,” the Framers ignored Montesquieu’s adage:
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person . . . the same monarch
or senate will make tyrannical laws, that they may execute them tyrannically.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1788, reprinted
in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 469, 470-71 (1988) (“The powers granted to Congress are
boundless in some instances of the utmost consequence to the people, particularly . . . their
power of legislation blended with that of the execution of their own laws, without controul.”).
321 T HE F EDERALIST N O. 47, supra note 206, at 502 (James Madison); see also T HE
FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 102, at 356-57 (James Madison) (“With another class of
adversaries to the constitution . . . the junction of the Senate with the President in the
responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the
executive, alone, is the vicious part of the organisation.”).
In fact, at the Convention, Madison had gone so far as to suggest that there might be no
need to explicitly grant appointments authority, since it was logically entailed within the vesting
of “executive power” simpliciter. Madison proposed amending the Virginia Plan to read: “[T]hat
a national Executive be instituted . . . with power to carry into effect, the national laws—to
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; and to execute such other powers, not
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature, as may from time to time be delegated by the national
legislature.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 63 (James Madison). He then observed
that he “did not know” that specifying the appointment power was “absolutely necessary,” since
it was “perhaps included in the first member of the proposition,” which vested the executive
power. See id. at 67 (“Mr. Madison did not know that the words [of the third clause] were
absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words. to appoint to offices &c. the whole being
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supporters of the Constitution—including John Adams,322 John Brown
Cutting,323 A Democratic Federalist,324 John Kean,325 and James Wilson326—
plainly held the same view.327 Indeed, Aristedes forthrightly “confess[ed]”
that the objections to the Senate had “at first, appeared formidable.”328 The
separation of powers risk was obvious: permitting a legislature to appoint
“persons for the execution of the laws” would arguably “be the same thing, in

perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any
inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent
doubts and misconstructions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
322 See Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 10, 1787), in 4 DHRC, supra note
45, at 212, 212 (1997) (“They have adopted the Idea of the Congress at Albany in 1754 of a President
to nominate officers and a Council to Consent: but thank heaven they have adopted a third
Branch . . . . I think that Senates and assemblies should have nothing to do with executive Power.
But still I hope the Constitution will be adopted . . . .”).
323 See Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short (Dec. 13, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra note
46, at 475, 478 (1983) (supporting the Constitution, but noting that his “principal apprehension” [was]
“the mingled legislative and executive powers of the senate . . . especially in appointments to office”).
324 A Democratic Federalist argued that:
[t]he executive powers of the Union are separated in a higher degree from the
legislative than in any government now existing in the world. As a check upon the
President, the Senate may disapprove of the officers he appoints, but no person
holding any office under the United States can be a member of the federal legislature.
How differently are things circumstanced in the two houses in Britain where an officer
of any kind, naval, military, civil or ecclesiastical, may hold a seat in either house.
A Democratic Federalist, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 294, 298 (1976)
325 See John Kean, Notes on the New Constitution (c. May 1788), in 27 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 408, 408-09 (2016) (advocating without elaboration “[a] legislature . . . who has no executive or
judicial powers,” and later urging in reference to “Defense” that “appointment of officers—ought
not be exercised by the Legislature”).
326 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 530 (James Wilson) (“The different branches
should be independent of each other. They are combined and blended in the Senate. The Senate
may exercise, the powers of legislation, and Executive and judicial powers. To make treaties
legislative, to appoint officers Executive for the Executive has only the nomination.”); see also 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 66 (James Wilson) (“The only powers he conceived strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not <appertaining to and>
appointed by the Legislature.”).
327 See, e.g., Statement of Thomas McKean, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 10, 1787),
in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 532, 534, 536 (1976) (“[T]he whole of the executive power is not lodged
in the President alone,” but “[a]s to the Senators having a share in the executive power, so far as to
the appointment of certain officers, I do not know where this restraint on the President could be
more safely lodged.”); see also id. at 544 (similar); id. at 546 (“There is scarce a king in Europe that
has not some check upon him in the appointment of officers.”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note
90, at 121-23 (William Davie) (“In this state, and most of the others, the executive and judicial powers
are dependent on the legislature. Has not the legislature of this state the power of appointing the
judges? Is it not in their power also to fix their compensation?”).
328 Aristides, supra note 87, at 236.
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many respects, as if the legislature should execute its own laws.”329 That’s why
George Mason explained that his proposed amendments330—like those
suggested by both James Wilson331 and the Society of Western
Gentlemen332—would restore each branch to its proper place by getting the
Senate out of the executive function of appointments333 and by bringing the
House into the legislative function of treatymaking.334
So while the most strait-laced formalists disagreed, a great many founders
did take a more functional view of Law Execution. Such commentators
gravitated toward a more loosely disaggregated view of executive power,
reflecting the functional reality that executing the law includes not just (i) the
power to impose prohibitions on private parties and (ii) the power to carry
out the legislature’s affirmative projects, but also at least presumptively (iii)
the appointment of different kinds of subordinates to do each kind of
execution. This disaggregated understanding occasionally also emerges in
scattered references to “executive powers” in the plural form,335 as in some of

329 Id. Aristides went on to defend the Senate’s role in appointments as a necessary concession
to pragmatics over theory:

Let us reflect . . . whether it be proper for any one man (suppose even the saviour of his
country to be immortal) to have the appointment of all those important officers . . . . I
confess, that the number of the senators for this purpose only is excessive. But I can
confidently rely on the extraordinary selection to compensate for the excess.
Id. at 237-38.
330 See Letter from George Mason to John Lamb, supra note 308, at 819 (“[T]he Legislative,
Executive and Judicial powers of Government should be separate and distinct . . . .”).
331 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 538 (James Wilson) (“Mr. Wilson moved to add,
after the word ‘Senate’ [in the Treaty Clause] the words, ‘and House of Representatives’. As treaties he
said are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also.”). Wilson’s motion
was rejected in the face of typical functionalist concerns about secrecy in a large body.
332 The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 30 &
May 7, 1788, reprinted in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 769, 771 (1990) (proposing to strip the President’s
veto power and require House approval of all treaties).
333 See Letter from George Mason to John Lamb, supra note 308, at 818 (“[T]hat the Power
of . . . appointing Ambassadors, other public Ministers or Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Courts,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
the Constitution, and which shall be established by Law, be vested in the president of the United
States with the Assistance of the [newly formed Executive] Council . . . .”).
334 See id. at 822 (“But all Treaties so made or entered into [by the President], shall be subject
to the Revision of the Senate and House of Representatives for their Ratification.”).
335 Early drafts of the Articles of Confederation themselves thus generically referenced
interactions by the national entity with “the Officers in the several States who are entrusted with
the executive powers of government.” E.g. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra
note 69, at 687 (Aug. 20, 1776). For other examples of this usage as the generic reference to statelevel executive actors in their mailbox function, see, e.g., 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra, at 414 (Dec. 7, 1775) (“those Officers, in whom the executive powers of
government in those colonies may be vested”); id. at 431 (“such officers in the several colonies as are
entrusted with the executive powers of government”).
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the state constitutions.336 The Continental Congress’s famous 1774 “Letter to
the Inhabitants of Quebec,” for example, argued that the future of liberty in
the North depended on its inhabitants’ proper understanding of
Montesquieu—including his standard gloss on “executive power” as “the
power of executing”:337
You have a Governor, it may be urged, vested with the executive powers, or the
powers of administration: In him, and in your Council, is lodged the power of
making laws. You have Judges, who are to decide every cause affecting your
lives, liberty or property.”338

“Your countryman,” the Americans warned, would have told the Quebecois
that any semblance of liberty in their government was but a “tinsel’d
outside.”339 The reason was simple: the British Governor controlled each
336 As a general matter, state constitutional drafting practice provides no comfort to residuum
theorists. A number of state constitutions use the plural phrase “executive powers” in a way that all
but requires either the disaggregated Law Execution understanding or the Cross-Reference
interpretation. See generally FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 572 (1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (compiling early state
constitutions that included the phrase “executive powers of government”). Massachusetts’s 1780
constitution and New Hampshire’s 1784 and 1792 constitutions refer to the “executive part of
government” in what is pretty clearly either the Cross-Reference or Law Execution sense. See MASS.
CONST. of 1780, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1893, N.H. CONST.
of 1784, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2457.
A number of state constitutions refer to “executive power” or “executive authority” singular in
a way that effectively mirrors Article II of the U.S. Constitution. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, reprinted
in 5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2596; N.Y. Const. of 1777, reprinted in id. at 2624; PA
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in id. at 3084, 3087-88, PA CONST. of 1790, reprinted in id. at 3095; S.C.
CONST. of 1778, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3250; VT. CONST.
of 1777, reprinted in id. at 3737; VT. CONST. of 1786, reprinted in id at 3754.
Two state constitutions do use the plural phrase “executive powers” in a way that could plausibly
refer to something like the royal residuum. But in each case the phrase is susceptible to either the
Law Execution or Cross-Reference understanding as well. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, supra (chief
magistrate “may exercise all the other executive powers of government”); N.C. CONST. of 1776,
reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2787 (governor “may exercise all the
other executive powers of government”).
337 Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec, supra note 258, at 110 (“When the power of making
laws, and the power of executing them, are united in the same person, or in the same body of
Magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same Monarch or
Senate, should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner . . . . [Likewise,] [t]here
is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Montesquieu)). Congress evidenced not a particular of shame in
resorting to outright flattery, using our northern neighbors to “exert[] the natural sagacity of
Frenchmen” and consider the authority of that “truly great man,” “your countryman.” Id. at 110-11.
338 Id. (emphasis added and omitted).
339 Id.; see also id. (“Your Judges, and your Legislative Council, as it is called, are dependant on
your Governor, and he is dependant on the servant of the Crown, in Great-Britain. The legislative,
executive and judging powers are all moved by the nods of a Minister.”).
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authority in the sequential process of creating, adjudicating, and executing
legislative instructions. And his control of that complete sequence rendered
the government of Quebec “a whited sepulchre, for burying your lives, liberty
and property.”340
That brings us to the final characteristic of the executive power. Everyone
agreed that it was an empty vessel authorizing only the implementation of
instructions issued by a legislative authority.
D. “The Executive Power” Was Unanimously Understood as an Empty Vessel,
Both Subsequent and Subordinate in Character
Beyond its definition as “the power to execute,” the signal characteristic
of executive power was that it was derivative and subsequent. This Section
will explore that derivative quality—which the founders drew directly from
the legal and political theory on their bookshelves—by explaining two
seemingly paradoxical features. First, the intrinsic subordination of executive
authority to its legislative principal. Second, the immense latent power of
executive authority, especially where its holder could influence the exercise of
legislative power to convey broad delegations of discretion and authority.
1. As a Form of Agency Authority, the Exercise of Executive Power was
Fully Subordinate to Instructions by its Legislative Principal.
As generations of writers had explained, the power to execute was fully
subordinate to the power to legislate. This claim had nothing to do with
power struggles among political institutions in any particular regime. It was
rather a logically entailed feature of the relationship between two intrinsically
successive functions of government in the abstract.341 The failure to
appreciate this distinction has frequently caused confusion for modern
audiences. One often-misunderstood line of Federalist 49, for
example, describes the branches of federal government as “co-ordinate” with
one another.342 A shallow reading of that sentence might seem in tension with
the mass of evidence that the founders understood executive power as
subordinate to legislative power.343 But it isn’t. Publius’s statement about the
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section III.C (discussing the dominance of this frame on the
eighteenth-century bookshelf).
342 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at
16, 16 (1986). This description is important more because it has become a standard judicial reference
in modern caselaw than because it was thought to be particularly common at the Founding. (It
wasn’t). E.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) (“[T]he acts of a co-ordinate branch
of the government . . . .”).
343 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 342, at 17 (“The several departments being perfectly
co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to
340
341
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coordinacy of institutional branches had nothing to with the subordination of
functional powers; invoking the former to refute the latter conflates the
political entity called “the executive” with the conceptual function of
government called “the executive power.”344
The founders definitely talked about the new constitutional entities as
organizationally parallel. The founders definitely created a structure that
would protect the President qua entity from becoming categorically
subordinate to the institution of Congress. And the founders definitely meant
for the institution of the presidency (which possessed a variety of powers,
including but not limited to the executive) to be in some respects coordinate
to the institution of Congress (which possessed a variety of powers, including
but not limited to the legislative). But when it came to the functional
question, the founders agreed—without contradiction of which I am aware—
that “the executive power” vested by Article II was fully subordinate to the
“legislative powers” vested elsewhere in the Constitution.
The Founding records are replete with versions of this observation, itself
practically a paraphrase of John Locke,345 David Hume,346 and many other
writers on whom the founders relied.347 Start with the famously pro-executive
John Adams, who defended the gubernatorial veto as necessary because “the
legislative power is naturally and necessarily sovereign and supreme over the
an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers . . . .”). Less
well remembered is Madison’s use of the same phrase during the Virginia debates in service of an
argument that sits uncomfortably with a strong departmentalist reading of Publius. See Madison, supra
note 131, at 1413 (“It may be no misfortune that in organizing any Government, the explication of its
authority should be left to any of its co-ordinate branches. There is no example in any country where
it is otherwise.”). Madison went on to discuss examples of judicial review of action by the states. Id.
344 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 342, at 18-19.. This is a version of what I have elsewhere
called the metonymy error. See Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section IV.A; see also Blake Emerson, The
Departmental Structure of Executive Power: Subordinate Checks from Madison to Mueller 17
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3533508 (“A department
is a specialized division of government in which officials exercise their powers. A department is thus
different from a power. It is the confined domain and rule-structure in which power operates.”). The
Federalist Papers were themselves elsewhere quite clear that obeying the law is different from obeying the
legislative branch. Consider also that the entities most often described as “co-ordinate” were the states and
the federal government, rather than the departments of the federal government themselves. That
characteristic was apparently quite consistent with their shared understanding that the federal government
would be supreme (for better or worse) within its field of activity.
345 See LOCKE, supra note 240, at 149-50 (“[T]here can be but one supreme power, which is the
legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate . . . . In all cases, whilst the government
subsists, the legislative is the supreme power; for what can give laws to another, must needs be
superior to him . . . .”).
346 Hume made the point repeatedly. DAVID HUME, Essay VI, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL,
AND LITERARY 44 (Eugene F. Miller, ed. 1985) (1758) (“The executive power in every government
is altogether subordinate to the legislative . . . .”); HUME, Essay XVI, supra, at 524 (“[T]he legislative
power [is] being always superior to the executive . . . .”).
347 See Mortenson, supra note 5, at Section III.D.

1336

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1269

executive.”348 Continue from there to an array of others across the ideological
spectrum, all agreeing with A Farmer that “[t]he power of making rules or
laws to govern or protect the society is the essence of sovereignty, for by this
the executive and judicial powers are directed and controuled, to this every
ministerial agent is subservient . . . .”349 Centinel was to the same effect: “It
will not be controverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in
government, and that all others are subordinate to it.”350 The Old Whig
emphasized this observation’s distinguished pedigree: “[I]n the opinion of
Montesquieu, and of most other writers, ancient as well as modern, the
legislature is the sovereign power.”351 And A Landholder suggested the
negative implication: “a legislative power without a judicial and executive
under their own control is in the nature of things a nullity.”352
This all just followed from the definition of the thing. Executive power
was intrinsically an empty vessel, awaiting instructions from an exercise of
the legislative power that would give it something to execute. This
understanding pervaded the discourse. It grounded Gad Hitchcock’s
observation, in a famous Election Day sermon from 1774, that “the executive
power is strictly no other than the legislative carried forward, and of course,
controllable by it.”353 It was necessary to Elbridge Gerry’s claim that reading
the Articles of Confederation to permit troop requisitions by Congress “must
preclude the states from a right of deliberating, and leave them only an
executive authority on the subject.”354 It surfaced in Theodorick Bland’s
1 JOHN ADAMS, Letter LIII, in 1 DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 362, 363 (3d ed. 1797) (1778) (“[A]nd therefore, . . . The
latter must be made an essential branch of the former, even with a negative, or it will not be able to
defend itself . . . .”).
349 A Farmer, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 16 & 23, 1788, reprinted in 17 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 133, 134 (1995); see also id. (“[T]o this all corporate or privileged bodies are subordinate: this
[legislative] power not only regulates the conduct, but disposes of the wealth and commands the
force of the nation.”).
350 Centinel, supra note 316, at 162.
351 An Old Whig, II, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 399, 401 (1981).
352 A Landholder, supra note 220, at 484. Comments like these have too often been mistaken
for being the end of an argument (i.e., contestable assertions of republican ideology) rather than the
beginning of one (i.e., an attempt to build from common ground). But that reading is demonstrably
wrong—not least because so many Federalists not only recognized but affirmatively relied on the
point as a key descriptive element of their arguments.
353 Gad Hitchcock, Election Sermon (1774) in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING
THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805 295 (1983); see also id. (“Legislators . . . should know how to give
force, and operation to their laws . . . . This, indeed, is to be done by means of the executive
part . . . .”). For more on the context of this annual sermon series, see LINDSAY SWIFT, THE
MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION SERMONS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY (1897).
354 Motion of Elbridge Gerry (June 2, 1784), in 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 518; see also Motion of Elbridge Gerry (May, 26, 1784), id. at 433
(depicting an earlier version of this same motion).
348
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argument that there was a profound distinction between “‘levy[ing]’ an
impost” and “‘collect[ing]’ an impost,” because “the first word imported a
legislative idea, & the latter an executive only.”355 It was reflected in references
to debt payment as “a simple executive operation”356 and contrasts between
“trifling executive Business” and “Objects of the greatest Magnitude.”357 And
it was emphasized in the Board of Treasury’s denials of compensation claims
grounded in equity rather than the statutory framework. “As the Executive
Officers of Congress,” they explained, they had no independent policy
prerogative.358 The Board’s only authority—even in the face of demands from
the likes of Pennsylvania359 and Virginia360—was to implement the letter of
legislative instruction as written.
For eighteenth-century Americans, the executive power’s subordinate role
in a principal-agent relationship was “naturally and necessarily” true361—
simply inherent in the very “nature of things.”362 Indeed, the empty vessel
nature of executive power made it a useful metaphor for enumerated
constitutionalism itself: “[A]s the constitution comes immediately from the
people; so ought the laws to flow immediately from the constitution; it should
like a circle circumscribe all legislative power as the legislat[i]ve ought to
355 Motion by Theodorick Bland (Mar. 27, 1783), in 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 945; see also id. at 945-46 (“[A]nd consequently the latter might be less
obnoxious to the States.”). The other congressional delegates were unpersuaded by the claim that
levying and collecting should be read as distinct phases of a process as opposed to synonyms in a
more pragmatic sense. But no one challenged the principle behind Bland’s proposed sales pitch; just
the way Bland was applying it to the semantics of their particular case.
356 Report of the Office of Finance (Aug. 5, 1782), in 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 46, at 435 (“Already Congress have adopted a plan for liquidating all past
accounts, and if the States shall make the necessary grants of Revenue, what remains will be a simple
executive operation which will presently be explained.”).
357 Letter from James M. Varnum to William Greene (Apr. 2, 1781), in 17 LETTERS OF THE
DELEGATES, supra note 75, at 115, 117 (“Our Time is consumed in trifling executive Business, while
Objects of the greatest Magnitude are postponed . . . .”).
358 Report of the Board of Treasury (July 3, 1786), in 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 386 (noting that “[i]t is not for this Board to enter into the Merits of
[a] Claim” that contradicts an “Explicit[]” statute). Recall also Adam Smith’s observation that if “the
leading men of America . . . . feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies . . . should be so far degraded
as to become . . . executive officers of parliament, the greater part of their own importance would be
at an end.” 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 452 (A. Strahan & T. Cadell, eds., 6th ed. 1791) (1776).
359 See Report of the Board of Treasury, supra note 358, at 386 (explaining that “[a]s the
Executive Officers of Congress,” it was “not for this Board to enter into the Merits of [a] Claim”
that would require reassessment of a statute).
360 See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 327 (July 11,
1787)(“It is with regret that the Board observe that a strict adherence on their part, to their duty as
Executive Officers, should expose the United States to the risque of not receiving from the State of
Virginia that support towards the Expences of the Current Year . . . .”).
361 See ADAMS, supra note 348, and accompanying text.
362 See A Landholder, supra note 352, and accompanying text.
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circumscribe the executive . . . .”363 Celebrating South Carolina’s ratification,
another Federalist amplified the point: “The legislative powers are
resolveable into this principle, that the sober second thoughts and
dispassionate voice of the people, shall be the law of the land. The executive
department amounts to no more than that the man of the people shall carry
into effect the will of the people.”364
This “no more than” was common ground across ideological lines For each
committed republican telling the drafting convention that “the Executive
magistracy [w]as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the
Legislature into effect,”365 you can find a strong advocate for the
constitutional Presidency telling a ratifying convention that “[e]xecutive
officers . . . have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is, by
positive grant and commission, delegated to them.”366 The Remarker put the
point sharply: “[t]he executive . . . hath its own [inherent] limits,” since “[t]o
make laws is an unlimited authority; but to execute them when made, is
limited to their existence.”367 And A Federal Republican used notably
identical language in defending the President’s veto:
It hath been made an objection to this constitution, that the legislative and
executive are not kept perfectly distinct and seperate. This, I think, is not
valid. The executive should have a check on the legislative for this simple
reason–that the executive hath its own limits—but the legislative
independent of it, would have none at all. To make laws is unconfined and
indefinite, but to execute them when made, is limited by their existence.368

363 Republicus, supra note 188, at 378; see id. (“[A]nd both take their form from tΔhe people as
the great centre of all . . . .”).
364 Speech of David Ramsay, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN HERALD, June 5, 1788, reprinted in
27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 432, 433; see also id. at 432 (“I congratulate you my fellow-citizens on
the ratification of the new constitution. This event, replete with advantages, promises to repay us
for the toils, dangers and waste of the late revolution.”).
365 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 65 (Roger Sherman). Note that Sherman started
in the same place as his ideological opponent John Adams, but came to very different conclusions
about the institutional implications that should follow. Id. at 68 (arguing “for the appointment by the
Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which
was to be executed”); id. at 64 (similar). It’s a wonderful example of how the debaters used identical
descriptive terminology and an identical conceptual toolkit even when making otherwise
contradictory normative arguments.
366 McKean, supra note 327, at 542.
367 Remarker, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note 46, at 527, 530
(2016); see also id. (“The executive should always have a negative upon the legislative, for this simple
reason, that the former hath its own limits, but the latter, independent of it, would have none at all. To
make laws is an unlimited authority; but to execute them when made, is limited to their existence.”).
368 A Federal Republican, supra note 60, at 255. Note that this description of the conceptual
nature of executive power came from an Antifederalist who nonetheless viewed that the
constitutional President as a threatening figure. See id. at 272 (“The executive, as vested in the
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Even Federalists could thus conclude in private that “[a]s to the executive
powers . . . there is nothing of any great importance in [the President’s]
power solely”369 or in public that “the cases, in which he can exercise an
exclusive power, are too insignificant to be productive of dangerous
consequences.”370
So when Charles Francis Adams commented decades later that “[the]
legislative power is then the precise measure of the executive power,”371 he was
just channeling the true legacy of the Founding. Standing alone, the executive
power was a thin authority that did no more than authorize the implementation
of instructions from some other source. That’s why the founders returned so
often to the idea of a “correspondent,” “consequent,” or “commensurate”
relationship between legislative and executive power. Certainly George
Washington’s letter transmitting the draft Constitution to the Confederation
Congress began by emphasizing the necessary “corresponden[ce]” between
legislated intention and the executive power of implementation:
The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of
making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and regulating
commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities should
be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union . . . .372

Consider not just Washington’s logic, but his vocabulary. He first identifies
some of the new government’s most important subject matter competences—
themselves spread, it is worth noting, across Article I and Article II. He then
emphasizes that the government is also vested with the “executive and judicial
authorities” that “correspond[]” to the implementation of these competences.
Washington’s idea of an intrinsic “correspondence” between specific
legislative authorities and the ensuing executive power of implementation
president is too pointedly supreme. The fears of the people will and ought easily to be agitated by
such an extent of power in a single man . . . .”).
369 Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing, supra note 292, at 571-72 (“As to
the executive powers, some appear to apprehend danger; but . . . I think no man of considerable
discernment can have fears from this quarter unless he has also very weak nerves.”). Note that this
description was of the President’s various powers standing alone. As the next section will discuss,
the founders understood very well that when executive authority was used to implement legislative
instructions that were sufficiently broad and discretionary, it could be very powerful indeed.
370 Americanus, II, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at
244, 245 (1988) (offering the President’s executive power as an example of just such an “exclusive
power,” emphasizing “[the] unity of the executive authority” and that “the executive power” was not
“lodged in the hands of many persons”).
371 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, AN APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS IN
CONSEQUENCE OF THE SENATE’S COURSE, & PARTICULARLY OF MR. WEBSTER’S SPEECH
UPON THE EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE BILL 15 (1835).
372 Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in 19 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 526, 526 (2003).
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recurred throughout the debates.373 For James Wilson, the word was
“commensurate”: as he told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, “the
executive powers of government ought to be commensurate with the
government itself, and . . . a government which cannot act in every part is so
far defective.”374 For Valerius Agricola, the relationship was better described
as “consequent,” with the first “right[] of sovereignty” defined as the standard
trio: “Legislation, and the consequent executive and Judicial rights.”375 But
everyone agreed on the underlying structure. Executive power was
subsequent, subordinate, and dependent on instructions from a prior exercise
of its legislative counterpart.
2. Executive Authority Was Immensely Potent, Especially When Its
Holder Could Influence the Exercise of Legislative Power to Convey
Broad Delegations of Authority and Discretion
A final point. It might be thought that the founders’ understanding of
executive power would reduce its bearer to a factotum. But that would
radically underappreciate both the essence and the potential of executive
authority. The significance of any particular grant of executive power isn’t
self-explanatory. Rather, it depends entirely on a series of decisions
subsequently made by the bearer(s) of legislative power. Just as an empty
vessel can be filled with water, small beer, fortified wine, or distilled spirits,
the significance of executive power depends entirely on the instructions its
bearer is later given to execute. And that, of course, can change over time.
373 See, e.g., A Freeholder, NEWPORT HERALD, Feb. 25, 1790, reprinted in 26 DHRC, supra note
46, at 731, 732 (2013) (“The Constitution is calculated for a confederacy of States. It vests in Congress
the power, of making war, peace, and treaties; over concerns of a foreign and general nature, of
regulating commerce, providing for the support of government, and establishing correspondent
judicial and executive authorities . . . .”); Solon, junior, PROVIDENCE U.S. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1790,
reprinted in 26 DHRC, supra note 46, at 737, 737-38 (quoting Washington’s letter transmitting the
draft Constitution to the states).
374 Statement of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratification Debates (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 550, 559 (1976). In its entirety, Wilson stated:

Let us examine these objections; if this government does not possess internal as well as
external power, and that power for internal as well as external purposes, I apprehend,
that all that has hitherto been done must go for nothing . . . . I presume, sir, that the
executive powers of government ought to be commensurate with the government itself,
and that a government which cannot act in every part is so far defective.
Id. at 557, 559.
375 P. Valerius Agricola, An Essay on the Constitution Recommended by the Federal Convention to the
United States, ALBANY GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 186, 188-89
(2003) (emphasis in original). Agricola went on to set out various subject matter competences to which
these three great powers of formulating intentions, assessing applications, and implementing results
could be applied. Id. (listing the subject matters of “making war and peace,” “raising money,” “making
commercial regulations,” and “promoting . . . the wealth and happiness of [the] community”).
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Consider by analogy the diverse range of instructions that the Continental
Congress imposed on General George Washington in his role as commanderin-chief.376 On one hand, he was subject to unbelievably particularized
instructions from his national principal, sometimes half-drowning in a flood
of orders ranging from the distribution of flour barrels,377 to the
transportation of refugees from Charleston to ports of their choice,378 to the
suspension of court-martial sentences until Congress could review the trial
records.379 On the other hand, Congress regularly delegated substantive
rulemaking authority of startlingly open-ended dimensions. Consider the
order “direct[ing]” General Washington “to carry . . . into the most effectual
execution” Congress’s desire to end the circulation of “dangerous and
criminal . . . correspondence” from England “contain[ing] ideas insidiously
calculated to divide and delude the good people of these states.”380 The statute
contained nothing more than a goal—to suppress English propaganda—and

376 As the pathbreaking work of David Barron and Marty Lederman have shown, Americans
adopted the British understanding of commander-in-chief as “a purely military post under the
command of political superiors” rather than a font of independent substantive authority. David J.
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-in-Chief at the Lowest Ebb, Framing the Problem,
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 772 (2008); see also generally id. at 77286 (surveying eighteenth-century practice in England, under the Continental Congress, and in the
separate states).
377 See 12 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 902-03 (Sept. 11, 1778)
(informing General Washington that “Congress have given orders for the purchase of 20,000 barrels of flour”).
378 The issue was recorded as follows:

Therefore, Resolved, That General Washington take order for procuring from the
British General the necessary passports, and the proper means of re-conveying back
to the State of South Carolina, by water carriage at the expence of the King of Great
Britain, the persons, families and baggage of those of the inhabitants of the said State
who are entitled to the benefit of the capitulation of Charles Town and who have been
sent from that State to other distant parts of these States by order of the Commanding
Officer of the British Troops in Charles Town . . . .
22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 330-32 (June 14, 1782).
379 See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 509-10 (Aug. 15,
1783) (“Resolved . . . that the execution of the sentences against the several offenders who have been
tried for convicted of mutiny by the general court-martial now sitting at Philadelphia, be suspended,
until the further order of Congress ten days after a full report of all the proceedings of the said
court-martial respecting the mutiny, shall have been laid before Congress . . . .”).
380 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 616 (June 17. 1778). In
full, the Congress stated:
Resolved, That it be, and it is hereby earnestly recommended to the legislative and
executive authorities of the several states, to . . . take the most effectual measures to
put a stop to so dangerous and criminal a correspondence. Resolved, That the
Commander in Chief . . . [is] hereby directed to carry the measures recommended in
the above resolution into the most effectual execution.
Id.
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an open-ended full-powers authorization to pursue the goal by any means
necessary.
The increasing prevalence of such open-ended instructions was surely due
in part to Washington’s increasing prestige. And that point is generalizable:
the more influence an executive has over the legislative process, the more
empowering and less constraining his instructions are likely to be. So as a
practical matter, the congressional “instructions” issued to General
Washington often consisted of legislative ratification of some proposal for
which he had himself sought approval,381 or a forward-looking authorization
for the great man to investigate some problem and take action if he saw fit.382
As Madison explained, this exact dynamic might yield tyrannical power for
the President precisely as an executive—unless Congress’s legislative
authority were limited:
One consequence must be, to enlarge the sphere of discretion allotted to the
Executive Magistrate. Even within the legislative limits properly defined by
the Constitution, the difficulty of accommodating legal regulations to a
country so great in extent and so various in its circumstances has been much
felt, and has lead to occasional investments of power in the Executive, which
involve perhaps as large a portion of discretion as can be deemed consistent
with the nature of the Executive trust. In proportion as the objects of
legislative care might be multiplied, would the time allowed for each be

381 E.g., 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 1004 (Aug. 27,
1779) (“Resolved, That the plan prepared by General Washington for conducting the western
expedition, is in the opinion of Congress wise and judicious; that the measures he has taken for the
execution of it are proper and prudent; and that Congress are perfectly satisfied with the General’s
conduct relative to the same.”); cf. 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69,
at 630 (Aug. 11, 1777) (“Congress took into consideration the letter from General Washington,
respecting the river defence necessary to be adopted for the protection of Philadelphia. Ordered,
That . . . the Board of War . . . be directed to carry the General’s plan of defence into execution with
all possible despatch.”).
An executive’s political ability to influence legislative instructions presumably varies based on
a range of factors, including his political coalition and his popular support. In this respect, the
President’s authority to participate in the Article I legislative process is a crucial lever of influence
on the content of the instructions that he is then entitled to implement under Article II.
382 See, e.g., 15 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 1108 (Sept.
26, 1779) (providing “that General Washington be authorized and directed to concert and execute
such plans of co-operation with the Minister of France, or the Count, as he may think proper”). Yet
another Congressional declaration stated:

[W]hether a reduction of the stationary teams cannot be made consistently with the
good of the service, or whether ox-teams cannot, in the present seat of war, be
substituted in a great measure for horse-teams; and if General Washington shall be of
opinion that both or either of these measures are advisable, that the quarter master
general take measures for carrying the same into execution . . . .
12 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 906 (Sept. 12, 1778).
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diminished, and the difficulty of providing uniform and particular regulations
for all be increased. From these sources would necessarily ensue a greater
latitude to the agency of that department which is always in existence, and
which could best mould regulations of a general nature, so as to suit them to
the diversity of particular situations.383

That’s at least in part why the Continental Congress would sometimes pair
such open-ended instructions with short-cycle sunset provisions.384
The latent possibility of such immense delegated authority thus posed a
recurring question for legislators: how much discretion to embed in any
particular instruction. Some contemporaries certainly argued that “laws should
be so formed as to leave little or nothing to the discretion of those by whom
they are executed.”385 Where a statute was written that way, any executive
authority parasitic on its instructions was indeed close to the caricature of an
automaton or messenger boy. But lots of statutes rejected this advice, instead
delegating broad authority for discretionary execution by its recipient.386 And
the consequence of such decisions was well understood. Thus the Board of
Treasury urged the Continental Congress not to extend the same discretionary
authority to its state commissioners for settling accounts with states that those
commissioners had for settling accounts with individuals:
That altho’ the powers vested by Congress in the said Commissioners for
settling Accounts with Individuals are as extensive as a regard to the Public
Security can possibly admit of . . . . it would be inconsistent with those
principles of equality which ought to Govern in the settlement of the
Accounts of the Individual States with the United States to vest the
Commissioners with those extensive powers, in settling the accounts of the
State, which they have a right to Exercise in the case of Individuals . . . .387

Discretion in questions of such magnitude, the Board explained, should be
reserved for truly high level executive entities—such as, for example, itself.
An analogous problem arose when interpreting existing statutes: how
much discretion should ambiguous legislative instructions be read to convey?

383 JAMES MADISON, Report on the Virginia Resolves, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
358 (Daillard Hunt, ed. 1906) (1799).
384 See, e.g., 20 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 556 (May 28,
1781) (“And be it further resolved that the powers herein granted to the Commander in Chief
continue for the space of six months, unless sooner revoked by Congress, and that he be fully
impowered and directed to execute the same . . . by all ways and means that to him shall appear
conducive thereto or the necessity of the case may require.”).
385 Report of the Office of Finance, supra note 356, at 442 (emphasis added) (treating revenue
laws as a special case of this general principle).
386 For a more detailed discussion, see Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 77, at Section III.A.
387 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 536-37 (July 14, 1785).
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The Continental Congress often used the formulation “take order,” for
example, when issuing instructions to executive agents—as with a resolution
instructing that “the Superintendent of Finance take order for furnishing
[discharged soldiers] two months pay.”388 But was the formulation a
discretionary authorization or a mandatory command? When the point was
pressed, the delegates had a hard time agreeing. John Rutledge moved to
resolve that “when a matter was referred to any of the [national executive]
departments to take order, it was the sense & meaning of Congress that the
same should be carried into execution.”389 The secretary’s notes suggest that,
after some discussion, it “seemed to be the general sense of the house that a
reference to take order implied a discretionary power.”390 James Madison’s
account is more detailed:
On this motion some argued that such reference amounted to an absolute
injunction, others insisted that it gave authority, but did not absolutely
exclude discretion in the Executive Departments. The explanation which was
finally acquiesced in as most rational & conformable to practice was that it
not only gave authority, but expressed the sense of Congress that the measure
ought to be executed: leaving it so far however in the discretion of the
Executive Department, as that in case it differed in opinion from Congress
it might suspend execution & state the objections to Congress that their final
direction might be given.391

The focus of their discussion was thus not what Congress could authorize or
require, but rather how Congress’s instructions should be understood if the
wording wasn’t clear.
That’s entirely consistent with the fact that executive power was
understood to have an immense latent potency. The scope of executive
departments’ authority and discretion was a function of legislative intent. The
legislature might decide to impose rote obligations in minute detail, or it
might decide to simply state a goal and authorize appropriate action. Either
way, executive power was neither intrinsically weak nor intrinsically strong.
Rather, its sweep turned on the revisable legislative decision of what
instructions to convey and how broadly to formulate their parameters.
27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 521 (June 2, 1784).
23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 848-49 (Nov. 12, 1782);
see also id. at 722-23 (similar).
390 Id. at 722; see also id. (“But it was argued by Mr Madison that if the thing was not done the
officer should report the reasons that prevented.”). Madison’s failure to quote his own intervention
here is consistent with my sense that his notes are unlikely to have overstated his role at the
Constitutional Convention.
391 Id. at 848. In the end, the motion was withdrawn, “the mover alledging that as he only
aimed at rendering an uncertain point clear, & this had been brought about by a satisfactory
explanation, he did not wish for any Resolution on the subject.” Id. at 849.
388
389
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That in turn brings us back to perhaps the most important impetus for
the Constitution in the first place. We saw above how people on all sides of
the ratification debates recognized that the Confederation Congress wasn’t
cutting it. And we saw how all sides agreed that its worst problem was the
lack of an effective mechanism to effectuate its intentions. That’s why national
governance was so fundamentally transformed by vesting executive power in
a single President.392 That’s why it was sometimes suggested that the new
constitution didn’t change the “ends” or “objects” of the national government
so much as it changed the mechanisms available to execute them.393 And that’s
why Publius said that “the executive power” was not only “restrained within
a narrower compass” than its legislative counterpart, but also “more simple in
its nature.”394 When the essence of a function is to implement instructions,
it’s just not that hard to explain.
IV. “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” WAS NOT ANOTHER WORD FOR
ROYAL PREROGATIVE
At this point the affirmative case for the meaning of “executive power” is
complete. What remains is to explore its implications for the larger structure
of Article II, and to more squarely address the principal competing theory in
its own right. In broad strokes, this Part will proceed as follows. Section IV.A
will sketch the radical implausibility of the residuum claim as a matter of
Founding-era politics, political theory, and legal terminology. Section IV.B
will show that, when engaging the question directly, the founders rejected
392 This wasn’t the only way that execution was transformed; also important were the new
Congress’s legislative competences, from Commerce to Necessary & Proper authorities. The idea of
legislative execution was especially important to Gouverneur Morris, who emphasized that each of the
three powers could be framed with relatively more or less compulsive aspect to its implementation:
“The foederal gov. has no such compelling capacities, whether considered in their legislative, judicial
or Executive qualities.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 43 (Gouverneur Morris).
393 William Cushing made such a suggesting, arguing

[T]he Confederation, in appearance imparted many, if not most of the great powers,
now inserted in the proposed Constitution . . . but not one efficient power, to carry a
single article into effect . . . . These govermental powers, in order to have full & proper
effect, must, in the nature of things, consist of the Executive, the Legislative, & judicial.
Without these govmt cannot be carried an End.
Cushing, supra note 251, at 1439-40. See also Jonathan Gienapp, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 54-56 (2018) (“[The Continental]
Congress’s inability to exercise its power was less an issue of legal authority (it enjoyed the power)
than a matter of practical legitimacy (the states simply did not allow itand Congress lacked the
resources to coerce them”).
394 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 3, 5 (1986).
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even the possibility of residual executive authority as absurd. Section IV.C
will explore residuum theory’s “dog that didn’t bark” problem, emphasizing
the sheer number of instances where at least someone would have referred to
the possibility of a Vesting Clause residuum if such a thing were even
plausibly in play.
A. The Royal Residuum is Facially Implausible
The first thing to say about the royal residuum is that it is wildly
implausible on any serious account of the era’s politics. To be sure, the
incompetence and excesses of state legislatures had created a vocal constituency
for a structurally independent executive branch and a presidential veto. While
not everyone agreed, there’s no denying the appeal of state constitutions with
strong executives like those of New York and Massachusetts.395 But here are
two more things that are every bit as undeniable: the virulently antimonarchical cast of American politics, and the radical semantic unsuitability of
“executive” as an umbrella term for royal power.
1. It’s Politically Implausible
As discussed above, founders of all ideological stripes recognized that
anti-monarchism was perhaps the defining feature of American politics.
Other than anxiety about national consolidation, the biggest problem in
selling the Constitution was probably American revulsion for even the
slightest pong of monarchy. On this point, there may be no prose more purple
than Hamilton’s:
[T]he writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize
their talent of misrepresentation, calculating upon the aversion of the people
to monarchy, they have endeavoured to inlist all their jealousies and
apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States;
not merely as the embryo but as the full grown progeny of that detested
parent. To establish the pretended affinity they have not scrupled to draw
resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a magistrate . . .
have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He has been
decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a King
395 See, e.g., WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA
254-73 (1973); WOOD, supra note 54, at 430-38 (describing states’ apprehension of the popular nature
of the Revolutionary constitutions and the tension between “the inherited dread of magisterial
despotism and a fear of popular disorder” in states’ constitutional reform efforts). But see MARC W.
KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 15 (1997) (suggesting that other historians attribute too much
significance to “the Massachusetts Moment”).

2020]

Executive Power Clause

1347

of Great-Britain. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his
brow, and the imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a
throne surrounded with minions and mistresses; giving audience to the
envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The
images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting
to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been almost taught to tremble at
the terrific visages of murdering janizaries; and to blush at the unveiled
mysteries of a future seraglio.396

Hamilton set out to rout such comparisons with a relentlessly systematic
demolition of this “gross pretence of a similitude between a King of Great-Britain
and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United
States.”397 Such Federalist mockery, of course, only evinced the Federalists’
political concern about this line of attack: “The enemies of the new form of
government endeavour to persuade others, what I can scarcely think they believe
themselves; that the President of the United States is only another name for King,
and that we shall be subject to all the evils of a monarchical government.”398
For now, suffice it to say that the Federalists’ urgent need to disprove such
comparisons marks the political implausibility of the Executive Power Clause
as the site of some royal residuum:
We have seen that the late honorable Convention, in designating the nature
of the chief executive office of the United States, have deprived it of all the
dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its
limited powers—As our President bears no resemblance to a King, so we shall see
the Senate have no similitude to nobles.399

On this background, it would be deeply weird to imagine that the Framers
snuck in—much less that the Ratifiers approved—an amorphous mass of
royal power that no English monarch had claimed since James II. The muchrehearsed Whig history of English constitutionalism depended on the
elimination of exactly such open-ended “sovereignty” in the king. Sure, many
American patriots were increasingly dissatisfied with unchecked unicameral
republicanism. But it’s implausible in the extreme that the revolutionary
generation would have responded by re-introducing the substance of Crown
prerogative under a different name.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 149, at 370 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
Publicola, supra note 68, at 496.
An American Citizen II, On the Federal Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept.
28, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 264, 264 (1981).
396
397
398
399
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2. It’s Doctrinally Implausible
The residuum’s sheer political implausibility is compounded by its
doctrinal impossibility in a robustly transatlantic legal culture.400 For one
thing, the idea that “the executive power” was an umbrella term for all of the
king’s powers runs into a brick wall when you consider that the royal
prerogative also included a veto401—which without exception of which I am
aware was classified as legislative.402 More fundamentally, the founders
followed Blackstone (and the rest of English law) in expressly distinguishing
executive power from the other branches of royal authority, whether in
foreign affairs, national security, finance, commerce, or church government.
Residuum theory requires us to believe that that this standard term of art for
one subset of the royal prerogative suddenly became the catchall for naming
the full motley array. Far from suggesting a sudden abandonment of black
letter terminology, however, the evidence all points to a rather dull carrying
forward of the standard framework.
There’s just no getting past the array of writers who expressly
distinguished between “legislation and the consequent executive and judicial
rights” on one hand and foreign affairs powers like “[t]he rights of making
400 See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2008);
DANIEL HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE (2005).
401 That the crown’s negative had basically fallen into disuse domestically left it no less a black
letter component of royal prerogative. Certainly the Founding generation had recent experience
with crown representatives vetoing the legislative projects of the colonial legislatures. “The king of
England has an unconditional negative,” wrote one Federalist, “and has often exercised it in his former
colonies.” Plain Truth, Reply to An Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov.
10, 1787, reprinted in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 216, 220 (1976); see also Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in
Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1113-16 (2011) (discussing Thomas
Jefferson’s 1774 “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” in which Jefferson “insists that the
King ought to withhold royal assent to bills passed by Parliament that would infringe on the colonies’
rights of self-governance”).
402 For just a few examples, see, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 139 (James
Madison); John Leland, Objections to the Constitution (Feb. 28, 1788), in 8 DHRC, supra note
46, at 425, 425 (1988); Instructions to Daniel Adams (Dec. 31, 1787), in 5 DHRC, supra note 46,
at 1055, 1055 (1998). Some discussions of the veto expressly contrasted “the supreme executive
power” or “the sole executive authority” and the royal negative—which was “a branch of legislative
jurisdiction.” See The Impartial Examiner, supra note 205, at 1609-10; see also 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 51, at 140 (James Wilson) (describing the President’s “revisionary duty” as
“extraneous” from his “[e]xecutive duties”).
The choice to create a presidential veto—the veto as such occasioned remarkably little resistance
at the convention, though it was more controversial during ratification—was just another example
of why it is far more accurate to speak of the Constitution’s distribution of powers rather than its
separation of them. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 94 (June 4, 1787) (adopting the
qualified negative); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 612 (C.C. Little & J. Brown, eds., 2d ed. 1851) (1833) (“In the convention there
does not seem to have been much diversity of opinion on the subject of the propriety of giving to
the president a negative on the laws.”).
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war and peace, consequently of raising troops, establishing navies, arsinals,
&c” on the other.403 Caroliniensis was typical in reminding South Carolinians
that “[n]ot only all executive power is lodged in” the King, but also twelve
more specifically enumerated “powers and prerogatives . . . together with
many others, with which any person may make himself more particularly
acquainted by reading the learned and accurate judge Blackstone on the
subject.”404 The point is equally unmistakable in Publius’s implication that the
Executive Power Clause didn’t even bear mention:
[While] the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a
single magistrate[,] . . . [t]his will scarcely . . . be considered as a point upon
which any comparison can be grounded; for if in this particular there be a
resemblance to the King of Great-Britain, there is not less a resemblance to
the Grand Signior, to the Khan of Tartary, to the man of the seven mountains,
or to the Governor of New-York.405

Because executive power was just the basic enforcement authority
possessed by any chief magistrate, in other words, you could only assess the
Antifederalists’ royal comparisons by comparing the other presidential powers
to the other elements of crown prerogative. And so Hamilton pivoted to a
drumbeat of contrasts between the other elements of Crown prerogative and

403 P. Valerius Agricola, supra note 375, at 189 (emphasis omitted). For a mere sampling of
other examples, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 481, 482 (distinguishing between “the power of making treaties” and “the class of
executive authorities”); Caroliniensis, CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, Apr. 1 & 2, 1788, reprinted in
27 DHRC, supra note 46, at 235, 236 (2016) (distinguishing between the English King’s possession
of “all executive power” and his separate possession of foreign affairs authorities); Cincinnatus, V:
To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 319, 324 (2003)
(“[S]overeignty consists in three things—the legislative, executive, and negociating powers . . . .” );
Luther Martin, Address No. III, MD. J., Mar. 28, 1788, reprinted in 12 DHRC, supra note 46, at 456,
458 (2015) (“the general government [possesses] extensive and unlimited powers . . . in the executive
legislature and judicial departments, together with the powers over the militia, and the liberty of
establishing a standing army . . . .”); Draft Essay in Defense of the Constitution, in 23 DHRC, supra
note 46, at 2536, 2538 (2009) (“The United Netherlands were also of distinct republicks possessing
however a common council a common treasury & a common military establishment & a
common executive . . . .). Fabius made a similar point when he argued:

Is there more danger to our liberty, from such a president as we are to have, than to
that of Britons, from an hereditary monarch . . . in the exercise of the whole executive
power; in the command of the militia, fleets, and armies, . . . who can at his will, make
war, peace, and treaties irrevocably binding the nation; and who can grant pardons or
titles of nobility, as it pleases him?
Fabius, IX, PA. MERCURY, May 1, 1788, reprinted in 17 DHRC, supra note 46, at 261, 262 (1995).
404 Caroliniensis, supra note 403, at 235; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander
Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 387, 387 (1986).
405 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 404, at 387 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the other authorities enumerated in Article II.406 Residuum theory, which
constantly cites such federative competences as being contained within
“executive power,” simply can’t make sense of these constant distinctions.407
B. The Royal Residuum Was Expressly Rejected
Standing alone, this semantic and political implausibility is fatal to the
cause of residuum theory. But we needn’t limit ourselves to linguistic or
historical inference alone, because residuum theory is even worse off than its
failure to cite affirmative evidence might suggest. That’s true in two respects:
first, the founders’ repeated an unmistakable denial of any such residual
authority; and second, the number of instances where their failure to mention
such authority is basically impossible to explain unless it didn’t exist.
1. They Knew Exactly What a Residuum Structure Looked Like
The founders were thoroughly familiar with residuum structure as a
doctrinal tool. The common law was understood as residual in precisely this
sense,408 and the concept was well-established as a structuring device for other
kinds of legal authority as well. The 1774 case of Campbell v. Hall, well known
to the colonists, expressly deployed the notion of a defeasible residuum to
explain royal power in foreign affairs.409 McCulloch v. Maryland drew on this
framework in imagining a government structure where “the people conferred
on the general government the power contained in the constitution, and on
the States the whole residuum of power,”410 and Gibbons v. Ogden engaged the
appellants’ claim that “full power to regulate a particular subject, implies the
whole power, and leaves no residuum; that a grant of the whole is
incompatible with the existence of a right in another to any part of it.”411
While the question of defeasibility might vary from system to system, the
See id. at 387-94. For the full list of contrasts, see infra, note 436.
Cf. Letter from Marine Committee to William Aylett (Mar. 26, 1779), in 12 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES, supra note 75 (quoting a separate letter written to James Maxwell and Paul Loyall)
(contrasting “the executive part of [] [military] business” and the non-executive part).
408 See Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1221 (“Like the common law more generally, the [King’s]
prerogative as described by Blackstone thus provided the default rule of decision for questions of
Crown authority—until Parliament chose, by contrary or supplementary legislation, to displace it.”).
409 See Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1048, 1 Cowp. 204, 210 (“[I]f the King (and
when I say the King, I always mean the King without the concurrence of Parliament) has a power to
alter the old and to introduce new laws in a conquered country, this legislation being subordinate,
that is, subordinate to his own authority in Parliament, he cannot make any new change contrary to
fundamental principles . . . .”). On the contemporary salience of Campbell, see JOHN PHILIP REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 158 (1986) (noting “the discussion
[Campbell] generated during the months leading up to the American Revolution”).
410 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819).
411 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198 (1824).
406
407
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underlying conceptual structure was an off-the-shelf move: residual authority
was that component of an original grant which remained after adjustment by
some superior source of legal authority.
The structural concept of a legal residuum was thus regularly invoked in
a wide range of discussions and by all sides of the Founding debates. They
used a variety of words for the idea, from “residuum”412 and “residue”413 in
the most general sense to “prerogative” when talking specifically about
executive magistrates.414 They deployed the concept to describe the
fundamental allocation of authority in state and federal government when
discussing the need for a bill of rights.415 And they deployed it again when
discussing the British system’s distinctive approach to the residual authorities
of an executive magistrate.
At the Virginia ratifying convention, for example, George Nicholas leaned
hard on the residuum structure of English crown power as a reason not to
adopt a bill of rights in America:
In England, in all disputes between the King and people, recurrence is had
to the enumerated rights of the people to determine. Are the rights in dispute
secured—Are they included in Magna Charta, Bill of Rights . . . ? If not, they
are, generally speaking, within the King’s prerogative. In disputes between
Congress and the people, the reverse of the proposition holds. Is the disputed
right enumerated? If not, Congress cannot meddle with it. Which is the most
412 See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 138 (statement of Samuel Spencer)
(discussing “those unalienable rights, which are called by some respectable writers the residuum of
human rights”); Federal Farmer: An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, Letter XIII
(May 2, 1788), in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 976, 1033 (2004) (specifying certain appointments
provisions, noting “we shall then want to lodge some where a residuum of power, a power to appoint
all other necessary officers . . . . The fittest receptacle for this residuary power is . . . the first
executive magistrate, advised and directed by an executive council . . . .”).
413 See, e.g., An Annapolitan, ANNAPOLIS MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 11 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 218, 220 (2015) (“One of these branches possesses a great share of the executive
authority, the residue of which is committed to a single man.”). For more on the sense in which the
Senate had executive power, see infra, Section IV.B.
414 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 146, at 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (“In England
for a long time after the Norman conquest the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited.
Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favour of liberty, first by the Barons and
afterwards by the people, ‘till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct.”).
415 See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 138 (statement of Samuel Spencer) (“There has
been a comparison made of our situation with Great Britain. We have no crown, or prerogative of a
king, like the British constitution.”); Statement of Thomas Hartley, Pennsylvania Ratification
Debates (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 DHRC, supra note 46, at 425, 430 (1976) (“[W]hatever portion of those
natural rights we did not transfer to the government was still reserved and retained by the people;
for, if no power was delegated to the government, no right was resigned by the people . . . .”); A
Citizen of New-York (John Jay), supra note 73, at 933 (“In days and countries where Monarchs and
their subjects were frequently disputing about prerogative and privileges, the latter often found it
necessary . . . [to] oblige the former to admit by solemn acts, called bills of rights, that certain
enumerated rights belonged to the people, and were not comprehended in the royal prerogative.”).
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safe? The people of America know what they have relinquished, for certain
purposes. They also know that they retain every thing else, and have a right
to resume what they have given up, if it be perverted from its intended object.
The King’s prerogative is general, with certain exceptions. The people are
therefore less secure than we are.416

When Patrick Henry rose the following week to dispute Nicholas’s
conclusion, he began by agreeing that crown power was residual: “Every
possible right which is not reserved to the people by some express provision
or compact, is within the King’s prerogative.” According to Henry, however,
the American context rendered this consideration irrelevant.417 Nicholas
returned to the point shortly thereafter, again invoking the residual structure
of English royal authority as a contrast to American governance structure: “It
is easier to enumerate the exceptions to [the King’s] prerogative, than to
mention all the cases to which it extends.”418
This agreement at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum exemplifies
what earlier work has already shown. Eighteenth-century English indeed had a
specific word for any catchall residual authority held by a magistrate. And that
word was “prerogative,”419 used perhaps most frequently in reference to the
English king’s residual authorities in the realms of foreign and military affairs.420

416 Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 10, 1788), in 9 DHRC,
supra note 6 at 1092, 1135-36 (1990).
417 Statement of Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 16, 1788), in 10 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 1299, 1333 (1993) (“[I]f implication be allowed, you are ousted of those rights. If the
people do not think it necessary to reserve them, they will be supposed to be given up.”).
418 Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 16, 1788), in 10 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 1299, 1333 (1993).
419 See, e.g., Congress’s Proclamation to Colonies (Feb. 13, 1776), in 4 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 135 (“The Share of Power, which the King derives
from the People, or, in other Words, the Prerogative of the Crown, is well known and precisely
ascertained . . . .”); 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 287 (statement of Gouverneur Morris)
(“[T]he great prerogatives of the [German] emperor, as head of the empire . . . .”); Americanus, VII,
N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 21, 1788, reprinted in 20 DHRC, supra note 46, at 629, 630 (2004)
(noting “the ideas we have imbibed from our English ancestors” include an understanding of “[t]he
extensive prerogatives and regal state, which the Supreme Executive in England have always
possessed”); see also generally, Mortenson, supra note 5.
420 For a few examples from documents not cited elsewhere in this Article, see generally
Congress’s Response to the King’s Proclamation (Aug. 20, 1782), reprinted in 23 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 471, 510 (stating that it is “the prerogative of the crown
to manage the affairs of peace”); Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratification Debates (June
18, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1387, 1388 (1993) (noting the “King’s prerogative to make
treaties, leagues, and alliances”); Westchester Farmer, To the Citizens of America, N.Y. DAILY
ADVERTISER, June 8, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 128, 129 (1981) (“The powers of
the supreme executive council should be well defined, and be perfectly enabled to maintain its
independence and vigor. It should possess the prerogative of making peace and war, of sending and
receiving all ambassadors, of making treaties, leagues and alliances with foreign states and
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2. They Repeatedly Denied that Any Such Residuum Existed in Article II
On this background, the founders’ repeated denial of any royal residuum
is unmistakable. The residuum concept was standard operating procedure.
The terms “executive prerogative”421 and “prerogatives of the president”422
were readily available—as was the move of building new structures from
existing governance templates.423 But the founders roundly rejected the
whole apparatus when it came to presidential power, precisely because of
American “jealousy of this danger” from “a monarch . . . [with] prerogatives
very considerable.”424 Indeed, this rejection was a pillar of Federalist
responses to the likes of Patrick Henry roaring that “there is to be a great and
mighty President, with very extensive powers; the powers of a King”;425 and
Luther Martin prophesying that the President will “when he
pleases . . . become a king in name, as well as in substance.”426 Over and over
again, Federalists responded to such loose emotive comparisons by dragging
their opponents back to the plain text of the Constitution, the well-known
doctrinal structure of English constitutionalism, and the patent difference
between the two.
It would be hard to make the point more clearly than “A Native of
Virginia” did in criticizing the Glorious Revolution for undershooting its
mark. It was true, he acknowledged, that William of Orange had dropped any
princes . . . .”); 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 522 (James Madison) (“[T]he Royal
prerogatives of war & peace, treaties coinage . . . .”).
421 See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 553 (James Madison Report) (“[I]t is in
this latitude, as a supplement to the deficiency of the laws, that the degree of executive prerogative
materially consists.”).
422 This phrase was used more casually, but it was available as well. See, e.g., Americanus, supra
note 370, at 247 (noting “the province of the president, and . . . the exercise of his prerogatives”); Cato,
IV, N.Y. J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC, supra note 46, at 195, 197-98 (2003) (describing “the
direct prerogatives of the president”).
423 See, e.g., Andrew Cecchinato, William Blackstone as Interpreter of the European Legal
Tradition 68 (2019) (unpublished manuscript). (“[E]ven within those doctrines that accompanied
and sustained the rise of nation-states, the paradigm of sovereign power could not be understood if
not by attributing to kings those same prerogatives that had been traditionally attributed to the
emperor himself.”).
424 Marcus, supra note 171, at 384; see also id. (noting that “a constant jealousy” toward executive
authority “is both natural and proper”). A similar point was made by Americanus. See Americanus,
supra note 419, at 630 (“The [King’s] extensive prerogatives and regal state . . . have ever been, and
with reason too, the object of terror to the friends of liberty. All their efforts have been directed
to . . . circumscribe and limit these dangerous powers within proper bounds.”).
425 Statement of Patrick Henry, supra note 111, at 961; see also, e.g., Statement of Patrick Henry,
Virginia Ratification Debates (June 18, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1371, 1384 (1993)
(“Gentlemen say, that the King of Great-Britain has the same right of making treaties that our President
has here. I will have no objection to this, if you make your President a King.”); Statement of Edmund
Randolph, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 7, 1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1006, 1018 (1990)
(describing antifederalist claim that “the President can . . . establish himself a monarch”).
426 Martin, supra note 268, at 496.
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pretense “to a divine right of governing,” had “acknowledged his [authority]
to flow from the people,” and had even “entered into a compact with them,
which recognized that just and salutary principle.”427 The problem was that
all these changes left the legal substance of Crown prerogative in place:
Had the English at this time limited the regal power in definite terms, instead
of satisfying themselves with a Bill of Rights, there would have been an end
of prerogative; but they from habit were contented with a Bill of Rights,
leaving the prerogative still inaccurately defined, to claim by implification, the
exercise of all the powers not denied it by that declaration.428

Could there be a better definition of residuum theory than “[a]
prerogative . . . to claim by implification, the exercise of all the powers not
denied” elsewhere in a constitutional document? And “A Native of Virginia”
didn’t stop there. The draft Constitution, he said, had confronted and
resolved this problem, precisely by rejecting that structure and so finally
finishing the project of their ideological forebears. Under the Constitution:
“The powers of the President are not kingly, any more than the ensigns of his
office. He has no guards, no regalia, none of those royal trappings which
would set him apart from the rest of his fellow citizens.”429
No more than the President had purple robes and a sparkling diadem, in
other words, could he “claim by implification” the right to any powers not
expressly enumerated.430 That was because the Constitution did what the
English had failed to do: “limit[] the [magistrate’s] power in definite terms”
and make “an end of prerogative.”
Federalist polemicists were relentless on this point in refuting claims that
a unitary executive magistracy would be an elective monarchy in all but
name.431 The President would possess the executive power, they
emphasized—and properly so. But he would have nothing like the default
suite of magisterial authorities known to British law as prerogative: “the
doctrine of prerogative and other peculiar properties of the royal character”
427
428
429
430
431

A Native of Virginia, supra note 68, at 660.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 655 (discussing structural reasons to omit a bill of rights and presidential term limits).
A typical argument along such lines was published in a local newspaper:
Mr. Adams . . . seems to bring us back again to the English government; as he . . . is
particularly fond of a strong Executive. Surely the air of Europe has not infected our
Plenipotentiary? This language is by no means consistent with republicanism, and
there are other passages in this writer which point direct to monarchy, or what is the
same, a first Magistrate possessed exclusively of the Executive power.

BALT. GAZETTE, July 3, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 46, at 89, 89 (1981) (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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were simply “incompatible with the view of these states when they are settling
the form of a republican government.”432 Instead, “[t]he Constitution plainly,
openly, and without disguise tells us the titles, offices, powers, and privileges
of [the President, Senators, and Representatives] and the purposes of their
appointment. What snake in the grass is there here?”433
Time and again their pamphlets, essays, and speeches made this point by
contrasting a recitation of Crown prerogatives—in both its detailed
administrative aspects and its amorphously residual nature—with the
President’s far shorter and expressly defined suite of authority:
It must excite ridicule and contempt in every man when he considers on one
side, the dreadful catalogue of unnecessary, but dangerous, prerogatives,
which, in the British Government, is vested in the Crown; and, on the other
side, takes a view of the powers with which this Constitution has cloathed the
President.434

From here, Federalist authors would catalogue the Crown prerogatives, in
language practically cut and pasted from the canonical Blackstone litany.
Americanus’s version was on the short side, comparatively speaking:
Imperial dignity, and hereditary succession—constituting an independent
branch of the Legislature—the creation of Peers and distribution of titles and
dignities—the supremacy of a national church—the appointment of Archbishops and Bishops—the power of convening, proroguing, and dissolving
the Parliament—the fundamental maxim that the King can do no wrong—to
be above the reach of all Courts of law—to be accountable to no power
whatever in the nation—his person to be sacred and inviolable—all these
unnecessary, but dangerous prerogatives, independent of many others, such
as the sole power of making war and peace—making treaties, leagues and
alliances—the collection, management and expenditure of an immense
revenue, deposited annually in the Royal Exchequer—with the appointment
of an almost innumerable tribe of officers, dependent thereon—all these
prerogatives, besides a great many more, which it is unnecessary to detail
here, (none of all which are vested in the President) put together, form an
accumulation of power of immense magnitude; but which, it seems, are only
immaterial incidents . . . .
You institute a comparison between a King of England, and a President, and
because you find that some of the powers necessarily vested in this President,
The Impartial Examiner, supra note 205, at 1610.
Letter from New York, supra note 108, at 382; see also id. (“What reason have we therefore
to be jealous that the Constitution, under the disguise of such humble appellations, aims at the
dignity and powers of the King, Lords, and Commons of the British Parliament?”).
434 Americanus, supra note 370, at 288.
432
433

1356

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1269

and some of the prerogatives of that King are alike, you place them on a
footing, and talk of a President possessing the powers of a Monarch.435

This pivot from mockery to a rote itemization of black letter prerogative
doctrine was standard.436 And the incredulous conclusion was inevitable:
“[L]et me pause and seriously ask you sir,” one Federalist wrote to his friend,
“to compare this tremendous catalogue of powers, privileges and prerogatives,
with those of our fœderal President . . . .”437 The bare comparison—between
435
436

Id. at 288-89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Blackstonian detail from Publius was typical of the genre:
[T]here is no pretence for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the
King of Great-Britain. But to render the contrast, in this respect, still more striking, it
may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer groupe.
The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the
people for four years. The King of Great-Britain is a perpetual and
hereditary prince.
The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace: The
person of the other is sacred and inviolable.
The one would have a qualified negative upon the acts of the legislative
body: The other has an absolute negative.
The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of
the nation: The other in addition to this right, possesses that of declaring
war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority.
The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the Legislature
in the formation of treaties: The other is the sole possessor of the power of
making treaties.
The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices:
The other is the sole author of all appointments.
The one can infer no privileges whatever: The other can make denizens
of aliens, noblemen of commoners, can erect corporations with all the
rights incident to corporate bodies.
The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of
the nation: The other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and
in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and
measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can
authorise or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin.
The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction: The other is the supreme
head and Governor of the national church!—
What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike
resemble each other?—The same that ought to be given to those who tell us, that a
government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and
periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 404, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton).
437 Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short, supra note 323, at 478 (detailed
itemization of prerogative contrasted to presidential power); see also, e.g., Fabius, supra note 403,
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England’s “hereditary Monarch, with all the appendages of royalty, and
immense powers” and “the feeble power of the President,” armed only “with
a small revenue and with limitted powers, sufficient only for his own
support”—spoke for itself.438
Indeed, once charges of kingship were dissected to their component parts,
the modal response was bafflement. Prerogative structure just wasn’t how a
government of limited and defined powers worked. It was precisely because
the President’s powers were “so clearly defined,” wrote Caroliniensis, that
they could “never can be dangerous.”439 Article II left no room for
implification: What you see is what you get.
The 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia serves well as a summary of the
conventional framework. In the course of discussing the legal dispute in that
case, the Supreme Court expressly contrasted the empty vessel of “executive”
power with the open-ended inherent authority implied by “prerogative.” “A
Governor of a State,” the majority observed
is a mere Executive officer; his general authority very narrowly limited by the
Constitution of the State; with no undefined or disputable prerogatives; without
power to effect one shilling of the public money, but as he is authorised under
the Constitution, or by a particular law; having no colour to represent the
sovereignty of the State, so as to bind it in any manner to its prejudice, unless
specially authorised thereto.440

If you keep the eighteenth-century doctrinal framework firmly in mind, the
Court’s point here can’t be missed. “Executive” authority is by its nature
grounded in “special[] authoris[ations]” rather than general implifications of
“undefined . . . prerogatives.”441 Chisholm may have been talking about a state
executive, but its vocabulary was thoroughly generic. Certainly there is no
way to reconcile it with a view of “executive” authority as a hidey hole for
residual prerogative.

at 262 (describing the difference between a “hereditary monarch” and “such a president as we are
to have . . . .”)
438 Statement of George Nicholas, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 4, 1788), in 9 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 915, 926, 928 (1990) (detailing an itemization of prerogative contrasted to
presidential power).
439 Caroliniensis, supra note 403, at 238 (contrasting the “supreme executive authority” that
was “vested” in the President with other Crown prerogatives like the veto and the treaty power).
440 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 446 (1793) (emphasis added); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398
(1798) (“If . . . a government . . . were established, by a Constitution, which imposed no limits on the
legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to
enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void.”).
441 A Native of Virginia, supra note 68.
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C. A Play Park of Silent Dogs
Others have observed the failure of royal residuum theorists to identify
even one positive assertion of the claim during drafting or ratification.442 I’ve
managed no better on their behalf. Despite reviewing tens of thousands of
pages of commentary from hundreds of writers and speakers—and going to
an abundance of caution to flag all instances that even vaguely tickled my
antennae for a second and third review with as generous a mindset as could
be mustered—I have been unable to find a single statement that the Executive
Power Clause contained a substantive residuum.443
But the research for this Article reveals something much more important.
This silence reigned even among participants who had a strong situational motivation
to speak. If there had been any possibility of reading the Executive Power
Clause to contain even a sliver’s residuum of substantive authority, it is simply
impossible to explain why no one in two groups of commentators thought to
propose, engage with, or at least mention the idea. First, authors who were
conducting a treatise-style march through the powers of the President.
Second, polemicists who attacked the constitutional president as a tyrant. If
the royal residuum had been even a colorable interpretive possibility, each
group would have had strong intrinsic motivation to engage it. And yet none
of them—not one—did so.

442 See Bradley &. Flaherty, supra note 22, at 551 (“[T]he historical sources that are most
relevant to the Founding, such as the records of the Federal Convention, the Federalist Papers, and
the state ratification debates, contain almost nothing that supports the Vesting Clause Thesis, and
much that contradicts it.”).
443 One of the most notable things worth flagging should speak to what I’ve meant to serve as
the interpretive generosity of review. In the course of Alexander White’s general defense of the
proposed constitution, he launched into a meandering digression into Roman constitutional structure.
First noting that “[t]he legislative power was vested in the assemblies of the people,” he then observed
that “[w]here the executive power was vested, and how distributed, I will give you in language better
than mine,” and proceeded to quote verbatim Polybius’s description of the Roman consuls and senators.
That description made clear that each had powers that were part of the Law Execution understanding
of executive power: “the administration of all public affairs” as well as the appointments power. It also
made clear that each officer had other powers as well, including some that were part of crown
prerogative (declaring war) and some that were not (power of the purse). See Alexander White,
WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 401, 406 (1988).
White’s discussion is no different in substance from Blackstone’s survey of similar authorities in
England. And it’s hard to see how his introductory line about “the executive power” could be an
umbrella category for everything described in the Polybius excerpt, since the list includes several
uncontestedly non-executive authorities like spending power. But it’s the closest thing I’ve found to
something that could be read as even ambiguous on the point at issue, so I cite it here.
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In the first category of treatise-style surveys of presidential power fall the
antifederalist Cato444 and the federalists Americanus,445 Cassius,446 James
Iredell,447 and Publius.448 Cassius’s comment was pithiest: “Section one, of
article second, provides, that the executive power shall be vested in a
president of the United States. The necessity of such a provision must appear
reasonable to any one; any further remarks, therefore, on this head, will be
needless.”449
Only the standard understanding that the executive power is the power
to execute, of course, could render “needless” any commentary beyond the
mere quotation of the Executive Power Clause. But the loudest silence came
from Publius, whose eighty-five essays left no argument unrebutted, no
criticism unrebuked, and no rejoinder unsaid. Yet nowhere in the Federalist’s
relentlessly over-explanatory hard sale will you find a whiff of a suggestion
that the Executive Power Clause might reference anything beyond the
standard eighteenth century definition. Certainly none of the Federalist’s
many long essays on the presidency, the Senate, or the young nation’s foreign
affairs powers even hint at the possibility of a complicated interaction—one
that would have cried out for explanation next to the endless trivia its authors
did elaborate—between a prerogative-style grant to the President and a
partial reallocation of that authority elsewhere in the document.
This obliviousness to “the executive power” as a possible font of
substantive authority is telling, especially from such careful itemizers of
constitutional authority. But it is almost more striking among opponents of
the constitutional draft—some practically hysterical about monarchy in
disguise. Not two sentences after passing over the President’s “supreme
executive power” without blinking, the “Impartial Examiner” burst into a
fury about the Constitution’s importation of crown prerogative—because it
included a veto:
It is ordained, as a necessary expedient in the fœderal government, that a
president of the United States (who is to hold the supreme executive power)
See generally Cato, supra note 422.
See generally Americanus, supra note 370.
See generally Cassius, VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 5 DHRC, supra note
46, at 479 (1998).
447 See generally 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 106-08 (James Iredell).
448 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 223 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 447 (1986);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in id. at 478; THE FEDERALIST NO. 75,
supra note 403 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted
in 17 DHRC, supra note 46, at 4 (1995); see also The Federalist No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted
in id. at 9 (“We have now compleated a survey of the structure and powers of the executive
department . . . .”).
449 Cassius, supra note 446, at 482.
444
445
446

1360

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1269

should also concur in passing every law . . . . [T]he British monarch being
founded on maxims extremely different from those, which prevail in the
American States, the writer hereof is inclined to hope that he will not be
thought singular, if he conceives an impropriety in assimilating the
component parts of the American government to those of the British: and as
the reasons, which to the founders of the British constitution were motives
superior to all others to induce them thus to give the executive a controul
over the legislative, are so far from existing in this country, that every
principle of that kind is generally, if not universally, exploded; so it should
appear that the same public spirit, which pervades the nation, would proclaim
the doctrine of prerogative and other peculiar properties of the royal
character, as incompatible with the view of these states when they are settling
the form of a republican government.450

It’s basically impossible to take residuum theory seriously when reading the
torrent of words devoted to charges like this without coming across a single
reference to the Executive Power Clause as granting any kind of substantive
authority, let alone a residual royal prerogative.451
Consider what opponents of the constitution had to say in the North
Carolina ratifying convention after the Executive Power Clause was read
aloud for discussion: nothing. Nothing. This silence was notable even at the
time; indeed, it affirmatively infuriated the federalist William Davie. After
what was apparently an extended pause following the reading of the clause,
he finally burst out:
What is the cause of this silence and gloomy jealousy in gentlemen of the
opposition? This department has been universally objected to by them. The
450 The Impartial Examiner, supra note 205, at 1609-10 (emphasis omitted). This passage comes
just after the Impartial Examiner has explained why the royal negative is not just consistent with,
but required by, English constitutional theory:

In monarchy, where the established maxim is, that the king should be respected as a great
and transcendent personage, who knows no equal—who in his royal political capacity can
commit no wrong—to whom no evil can be ascribed—in whom exists the height of
perfection—who is supreme above all, and accountable to no earthly being, it is
consistent with such a maxim, that the prince should form a constituent branch of the
legislature . . . . This secures to him the intended superiority in the constitution, and
gives him the ascendant in government; else his sovereignty would become a shadow.
Id.
451 For others not previously cited who criticized the President as a king without saying a word
about the Vesting Clause, see generally Luther Martin, Genuine Information I, BALT. MD. GAZETTE,
Dec. 28, 1787, reprinted in 11 DHRC, supra note 46, at 126 (2015); Luther Martin, Genuine Information
VI, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1788, reprinted in id. at 177; Luther Martin, Genuine Information IX,
BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 1788, reprinted in id. at 212; Tamony, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 9,
1788, reprinted in 8 DHRC, supra note 46, at 286 (1988); GAZETTE OF THE ST. OF GA., Mar. 20,
1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note 46, at 442 (1986).
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most virulent invectives, the most opprobrious epithets, and the most
indecent scurrility, have been used and applied against this part of the
Constitution. It has been represented as incompatible with any degree of
freedom. Why, therefore, do not gentlemen offer their objections now, that
we may examine their force, if they have any? The clause meets my entire
approbation. I only rise to show the principle on which it was formed. The
principle is, the separation of the executive from the legislative—a principle
which pervades all free governments.452

Davie’s rhetorical flourish usefully makes the awkward pause leap off the
transcribed page. It wasn’t exactly fair in context, however, because the
opposition had plenty to say about the rest of the President’s powers. Indeed,
the convention went on to spend days on the remaining provisions of Article
II. But the Executive Power Clause? Nothing but “silence” greeted it among
North Carolina antifederalists who had otherwise come loaded for bear.
The lack of reference to residuum theory at the Virginia convention may
be even more striking, because the antifederalists in Virginia were
simultaneously among the most talented lawyers and the most paranoid
republicans of their generation. Their florid fantasies of despotism were
enough to drive the earnest James Madison to distraction.453 And yet, even
though the crown prerogative was the subject of extended discussion in the
Virginia convention,454 the antifederalists’ frantic efforts to puff up the
Constitution into the foetus of monarchy failed to gesture even once at the
Executive Power Clause as a source of authority even worth comment, let
alone concern. Over two full days spent discussing Section 1 of Article II, the
only thing they discussed was its mechanism for electing the President.455 The
Executive Power Clause itself was never even mentioned. It wasn’t until they
got to the article’s second section—the part with clauses complicated or
controversial enough to be worth actual discussion—that they started talking
452 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 90, at 103 (William Davie); see also id. at 102 (“Is it not highly
improper to pass over in silence any part of this Constitution which has been loudly objected to?”).
453 These ranged from the idea that the future District of Columbia was designed as a refuge
for traitors to the claim that Congress’s power to “govern[]” the militia was meant to smuggle in
permanent martial rule for the entire male citizenry. “We must,” Madison finally said, “keep within
the compass of human probability.” Statement of James Madison, Virginia Ratification Debates
(June 14, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at 1258, 1295 (1993). For more background on the last
fear, see Bernadette Myler, Originalism and a Forgotten Conflict over Martial Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
1335, 1340-43 (2019).
454 See Statement of Patrick Henry, supra note 417, at 1328-29 (“[I]n Great-Britain . . . every
possible right which is not reserved to the people by some express provision or compact, is within
the King’s prerogative.”); see also Statement of George Nicholas, supra note 418, at 1333 (“It is easier
to enumerate the exceptions to his prerogative, than to mention all the cases to which it extends.”).
455 See generally Virginia Ratification Debates (June 18, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 46, at
1371 (1993); Virginia Ratification Debates (June 17, 1788), in id. at 1388.
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about the powers of the office. And then they leapt directly into the fray, with
Mason expressing “alarm[]” at “the magnitude of the powers of the President”
from his authority as Commander-in-Chief to his power to pardon,456 and the
other delegates off to the races from there.
The point of all this isn’t that the evidentiary record is spotty. To the
contrary, it’s voluminous, and there was no lack of motivation to raise the
issue if it existed. And yet residuum theory doesn’t appear once in their
discussions—across an enormous array of instances where only a ninny would
have failed to raise it if the idea were vaguely plausible, let alone the obvious
implication of a well-known phrase.
*

*

*

Consider too the following coda. It’s a mistake to fetishize the sequence of
recorded discussion at the drafting Convention, a project that too often
devolves into the archival equivalent of haruspicy. But note how one of the most
puzzled-over exchanges in the Philadelphia records reveals itself as perfectly
sensible if you just take the standard eighteenth-century framework seriously.
On June 1, the Convention opened the topic of presidential power. The
starting point was the Virginia Plan, which proposed
that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National
Legislature . . . ; and that besides a general authority to execute the National
laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation.457

The plural formulation tracked longstanding references by the Continental
Congress to “the executive powers, or the powers of administration.” The
term “executive rights,” however, was so unusual as to be a little weird; indeed,
the phrase appears nowhere else in the materials I have canvassed.458 Unless
Madison’s subsequent explanation was a bad faith effort to cover up a failed
attempt to smuggle in the royal prerogative,459 either the Virginia drafters
either hadn’t done a careful word-by-word parsing of this language, or they
456 See Statement of George Mason, Virginia Ratification Debates (June 18, 1788), in 10
DHRC, supra note 46, at 1371, 1378 (1993).
457 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 21.
458 I have been unable to find the phrase anywhere else in the Philadelphia records, and it does
not seem to appear in the Documentary History, the Letters of the Delegates, or the Journals of the
Continental Congress. As ratified, of course, the Constitution used “the executive power” as a
standard term of art—and as the ensuing discussion shows, this was no accident.
459 As subterfuges go, this one would be passing strange from the man who five years later
would write Helvidius No. 1. See Helvidius No. 1 (Aug 24, 1793), reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-34 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) (“[T]he two powers to declare war and
make treaties . . . can never fall within a proper definition of executive powers.”).
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simply meant the reference to “Executive rights” as a reference to the
disaggregated components of law execution.460
The oddness of the formulation certainly struck Charles Pinckney.
Channeling the standard monarchical paranoia of his era, he rose to warn that
unless they were careful to define their terms, the Virginia Plan’s unusual
formulation might open a loophole for the new chief magistrate to to claim a
broad suite of implied powers analogous to the actual royal prerogative and
thus “render the Executive a Monarchy.”461 Pinckney appears to have worried,
in other words, that a bare reference to “Executive rights” might be susceptible
to exactly the metonymic reading that modern-day residuum theorists seek
to impose on (the very different wording of) the Executive Power Clause.
Each of the next three speakers hastened to assure Pinckney that there
was no plausible scenario under which the Convention would or even could
adopt the residual prerogative that was the essence of such monarchy. They
all knew such a proposal would render any draft dead on arrival. John
Rutledge began, declaring that while “he was for vesting the Executive power
in a single person,” he “was not for giving him the power of war and peace,”
and urging his fellow delegates to chime in on the point.462 Roger Sherman
followed up with doctrinaire republicanism, asserting that “he considered the
Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will
of the Legislature into effect.”463 And then James Wilson—famously a
forceful advocate for a strong executive—signed on to Rutledge’s point in full,
expressing it in the traditional Blackstone framework:
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide
in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a
Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers
he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and

460 Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec, supra note 258, at 110. For more on the disaggregated
view of the coercive power, the implementation power, and the appointment power as component
parts of law execution, see supra Section III.C. Note that the Virginia state constitution used the
plural phrase “executive powers” in a way that cannot be understood as a reference to the royal
residuum. See 1776 Virginia Const., THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, vol. 7, p. 3816-3817
(“[H]e shall . . . exercise the executive powers of government, according to the laws of this
Commonwealth; and shall not, under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue
of any law, statute or custom of England”).
461 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 50, at 64-65 (Charles Pinckney) (“Mr. Pinkney was for
a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of <the existing> Congress might extend
to peace & war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an
elective one.”).
462 Id. at 65 (John Rutledge) (emphasis added)
463 Id. at 65 (Roger Sherman).
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appointing officers, not <appertaining to and> appointed by the
Legislature.464

Wilson thus saw “only” two “strictly Executive” powers among those
contained in royal prerogative: “executing the laws” and “appointing officers.”
The other elements of royal prerogative were “legislative”—explicitly
including “that of war & peace &c.”465 Certainly any particular political
system might decide to allocate this legislative control over foreign and
military affairs to the same political institution that held executive power. But
like the other elements of royal prerogative, neither foreign affairs nor
military authority was among the “executive powers, or the powers of
administration”466—much less of the executive power that was eventually
vested by the actual text of the Constitution.
After a brief squabble about whether the executive should be a single
person, James Madison—an influential member of the Virginia delegation that
had written the proposal under discussion—herded them back to Pinckney’s
concern. Echoing Wilson’s observation that “executive powers ex vi termini,
do not include the Rights of war & peace &c,”467 Madison responded to
“General Pinckney[’s fear of] improper powers” by offering a clarifying
amendment to more precisely specify the substance of what the Virginia
delegation had intended to propose.468 As he explained, “certain powers were
in their nature Executive,” and “a definition of their extent would assist the
judgment in how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer.”469
Don’t miss the point: Madison’s amendment was proposed, understood,
and adopted, not as a narrowing revision, but as a more specific “definition”
of which powers were “in their nature” executive in the sense that the Virginia
Plan’s drafters had always intended to convey. As adopted, Madison’s
amendment listed exactly two powers that were, per his introduction, “in

464 Id. at 65-66 (James Wilson). King’s notes are to the same effect: “Extive. powers are
designed for the execution of Laws, and appointing Officers not otherwise to be appointed.” Id. at
70 (James Wilson). And Pierce’s notes suggests that Wilson explicitly included the power of
“[m]aking peace and war” in the “legislative powers” of the king. Id. at 73-74 (James Wilson)
(emphasis added).
465 Id. at 65-67 (emphasis added).
466 Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec, supra note 258, at 110.
467 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 70 (James Madison). Madison’s notes of his own
speech do not reflect this explicit claim.
468 Madison’s meeting notes confirm this claim. His summary of the Virginia Plan proposal
replaced “executive rights” with the more standard phrase: “that a national Executive . . . possess the
executive powers of Congress.” Id. at 62-63 (James Madison) (emphasis added). Just like his
subsequent clarifying amendment, Madison’s abbreviated description of the Virginia Plan treated as
irrelevant its nowadays-much-obsessed-over distinction between “Executive rights” and the “general
authority to execute the National laws.”
469 Id. at 66-67 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
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their nature Executive.”470 And those powers were (of course) the same ones
Wilson had just finished saying were the “only” ones “strictly Executive” in
nature: the power to execute the laws, and the power to make at least some
appointments.471 The clarifying revision was quickly adopted without dissent.
Did the Convention later come to believe that the President should have
other powers as well? For sure. But those subsequent additions were in addition
to, rather than part of, “the executive power.” That’s why Madison’s
amendment was proposed, that’s how he explained it when introduced, and
that’s what they voted on without dissent. The notes are so brief, at least in
part, because the basic point was so obvious to those discussing it.
CONCLUSION
As a historical matter, the competition between the royal residuum and
the law execution interpretations of the Executive Power Clause isn’t close.
On one hand, you have an interpretation that is unanimously commanded by
eighteenth-century legal treatises, political theory tracts, and dictionaries;
that fits with everything we know about the political valence of monarchy in
late eighteenth-century America; that was expressly embraced by scores of
founders; and that makes sense of literally every reference to “executive” in
the framing and ratification debates. On the other hand, you have an
interpretation whose proponents have yet to identify a single sentence of
direct affirmative support among the millions of words contained in our
records of framing and ratification.
It might well be asked how anyone has concluded otherwise. At least
where academic residuum theorists are concerned, the answer comes down
to a few pervasive errors. First, and easily the most important, is what earlier
work has described as the Metonymy Error: misunderstanding the
metonymic logic of using the noun “executive” to name a political entity that
possesses both “the executive power” and also many others.472 A second and
related error involves taking prescriptive claims that the executive branch
Id. at 67 (James Madison).
Id. at 66 (James Wilson); see id. at 67 (recording the amendment as stating “with power to
carry into effect. the national laws. [and] to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for”).
The full colloquy is even better. Madison’s first draft of the amendment included a third category
of presidential authority: “and to execute such other powers <‘not Legislative nor Judiciary in their
nature’> as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature.” Id. at 66 (James Madison).
Pinckney spoke up immediately to “amend the amendment by striking out the last [category].” Id.
(Charles Pinckney). His earlier concerns apparently fully allayed by Wilson’s reminder of the doctrinal
point, he viewed it as “unnecessary, the object [already] being included in the power to carry into effect
the national laws.” Id. (Charles Pinckney) (internal quotation marks omitted). He wasn’t interested, in
other words, in distinguishing between the negatively prohibitory and affirmatively implementatory
aspects of law execution; for him they were features of the same authority.
472 See Mortenson, supra note 5, at 1245-49. (explaining this problem in detail).
470
471
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should have various powers, and using them as evidence for the descriptive
proposition that the executive power already includes them.473 The third
error is a failure to realize that the founders’ occasional references to
“executive powers” plural were typically grounded in the disaggregated
understanding of Law Execution described in Section III.B.474 The fourth
error looks to Founding-era claims that both the Continental Congress475
and the constitutional Senate476 had executive power, which residuum
theorists suggest can only be explained as a description of these bodies’
foreign affairs competences.
In light of the arguments and evidence presented above, the gist of the
first three errors should be obvious. The fourth category, which takes more
time to address, is addressed at some length in forthcoming work that begins
to map the implications of the Law Execution thesis for contemporary
doctrine.477 But a brief summary seems advisable, if only for those who are
aware of the objections and would like to hear something about them here.
In short, and without exception of which I am aware, every single
description of the Continental Congress and the constitutional Senate as
“executive” either unmistakably relied on or was fully consistent with the
standard Law Execution understanding of executive authority. The
Continental Congress was said to have executive power because it had the
power to execute laws, both by coercing compliance with prohibitions478 and
by implementing affirmative legislative projects.479 Comparable claims about
473 See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 32, at 267 (“Where did the [foreign affairs] power
rest? With whoever wielded the executive power. Although the two powers were distinct in Locke’s
treatment . . . the two powers, he said, are always almost united.” (footnote omitted) (internal
quotations omitted)).
474 See, e.g., id. at 299 (quoting John Jay’s reference to “the ‘great executive powers’ that were
formerly held by Congress.”).
475 E.g., McConnell, supra note 3, at 191 (“The ‘Executive rights’ of the Confederation
Congress went far beyond law execution—indeed, the Congress did not have the power of law
execution. Law execution was performed by the states.”). As frequently discussed during the
ratification debates, the Continental Congress did have the power of law execution; it just did a
terrible job of implementing it. See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 77, at 433-44, 63-64 & n.225
(describing congressional experimentation with various modes of execution).
476 E.g., PRAKASH, supra note 25, at 118-19 (2015) (“The Senate would serve as an executive
council on treaties and diplomatic appointments . . . . [But] the Senate’s executive powers over
foreign affairs raised hackles” among Anti-Federalists, and “Federalists generally agreed that treatymaking was an executive power.”).
477 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 77, at 38-60.
478 See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 51, at 447 (statement of James Madison)
(noting the power to “operate immediately on . . . persons & properties” already “is the case in some
degree as the articles of confederation stand; the same will be the case in <a far greater degree>
under the plan proposed to be substituted”).
479 See, e.g., 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 785 (Oct. 8,
1777) (“[T]he committee appointed to carry into execution the resolution of Congress, ordering a
medal to be struck and presented to General Washington.”).
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the Senate relied on varying combinations of three theories, each plainly
grounded in the same Law Execution understanding. First, some founders
thought that the Senate’s role in appointments was conceptually executive.480
Second, some thought the Vice President’s voting role forced a member of
the executive branch into the constituent membership of the legislature.481
Third, some shared a forthrightly functional concern that regular interactions
between the two bodies—including but not limited to what they described as
the executive activity of appointments and the legislative activity of
treatymaking—would produce a dangerous entanglement likely to yield
functionally unified control over the full sequence of complete
government.482 Not one of these theories lends the slightest support to
residuum theory.
And so we end where we started. For once, the original understanding of
constitutional text is both clear and simple. When Article II vested “the
executive power,” it conveyed the authority to execute the laws. This power
was an empty vessel that authorized only those actions previously specified
by the laws of the land. Sometimes statutory terms delegated far-reaching
policy discretion; other times statutes would specify in minute detail the
precise and limited action that was authorized. Either way, the conceptual
gist of executive action was implementation of instructions and authority that came
from elsewhere. Make no mistake: the presidency thus created was a massively
powerful institution. Just not one with a free-floating foreign affairs power, a
residual national security authority, or indeed any other power not specifically
listed in the Constitution. To the contrary, the President thus created was
“guided by law,” “fetter’d by system,” and “manacled both by man and
measures.”483 Is he still?

480 See supra Section III.C (discussing the view that the executive power entailed the right to
appoint “assistances”).
481 See, e.g., Cincinnatus, supra note 320, at 283 (noting “the union of the executive with the
legislative functions” and emphasizing “[t]he union established between them and the vice
president, who is made one of the corps”). Cincinnatus also argued that the separation of powers
was separately violated by the Senate’s roles in appointments and impeachment. Id.
482 E.g., Statement of George Mason, supra note 456, at 1376 (“[T]he Constitution has married
the President and Senate—has made them man and wife. I believe the consequence that generally
results from marriage, will happen here. They will be continually supporting and aiding each other:
They will always consider their interests as united . . . . The Executive and Legislative powers thus
connected, will destroy all balances . . . .”); Cato, VI, N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 19 DHRC,
supra note 46, at 416, 419 (2003) (“They are so intimately connected, that their interests will be one
and the same . . . .”).
483 Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short, supra note 323, at 478.
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